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ABSTRACT 
 
Brain mechanisms of affect and learning 
 
Jenna M. Reinen  
 
 
Learning and affect are considered empirically separable, but these constructs 
bidirectionally interact.  While it has been demonstrated that dopamine supports the 
informational component of reward learning, the term “reward” inherently infers that a 
subjective positive experience is necessary to drive appetitive behavior.  
In this dissertation, I will first review the ways in which dopamine operates on 
the levels of physiology and systems neuroscience to support learning from both positive 
and negative outcomes, as well as how this framework may be employed to study 
mechanism and disease. I will then review the ways in which learning may interact with 
or be supported by other brain systems, starting with affective networks and extending 
into systems that support memory and other types of broader decision making processes. 
Finally, my introduction will discuss a disease model, schizophrenia, and how applying 
questions pertaining to learning theory may contribute to understanding symptom-
related mechanisms.   
The first study (Chapter 2) will address the way in which affective and sensory 
mechanisms may alter pain-related decisions. I will demonstrate that subjects will 
choose to experience a stimulus that incorporates a moment of pain relief over a shorter 
stimulus that encompasses less net pain, and will suggest that the positive prediction 
error associated with the pain relief may modulate explicit memory in such a way that 
impacts later decision making.    
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In the second study (Chapter 3), I will examine reward learning in patients with 
schizophrenia, and demonstrate selective learning deficits from gains as opposed to 
losses, as well as relationships in performance to affective and motivational symptoms. 
The third study (Chapter 4) will extend this disease model to a novel cohort of subjects 
who perform the same reward learning task while undergoing functional MRI. The data 
from this chapter will reveal deficits in the patient group during choice in orbitofrontal 
cortex, as well as an abnormal pattern of learning signal responses during feedback 
versus outcome, particularly in orbitofrontal cortex, a finding that correlates with 
affective symptoms in medial PFC.   
Taken together, these data demonstrate that learning is comprised of both 
informational and affective processes that incorporate input from dopaminergic 
midbrain neurons and its targets, as well as integration from other affective, mnemonic, 
and sensory regions to support healthy learning, emotion, and adaptive behavior. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
  




I. Rationale: Dopamine and Learning  
 
One of the most widely studied topics in behavioral and neural science addresses 
how animals learn to associate a predictive cue in the environment with good or bad 
outcomes. Rescorla and Wagner proposed a model that addresses how, through repeated 
associations, an animal learns computationally to anticipate an inherently rewarding 
outcome from a predictive cue. Specifically, it was hypothesized that in order to track 
the value of the cue over time, dopamine neurons evaluate the difference between the 
reward expected and the reward received (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972). The magnitude 
of this difference would then drive learning, leading to a conceptual anticipated value 
that is associated with the cue. Finally, the theory stipulates that this computation is 
generated during every interaction with the cue, so that the animal can track its reward 
value dynamically.  
More recent work has elucidated the neural mechanism underlying this process, 
specifically implicating a network of midbrain dopamine neurons. Evidence for this 
stems from physiology research in awake primates while recording from the midbrain, 
in which the animals were exposed to a series of cue-reward pairings. Data revealed that 
at first, a population of dopamine neurons fired in response to a reward when it was 
most unexpected. After many iterations, the animal learned that the cue predicted the 
reward, and this observed firing rate shifted from the reward outcome to the cue itself. 
Subsequently, if the expectation of reward outcome was violated, the same neuronal 
population fired at a rate that correlated with the difference between the expected reward 
associated with the cue and the actual reward received. This meant that a reward that 
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was better than expected yielded a firing rate above baseline, and a reward worse than 
expected yielded a firing rate below baseline. This type of learning signal is referred to 
as prediction error, which is then used to update expected value on the next trial 
(Schultz et al., 1997).  
The processes just described have been well-studied on a physiological level. It 
is clear, however, that brain structures do not operate in isolation, and anatomical data 
have shown that the midbrain dopamine neurons that support the learning signals just 
described also project to other regions, including the striatum, prefrontal cortex and 
medial temporal lobe (Lisman and Grace, 2005; Oades and Halliday, 1987; Williams 
and Goldman-Rakic, 1993). This implies that the impact of a prediction error extends 
beyond simple reward learning, and has an influence over many other cognitive 
functions including cognitive control, affect, and memory. In line with this reasoning, 
data from the human BOLD signal has indicated that the prediction error signal seems to 
represent slightly different constructs in different brain systems, each having distinct 
roles in modulating value, decision making, and other functions (Hare et al., 2008). For 
instance, the orbitofronal cortex (OFC) is thought to update outcomes for use as a 
cognitive construct, a process that uses information from prediction errors, but also from 
other neural targets to the prefrontal cortex to aid the animal in making optimal choices 
that are relevant to the current environment at hand (Schoenbaum et al., 2011).  
Further, this learning signal also can be observed in brain regions not 
traditionally studied as targets of reward processing, and may have a significant impact 
on decision making through separate mechanisms. Innervation from dopaminergic 
neurons projecting to the medial temporal lobe, and specifically the hippocampus, may 
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help to modify explicit memory in an adaptive way, (Adcock et al., 2006; Shohamy and 
Adcock, 2010; Wimmer and Shohamy, 2012).  Computational learning signals have also 
been observed in the amygdala from single unit recordings in primates, and in the 
BOLD signal in humans (Bermudez et al., 2012; Bermudez and Schultz, 2010a, b; 
Prevost et al., 2012; Prevost et al., 2011). These findings suggest that the amygdala may 
both play a role in emotional associative learning, as well as interact with striatum to 
facilitate learning rates when the context or reward is particularly affective (Bermudez 
and Schultz, 2010a; Li et al., 2011; Watanabe et al., 2013).  
Though this framework originated from the perspective of learning from 
rewards, it may be extended to learning from negative outcomes, as well. There are 
essentially two ways to consider how this framework supports learning from negative 
outcomes: first, dynamic tracking of a reward implies that worse-than-expected 
outcomes must also be computed, and thus a negative prediction error usually means 
that the population of neurons responding to the outcome fire below the baseline rate. 
Second, context can modulate the way that rewards are perceived. In the domain of an 
aversive environment or persistent aversive stimulus, a null outcome may be processed 
as better than expected. For someone with back pain, the baseline would be negative, 
and thus lack of pain is better than pain. In these specific instances, it has been shown 
that lack of pain yields a phasic signal in the striatum (Baliki et al., 2010; Seymour et al., 
2005). Affective context may also recruit brain systems other than the dopamine circuit, 
causing interactions or tradeoffs between structures that underlie these processes.  
Negative and positive feedback may not be processed in the same manner, and as 
such, thus the underlying neurobiology may impact behavior in different ways. Within 
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the dopaminergic midbrain and its targets, studies have shown that different neurons or 
regions within striatum specialize in representing learning about negative outcomes 
(Delgado et al., 2008), or in the same regions but that cell populations are intermixed 
with specific valence properties (Barberini et al., 2012; Morrison and Salzman, 2009, 
2011). Still other theories stipulate that gains and losses are registered on the basis of 
different dopaminergic inputs, in that D1 pathways support positive phasic events to 
support “go learning,” and D2 pathways are related to tonic dopamine baseline, and 
support “no-go” learning (Frank et al., 2004). Of course, it is also likely that the 
dopamine system interacts bidirectionally with other brain regions and neurochemical 
systems, such as the opioid system (Leknes and Tracey, 2008) that support learning 
from negative outcomes, possibly contributing to differences observed in gain-loss 
learning. 
What is the best way to study this mechanism? One way is to consider it in steps, 
has been done in seminal work (Schultz et al., 1997), by examining the cue and outcome 
phases separately. Computational models concerning this framework have focused on 
the informational component that a prediction error may quantify, and this learning 
signal is evident in the striatum and prefrontal cortex across species and methods, 
suggesting that the separation of these components is a consistent and reliable approach 
for studying dopamine’s role in learning. However, there has also been a considerable 
degree of discussion with regards to the affective experience that these two stages 
signify, if any. Historically termed the “pleasure chemical,” many deemed dopamine 
necessary for the affective and sensory experience associated hedonic reward outcome 
(Wise et al., 1978). Other data, however, have shown that dopaminergic activity in the 
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striatum is not necessary for pleasurable responses in animals, but rather is involved in 
coding only for the “incentive salience” quality that is necessary for routing attention, 
activating motor systems, and facilitating the process of forming associations between 
cues and rewards (Berridge and Robinson, 1998). These studies conclude that the onset 
of the cue is associated with a feeling of anticipation and motivation, and that while this 
phase is supported by dopamine signaling, that the subjective feeling of pleasure while 
consuming a reward is likely to be supported by different systems altogether, such as 
those that involve opioid signaling (Smith et al., 2011). 
Examining the separate contributions of the neural mechanisms supporting the 
cue and outcome phases can contribute to understanding the interaction between 
learning and affect. Studies that address the role of dopamine in reward localized most 
of the relevant analyses to the striatum (Berridge and Robinson, 1998; Smith et al., 
2011). While the striatum is a very specific and important target of the dopaminergic 
midbrain for learning, the orbitofronal cortex, medial temporal lobe, and sensory regions 
likely contribute to other aspects of learning as well, including the affective experience 
especially as it pertains to pleasure. Further, a great deal of this same research stems 
from studies performed in rats using facial responses as outcome measures from which 
to draw conclusions about human pleasure. However, complex emotions may be 
involved during the cue phase, such as anticipation and motivation, and during the 
outcome phase, like pleasure and meaning. It is possible that emotions may affect 
information processing and feed into or modulate the value calculated during the cue, as 
well as during the presentation of the reward outcome. Accordingly, important questions 
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remain as to how affective experience and informative computation interact during 
learning. 
Finally, this experimental approach can contribute to our understanding of 
diseases involving dopaminergic and affective abnormalities. The dopamine prediction 
error theory not only provides a testable hypothesis by which to examine human 
learning, affective processes, and decision making, but establishes a framework from 
which one might address the cognitive impact on diseases with abnormal dopamine 
function, such as schizophrenia and Parkinson’s disease, and diseases that involve 
affective abnormalities, such as major depressive disorder. In particular, schizophrenia 
involves self-reported hedonic deficits, which could theoretically alter the salience of the 
reward, and thus impact the learning rate. Similar results could occur with abnormalities 
in anticipatory value, or updating value to the cue stimulus at the time of choice. The 
symptoms of schizophrenia can be quite debilitating, and accordingly, several groups 
have broken down each stage to determine whether there is any relationship to 
motivational symptoms and anticipatory value during the cue, or affective symptoms 
and hedonic response at the outcome. These findings to date will be discussed in a later 
section about the negative symptoms of schizophrenia.  
 
II. Affective Processing  
The process of and mechanisms supporting the generation and experience of 
emotion have been widely debated in the fields of psychology and neuroscience (Barrett 
et al., 2007). Meta-analyses of neuroimaging studies concerning emotion have suggested 
that emotional states engage brain regions that have been traditionally associated with 
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many diverse functions, including reward processing, (Lindquist et al., 2012), such as 
the striatum and medial prefrontal cortex (Kober et al., 2008). Similarly, some reviews 
have suggested mental representations of emotion are associated with BOLD activity in 
the temporal lobe, orbitofrontal cortex, and/or ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Barrett et 
al., 2007). There has been a range of mechanisms proposed to explain the ways in which 
affective states modulate learning and memory, including theories suggesting that 
memory can be modulated through shifting states of arousal mediated by temporal and 
frontal activity, and that in particular, negative emotional stimuli are particularly 
effective in altering memory (Kensinger, 2009; Kensinger and Schacter, 2007). Other 
lines of research have produced data that suggest that reward may alter encoding and 
retrieval as well, suggesting a mechanism by which positive outcomes may modulate—
and even enhance—explicit memory (Adcock et al., 2006; Knutson and Adcock, 2005). 
In schizophrenia, while several studies have shown conflicting evidence of a consistent 
deficit across patients (Kring and Barch, 2014), a meta-analysis has indicated that during 
emotional perception, several brain regions in patients are decreased relative to controls, 
including amygdala, prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate, and other subcortical 
structures (Taylor et al., 2012).  
Assuming that anticipating and hedonically responding to a reward involves 
affective processes, how might we define these processes so that we may identify the 
brain systems that support them? Reward prediction and outcome can incur experiences 
associated not only with bivalent (positive, negative) outcomes of valence and arousal, 
but also with experiences that may be described as more emotionally or theoretically 
multi-layered. For instance, the cue period in learning models has been equated with 
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complex emotion, such as anticipation, motivation, or wanting. Similarly, the outcome 
event has been compared to pleasure, hedonic experience, consumption, or liking.  None 
of these descriptors are associated with simple nor unitary experiences in humans, but 
rather describe complicated subjective experience that may modulate interacting with a 
reward or punishment, and consequently the ways that value is updated over time. 
Because of this complexity, defining and understanding the neural correlates of affective 
processing during encoding may shed light on the mechanisms for learning itself. While 
it is important to consider whether prediction error quantifies information and not affect, 
it is also likely that specific affective experiences are associated with it at certain stages 
of learning. These events have been referred to as wanting (motivation at cue) and liking 
(hedonic response at reward outcome). As discussed, many of the experiments initially 
designed to study learning were performed in rodents, in which the interactive 
experience with reward was mostly comprised of food. However, in is unknown whether 
a mouse wanting or liking a pellet reward is necessarily equated on the same sensory, 
mnemonic, and affective levels that an intense human experience of desire or pleasure 
would be, such as missing an old friend or feeling the relief of intense back pain. While 
some have argued that pleasure should not be necessarily subjective given its important 
role in survival, it is important to also recognize the multi-layered and complex nature of 
this construct when considering the its underlying mechanism in human learning 
(Berridge and Kringelbach, 2013). While we often need to isolate emotions as variables 
to study in experiments across species, it is also crucial to recognize the differences 
produced between species, and also in clinical relative to experimental contexts.  
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There are several interconnected brain regions that play prominent roles in the 
stages of learning and relevant affect, and may contribute to their cooperation during 
learning. Some consider prefrontal cortical areas, specifically the orbitofrontal and 
ventromedial cortices, to have a distinct, albeit complex role in response to pleasure and 
value. In humans, functional neuroimaging has demonstrated that medial orbitofronal 
regions correlate with value, reported pleasure, and learning outcome signals like 
prediction error (Bartra et al., 2013). This region, along with the ventral pallidum, 
insular cortex, amygdala, and striatum, have also been associated with reported pleasure 
(Berridge and Kringelbach, 2008, 2013; Kringelbach and Berridge, 2009), but it is 
unclear exactly how these structures cause, respond, update, modulate, encode, or 
simply reflect hedonic states.  While many of these regions receive projections from 
dopamine neurons, it is also known that opioid injections in striatum augment 
pleasurable facial reactions in rodents (Pecina and Berridge, 2005), and as such, has 
been postulated to be a separable entity from cue-related anticipation or learning itself.  
The orbitofrontal cortex has repeatedly been shown to be a region that integrates 
many different types of sensory, affective, reward- and memory-related functions, and 
thus may possibly support the type of complex human experience of affective meaning, 
reward, pleasure, or integration of these constructs into a currency used to guide 
behavior (Berridge and Kringelbach, 2013; Roy et al., 2012; Schoenbaum et al., 2011). 
While patients with lesions to this region still show intact liking reactions to food, sex, 
or other rewards (Anderson et al., 1999; Damasio, 1996; Hornak et al., 2003), primates 
that have lesions in this region show deficits in updating reward information from 
pleasurable experiences or representing rewards in cognitively operable ways, and 
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behaviorally, they do not always perform in a way that optimizes and integrates their 
choices (Schoenbaum et al., 2006). Further, the orbitofrontal cortex has been shown to 
support or represent a range of affective outcomes, extending beyond pleasure, given 
that several studies in primates suggest that individual cells in the orbitofronal cortex 
code for negative outcomes, and some code for positive ones (Morrison and Salzman, 
2009). Still other studies show that this region can respond to context in that it reflects a 
lack of threat or aversion (Mobbs et al., 2010), and that this portion of the cortex shows 
a medial-to-lateral distinction depending on the valence of the environmental outcomes 
(Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004).  This makes it an optimal target for learning in terms of 
its ability to represent a range of valence during outcome.  
 Like positive feelings of motivation and pleasure, avoidance and pain also 
contribute to learning experience. As mentioned, aversive learning has been well-studied 
for many years, and is considered an important and seminal line of research as it pertains 
to affective processing. There is a wealth of data to suggest that limbic structures like the 
amygdala are necessary for learning to associate cues with aversive outcomes (Phelps 
and LeDoux, 2005). However, as discussed, the prediction error framework may support 
learning from aversive experiences such as pain, losses, and negative social feedback 
(Frank et al., 2004; Seymour et al., 2007; Zaki et al., 2011), and some data suggest that 
amygdala-striatal interaction supports actions that allow an animal to avoid an undesired 
outcome (Delgado et al., 2009) and track rewards in specialized ways (Li et al., 2011). 
Striatal prediction error may even track aversive experience, such as pain and its 
eventual relief, and possibly influence the way it is encoded (Baliki et al., 2010). While 
this finding does not appear to support claims of a direct link between dopamine and 
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pleasure, it does solidify the idea that dopamine links affective experience with cue 
value (Berridge and Kringelbach, 2013), and suggests a possible mechanism for brain 
systems to interact and represent affect in such a way that it is translated into value.  
   
III. Memory, Valuation, and Decision Making 
The reinforcement learning framework is only one of many non-mutually 
exclusive theories historically cited to account for decision making behavior. Many 
psychological constructs, including context, memory, and affect, have been shown to 
modulate the decisions, and sometimes even in ways that may seem counterintuitive or 
irrational (Ariely and Carmon, 2000; Kahneman et al., 1993; Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979). For example, humans are consistently known to weigh risky decisions more 
heavily when threatened by loss than motivated by gain, or to prefer improving 
sequences of events, even if it means prolonging an aversive experience (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979; Zauberman et al., 2006). To account for deviations in discount related to 
value, risk probability, or utility, affective processes and their role in survival have been 
a topic of study used to understand the mechanism behind these seemingly paradoxical 
decision behaviors. Work in this area suggests that affective cognition may be adaptive 
rather than illogical. To examine this mechanism and its influence on decisions, many 
behavioral scientists have referred to the way in which affect modulates explicit 
memory. 
Accordingly, a major subfield of decision-making theory derives from the notion 
of heavy involvement of explicit memory systems. Extensive research suggests that 
memory can be separated into two broad systems—explicit and implicit— that were 
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thought to be distinct both cognitively and neurally (Squire, 1992). However, recent 
work has called into question the distinct roles of these systems, strongly implying that 
these subtypes of memory may interact with each other (Foerde et al., 2006; Poldrack et 
al., 2001). Thus, it is possible that the interaction of affective or salient experience with 
reward can modify our memory of the event in order to provide a mechanism for 
maximizing utility, even if this decision may seem irrational on the surface. Whether or 
not a decision is guided by conscious deliberation, decisions are informed by direct past 
experience with the choices available, or the best inferences and generalizations possible 
given our current knowledge. Memory for rewards and motor movements, supported by 
the dopamine framework described above, was thought to be distinct from the explicit 
system that coded for declarative, autobiographical, and object memory. These systems 
are now thought to be less distinct and more flexibly interactive, in that dopaminergic 
projections to hippocampus may facilitate memories not only for rewards, but for co-
occurring stimuli and their associations that may aid in obtaining rewards (Adcock et al., 
2006; Poldrack et al., 2001; Shohamy and Adcock, 2010; Shohamy and Wagner, 2008; 
Wimmer and Shohamy, 2012).  
Finally, it is worth considering the nature of higher-level, more abstract rewards, 
how they are valued, and impact decisions. Why do some people report that reaching the 
top of a dangerous mountain is rewarding, despite that hedonically the experience itself 
is grueling, painful, and unpleasant? Value and decision making clearly involve more 
abstract concepts that are impacted by a complex interaction of social, affective, 
mnemonic, effort-based, and genetic factors. Several brain regions are candidates for 
representing types of value from each of these, one of which is the orbitofrontal and 
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ventromedial cortices (Roy et al., 2012). This question, while worth investigating, is 
inherently difficult to address, especially with respect to variable isolation and how 
some of these factors interact to modulate human decisions, and how they impact 
motivation and pleasure. 
 
IV. The negative symptoms of schizophrenia   
Schizophrenia is an ideal disease model for studying the intersection of learning 
and affect, as it is debilitating disease associated with abnormal dopamine function (Abi-
Dargham et al., 1998), as well as with motivational and affective deficits, such as 
apathy, affective flattening, anhedonia, alogia, and attention symptoms. These 
symptoms, referred to as the negative symptoms of the disease, are an important area of 
investigation given the potentially significant impact on quality of life, and functional 
outcomes, including, for example, how a patient interacts socially or seeks out 
employment.  
Some research to date has explored affective processing in schizophrenia, but the 
findings and the relationship to the negative symptoms of the disease have been mixed 
(Barch, 2008). Individuals with schizophrenia are known to be deficient when eliciting 
both positive and negative facial and vocal expressions, but the extent to which this 
depicts actual dearth of experience of emotion is unclear (Kring and Moran, 2008; Sloan 
et al., 2002). Perhaps surprisingly though, several studies suggest that emotional and 
hedonic experience is intact in schizophrenia, and even that self-report from patients and 
reports from their physicians depicting their emotional experience can be misaligned 
(Gard et al., 2007; Selten et al., 1998).  A meta-analysis of emotion in schizophrenia 
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indicated that while about half of studies find comparable reports of emotion in patients 
and controls, still others find deficits in patients’ experience of positive emotion, or that 
they report more negative emotion (Kring and Moran, 2008). It is difficult to make sense 
of these divergent findings—one may have trouble deciphering whether this is attributed 
to the framing of the studies at hand, due to self report, or actual emotional experience, 
but some have suggested differences should not be interpreted as deficits in emotional 
processing per se, but rather a difference in motivational representation in translating 
affect into action related to goal-based behavior (Heerey and Gold, 2007).  
This idea that affect and motivational behavior are separate but interactive 
processes is worth further exploration for several reasons. Given what we know about 
dopamine’s anticipatory role in reinforcement learning, and since schizophrenia is a 
disease with known dopamine signaling abnormalities, it follows that disruption in the 
framework supporting reward learning may contribute to severity of negative symptoms. 
Despite some mixed findings, by and large the behavioral reward learning literature 
supports this theory (Farkas et al., 2008; Gold et al., 2008; Polgar et al., 2008; Waltz and 
Gold, 2007; Weiler et al., 2009), and in particular, several studies have shown that these 
impairments are most pronounced in patients with severe negative symptoms while 
pursuing rewards, but not losses (Reinen et al., 2014; Strauss et al., 2011; Waltz et al., 
2010b).  
A question remains regarding how to link the affective and learning components 
together to better understand the mechanisms that underlie the deficits, and can be 
extended to address the finding that learning in schizophrenia is selectively abnormal 
when updating information from gains, but not necessarily losses. Given what we know 
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about the amygdala as key in acquiring aversive responses, the striatum in predicting 
outcomes, and the orbitofronal and ventromedial PFC (vmPFC) for representing 
outcomes and updating learned information, it has been proposed that affective learning 
may involve a circuit, and a breakdown in connectivity or part of the whole may result 
in significant deficits, such as the negative symptoms we see in schizophrenia (Ochsner, 
2008).  In fact, some imaging data does demonstrate that while there is little difference 
between patients and controls when processing aversive information, functional 
coupling between amygdala and PFC is deficient relative to controls, and studies and a 
meta analysis showed some degree of abnormal amygdala recruitment overall (Anticevic 
et al., 2012a; Anticevic et al., 2012b). Further, research in patients has shown that 
processing positive stimuli is abnormal in the striatum and amygdala, and activity in 
these regions were inversely related to symptoms of anhedonia, suggesting that multiple 
brain systems may contribute to these deficits (Dowd and Barch, 2010). 
In addition to the gain-loss learning difference, studies have also attempted to 
determine whether there is a specific stage in learning that is selectively impaired in 
schizophrenia, and some have proposed that the reward anticipation period is 
exclusively compromised. The data supporting this notion is mixed, however: many 
behavioral and functional imaging studies report a deficit in anticipating rewards, but 
several also show abnormalities in responding to reward outcome, as well. To date, there 
have been a great deal of self-report and functional imaging literature suggesting there 
exist deficits in reward anticipation but not reward experience in schizophrenia (Barch 
and Dowd, 2010; Gard et al., 2007; Gold et al., 2012; Gold et al., 2008; Kring and 
Barch, 2014; Wynn et al., 2010). However, there is also evidence to suggest that several 
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neural regions show abnormal responses, especially in the cortex, to the experience and 
outcome of reward as well (Schlagenhauf et al., 2009; Walter et al., 2010; Waltz et al., 
2010b).  
A first step in examining the mechanisms that underlie the learning deficits in 
schizophrenia and their relationship to symptoms is to quantify and examine the learning 
signal present during anticipation and outcome. Accordingly, a handful of studies have 
specifically isolated the representation of prediction error and examined it in relation to 
performance and symptom profile. Many of these studies have shown differences in the 
BOLD signal correlating with the prediction error regressor in patients versus controls	  in	  
varying	  regions	  (Murray et al., 2008b; Walter et al., 2010; Waltz et al., 2009; Waltz et 
al., 2010b), though some have not (Dowd and Barch, 2012). Of note, examining the 
prediction error signal per se is essentially assessing the delta of outcome expected 
versus outcome received on a trial-by-trial basis. As mentioned in prior sections, 
converging evidence has indicated that this signal is observed in striatum and medial 
PFC (specifically, ventromedial PFC and orbitofrontal cortex), and a combination of 
targeted ROI analyses, as well as whole-brain analyses, that have compared this 
response in patients compared to controls. During reward outcome, several studies have 
shown relative deficits in PE in patients in midbrain, striatum, medial temporal lobe, 
ventral pallidum, medial and ventrolateral PFC, and ACC (Abler et al., 2008; Murray et 
al., 2008b; Waltz et al., 2010b) whereas during anticipation, value represented in 
orbitorfrontal cortex and/or striatum has scaled inversely with negative symptoms 
(Dowd and Barch, 2012; Juckel et al., 2006a; Kirsch et al., 2007; Schlagenhauf et al., 
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2009; Waltz et al., 2010b), suggesting that reward information updating could be 
deficient during multiple stages of learning.  
A final consideration related to these studies is that many of the patient 
participants are medicated, often with second-generation atypical antipsychotics, which 
may impact dopamine function, and consequently prediction error and behavior. Studies 
have shown that learning signals and decisions are modulated by pharmacological 
manipulations, including antipsychotics (Frank et al., 2004; Insel et al., 2014; 
Pessiglione et al., 2006). A mechanism proposed for this has separated the phasic (D1) 
signals from the tonic (D2) signals by way of examining the communication between 
different structures and targets of the basal ganglia, and concluding that augmentation of 
the dopamine system, with medications such as L-Dopa, will increase the efficiency of 
the phasic, positive signal, strengthening the ability to learn from reward (Cohen and 
Frank, 2009; Frank et al., 2004; Rutledge et al., 2009; Waltz et al., 2007; Waltz et al., 
2010a). Conversely, drugs like haloperidol have been shown to blunt positive PE and 
enhance negative PE specifically in the striatum when subjects learn from gains but not 
losses (Pessiglione et al., 2006). This suggests two things: first, it helps to strengthen the 
theory that dopaminergic manipulation can modulate learning and decision behavior, 
which has implications for negative symptoms. Second, it is necessary to consider these 
findings in terms of how they apply to prior studies that tested subjects on medication, as 
many American ethics boards understandably require that participants are stabilized on 
medication before they consent to participating in experiments, especially those 
involving functional imaging. 
 
V. Overview of present research  
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The work presented in this thesis aims to identify the cognitive and neural 
mechanisms that underlie affect-learning interactions in healthy participants and in a 
disease model, namely, schizophrenia. In the first study (Chapter 2), we examine online, 
retrospective, and willingness-to-pay (to avoid) ratings in healthy subjects based on 
painful stimuli varied on temperature, duration, and relief. This study was designed to 
explore the way that a positive prediction error-evoking experience can modulate the 
memory for a painful event, and impact economic decisions related to these experiences.  
In the second and third studies (Chapters 3 and 4), we used a disease model to 
explore the ways in which learning and affective deficits are related. Schizophrenia 
serves as an important example not only because the mechanisms underlying the 
negative symptoms of the disease are not well understood, but also because is a disease 
associated with dopamine abnormalities in combination with motivational (apathy, 
avolition) and affective deficits (anhedonia, affective flattening), thereby providing a 
basis by which to examine mechanisms underlying emotion-cognition interactions. 
Study 2 (Chapter 3) examines these behavioral differences in healthy controls 
and patients with schizophrenia when subjects learn in the separate context of loss and 
gain. It will allow for the establishment of a behavioral deficit in schizophrenia, 
breaking down the effect of motivational context, and determining whether or not there 
is a relationship to symptoms.  
The final study, Study 3 (Chapter 4) will employ the same task as in Study 2 in a 
novel cohort of patients and matched controls while undergoing functional imaging. As 
before, we will separate choice value from prediction error during anticipation and 
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reward outcome, and determine whether or not there are group differences in two a prior 
anatomical regions of interest, the ventral striatum and orbitofrontal cortex. Finally, in 
order to make a connection between informational and affective coding in patient 
participants, we will determine whether BOLD activity in any of these brain regions are 













Chapter 2: Affective and sensory mechanisms impacting the 
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A great deal of decision theory stipulates that decisions are generated through a 
calculated process by which the anticipated utility of the experience, or the difference 
between expected hedonic value relative to the cost, is assessed to make a choice (Dolan 
and Kahneman, 2008; Kahneman et al., 1997). However, humans are known to be 
swayed by the affective properties of memory for an experience, and hence do not 
always decide based on the raw calculation of this differential. Instead, for example, 
they will overweigh a loss relative to a gain (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), or favor an 
improving sequence of events compared to other sequences with an equivalent average 
rating (Lowenstein and Prelec, 1993). This type of decision behavior is applicable to 
pain, and can lead people to make health decisions that seem irrational: we are known to 
prolong seeking necessary treatment when it is needed (Foley et al., 2005; Goldberg et 
al., 2000; Roberts and Timmis, 2007), or to seek treatment when it is unnecessary 
(Kroenke, 2003). Consequently, understanding the sensory, affective, and cognitive 
bases for valuation and decisions about pain relief in relation to the financial cost of 
healthcare is an important step in identifying the psychological mechanisms underlying 
seemingly unintuitive treatment-seeking behavior (Smolderen et al., 2010).   
 As such, prior studies have indicated that very particular factors of a painful 
event drive evaluations and subsequent decisions. First, the most intense moment of 
pain, or the peak, is reliably correlated with higher pain ratings, sometimes despite 
variability in duration (Jensen et al., 2008; Redelmeier and Kahneman, 1996). Second, 
the duration of the painful event may affect the way the event is retrospectively 
evaluated, but the impact of this factor on decisions has met with conflicting results 
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(Ariely and Lowenstein, 2000). Third, and less well-established, is the idea that the 
incorporation of pain relief periods may recruit a reward signal that could lead to a less 
aversive association with that particular event (Becerra et al., 2001; Geuter et al., 2013; 
Leknes and Tracey, 2008). This stems conceptually from recent studies showing that a 
relief period during a painful stimulus is associated with a response in the ventral 
striatum (Baliki et al., 2010), but has not yet been tested within an economic decision 
making framework. Additionally, this mechanism may inform prior findings showing 
that modifying the sequence of events to decrease the intensity of the final moments of 
an experience has been shown to decrease one’s overall pain rating (Redelmeier and 
Kahneman, 1996; Redelmeier et al., 2003), a phenomenon also found to have consistent 
effects not just in the way one experiences pain (Ariely, 1998; Kahneman et al., 1993; 
Stone et al., 2000), but in emotional experiences in general (Fredrickson, 2000), both of 
which likely contribute to memory of the event and relevant future choices.  
 Decisions are based on value associated with available options, thus 
understanding the cognitive mechanisms of learning and valuation during aversive 
events- particularly those varied on peak, duration, and relief- may elucidate the why 
certain decisions are made. While the reliability of memory for pain events has been 
debated (Babul and Darke, 1994; Beese and Morley, 1993; Erskine et al., 1990; Jantsch 
et al., 2009; Koyama et al., 2004; Read and Lowenstein, 1999), it does appear that 
sensory and affective experience can impact the factors that bias decisions related to 
pain, possibly through context and attentional direction (Ariely and Lowenstein, 2000).  
It is therefore valuable to further unpack these aspects of aversive pain experiences that 
impact decisions. 
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 Specifically, there also remain unexplored alternative intersections of sensory and 
affective mechanisms that may provide explanations for these phenomena in terms of 
pain perception. Offset analgesia, or the disproportionate decrease in reported pain 
following a relatively small decrease in pain administered (Derbyshire and Osborn, 
2008, 2009; Yelle et al., 2009; Yelle et al., 2008), may modulate the affective experience 
associated with that pain event. It is possible that the offset analgesic effect decreases 
the actual perception of pain when it occurs, yielding a phasic signal in the striatum 
(Baliki et al., 2010) which could diminish the expected aversive quality of the 
experience. As a consequence, one possibility is that activity in the reward network in 
response to a pain or pain relief event may attenuate the aversive experience that is 
normally associated with a painful experience.  
 To examine the aspects of a painful experience that contribute to valuation and 
decisions, we designed two experiments to assess the relative contribution of 
temperature, duration, and pain relief. We first recorded moment-to-moment and 
summary pain ratings, and employed an economic decision making paradigm involving 
willingness-to-pay estimates (Read and Lowenstein, 1999) to determine how these 
characteristics contribute uniquely to choices between monetary costs and benefits 
versus the anticipation of pain experience. In our second experiment, we further 
examined the impact of offset analgesia and time-to-ratings in the participants’ 






 We tested 40 healthy, right-handed volunteers (27 female) in two different 
experiments. Prior to any experimental procedures, all subjects were given informed 
consent as approved by the Columbia University Institutional Review Board. Subjects 
were recruited on the basis of health and pain-related questionnaires screening for 
psychiatric, neurological, and pain disorders. 4 subjects were excluded for data 
acquisition malfunctions or unreliable pain ratings.  
 
Stimulation and Calibration 
 Prior to experimentation, each subject participated in an established pain 
calibration procedure to determine both safety and reliability of pain sensation and self-
reported pain ratings (Atlas et al., 2010). For both calibration and experimentation, 
thermal stimulation was delivered using the non-dominant (left) inner forearm using a 
16 x 16mm thermode (TSA-II Neurosensory Analyzer by Medoc, Inc.). During each 
individual pain calibration, subjects gave verbal ratings on 24 pseudorandom trials of 
thermal stimuli according to a continuous scale ranging from 0 to 8, in which 0 
corresponded to no pain at all, and 8 corresponded to maximum tolerable pain. Subjects 
did receive an explanation about the rating procedure and the scale, but were not 
explicitly told about the pseudorandom ordering or what type of stimulus they were to 
receive on each trial. Using 8 sites on the inner forearm, we administered low, medium, 
and high levels (initially delivered at 41, 42, and 47°C) of thermal stimulation according 
to an adaptive procedure that identified the most reliable forearm sites and temperatures 
aimed to elicit low, medium, and high pain for each participant based on a response 
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curve estimated to describe the relationship between thermal stimulation and reported 
pain. This allowed us to determine the individual’s range of tolerable pain in the context 
of the experiment, as well as determine whether their reported pain was reliably related 
to thermal stimulation. Based on each subject’s ratings on each calibration trial, we 
calculated a ratings-by-temperature fit to determine slope, intercept, and R2. After the 
calibration, average residuals were calculated for each of the 8 skin sites, and the five 
skin sites with the lowest average residuals were used during the experiment. Further, 
the linear function calculated during calibration was used for each individual to 
determine their low, medium, and high temperatures for use during the experimental 
phase.  
 
Experimental Paradigm 1 
 20 subjects participated in Experiment 1. The first phase of experiment 1 
consisted of conditioning and subjective evaluation. Each participant was told that they 
would see a series of shapes (fractals) followed by thermal stimulation. During this 
stimulation, each subject was asked to rate their online (moment-to-moment) pain on a 
visual analog scale (VAS) scale (Figure 2.1a) using the computer’s mouse. Following 
thermal stimulation, subjects were asked to rate that stimulus by giving it a summary 
score based on the 8-point continuous scale used during calibration depending upon how 






Fig. 2.1. Associative learning and decision making phases of Experiment 1. (A) (One trial) Subjects first 
learned to associate fractal pictures with six different types of pain stimuli, while rating pain moment-to-
moment, and finally providing an overall summary score of the pain from that trial. (B) (Three trials) In 
the subsequent decision phase, subjects were given a monetary endowment with which they made 
decisions between the fractal representation of the painful stimulus and a monetary amount which they 
could use to buy out of the pain experience.  
 
During this associative paired learning phase, six unique, emotionally-neutral 
fractals (Figure 2.1b) were presented for 2s, followed by one of six specific types of 
thermal stimulations of varying duration (long or short), heat level (hot or warm), and 
shape, which was varied by temperature (high-double peak and low-double peak) over a 
course of 30 trials (Figure 2.2).  Each trial lasted between 12 and 18s, including a 2s 
time-to-peak and 2s ramp-down. Fractals were counterbalanced across participants.  
Following the learning phase, each participant was told (s)he would be receiving 
$9.99 to make a series of 60 decisions in the subsequent phase (Figure 2.1b). In this 
phase, the subject was presented with a choice between a particular fractal that had been 
paired with a specific painful stimulus, and an amount of money that they would have to 
pay from their endowment in order to “buy out” of experiencing the painful stimulus 
associated with the fractal presented. Participants were told that one of the 60 decisions 
would be picked at random at the end of the experiment, and they would either have to 
4s







experience that pain stimulus 5 times or lose 5 times that amount from their endowment. 
They would be able to keep any remaining money, which would be paid to them at the 
end of the experiment, along with the $12 hourly rate.  
After they completed the final decision phase, we asked each participant several 
questions, including how they would rate pain associated with each fractal on a 
continuous scale, how confident they were in their ability to learn the association 
between the fractals and the stimuli, the estimated duration of the stimulus associated 
with each fractal, and how much they liked each fractal. Finally, subjects completed a 
series of forced choices between two fractal based on which one was associated with 
more pain.  
 
Experimental Paradigm 2  
20 new subjects participated in Experiment 2. The second experiment was 
identical to the first in terms of the calibration procedure but did not include an 
associative learning phase. Instead, subjects were randomized into one of two groups, in 
which one group experienced a series of 24 pain stimuli and made both online and 
summary ratings, and a second group that made summary ratings only.  
Four thermal stimuli were used, and were varied based on modified ending 
(none, plateau, or long plateau) and delay to rating (immediate or delayed; Figure 2.3).  
Each trial lasted between 20 and 24s, including a 2s time-to-peak and a 2s ramp-down. 
Stimuli including a plateau incorporated a 2 °C drop in temperature following a peak, 
which has been shown to be at least adequate in initiating offset analgesia (Derbyshire, 
2009). Unlike the previous experiment, we did not vary temperature, nor did we 
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administer a decision-making phase or post-experimental questions. The order was 
counterbalanced across subjects.  
 
Fig. 2.2. Example stimulation profiles for each type of pain stimulus in Experiment 1. In experiment 1, 
subjects learned to associate fractal cues with six different type of pain stimuli, which varied on duration, 
temperature, and additive modified ending. Each provided online and summary ratings. The stimuli above 
are based on the temperatures administered for an example subject. The temperature level for each subject 
was based on individual calibration performed before testing.   
 
 
Fig. 2.3. Example stimulation profiles for each type of pain stimulus across Experiment 2. In experiment 
2, subjects rated four stimuli that were varied on duration, time to rating, and additive modified ending. 
All subjects provided summary ratings, but only half provided online ratings. The stimuli above are based 
on the temperatures administered for an example subject. The temperature level for each subject was 








Experiment 1  
 
Online Ratings  
Online ratings for each type of stimulation were calculated by determining the 
area under the curve (AUC) for each subject’s percent reported pain, on a scale of least 
to most imaginable pain, for the duration of the stimulus. These results are reported in 
Figure 4A. On average, subjects reported the most moment-to-moment pain for the 
long, hot, single peak followed by the long, hot double peak. We analyzed the 
differences in reported online pain in the first four (non-double peak) stimuli an 
ANOVA with factors for temperature and duration. As expected, a main effect of both 
temperature and duration indicated that both of these factors contribute to a greater 




Fig 2.4. Mean online ratings for each stimulus type across subjects. In experiment 1A (A), all subjects 
made moment-to-moment (“online”) ratings during the associative learning phase. Average online ratings 
showed that the modified ending stimulus was perceived as a plateau ending, which served as an 
experience of relatively reduced, but present, pain. In experiment 1B (B), a proportion of subjects made 
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online ratings. However, the online ratings showed that on average, subjects may have experienced offset 
analgesia following a dip in the peak temperature. 
 
Qualitative aspects of the online ratings were also of interest (Figure 2.4A). 
Double peak stimulations were not perceived as two separate and equal peaks, but rather 
were represented as a plateau of decreased pain lasting for the second half of the 
duration of the stimulus, which is consistent with prior subjective reports of offset 
analgesia (Yelle et al., 2008). Paired-samples t-test indicated that the short, hot (high 
temperature) stimulus had a significantly smaller AUC compared to the hot stimulus 
with a double peak (t=-2.7475, p=0.01), as was the short, warm (low temperature) 
stimulus compared to the warm stimulus with a double peak (t=-3.04,p=0.008), 
indicating that subjects did perceive the different ending between the two stimuli. To 
determine if there was any difference in terms of peak pain for the short and long versus 
double peak stimuli, we extracted the peak value from the AUC ratings on each of the 
hot and warm short trials, as well as the hot and warm double peak trials. We found no 
significant difference in terms of peak rated online pain for the short, hot stimulus and 
the hot stimulus with the double peak (t=0.7691,p=0.453) or for the analogous test for 
the warm stimuli (t=-1.54,p=0.144).   
 
Summary Ratings 
Summary ratings were calculated from the rating subjects gave following each 
trial, based on the 0 to 8 scale described above (Figure 2.1a). We again used an 
ANOVA with factors of temperature and duration to assess the first four stimuli, and 
found a main effect of temperature (Ftemp(1,67)=86.07, ptemp<0.001) and for duration 
(Fduration (1,67)=11.32, pduration=0.01.) Subsequent t-tests showed no significant 
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differences between the short stimuli when compared to the double peak stimulus for 
either high or low pain (thot=0.041,p hot=0.97; twarm=-2.83,p warm=0.12.) 
 
Willingness to Pay  
 We examined willingness to pay, a metric that has been shown to be reliable 
(Read and Lowenstein, 1999), based on the mean amount of money each subject chose 
to give from the endowment in order to avoid this particular type of pain. Subjects were 
more likely to pay to avoid high pain as opposed to low pain, as shown as a main effect 
of temperature (Ftemp(1,67)=18.74, ptemp<0.001), but not for duration 
(Fduration(1,67)=0.37, pduration=0.54.)  Paired samples t-tests indicated that while subjects 
did not show different WTP behavior for the warm, short compared to the warm double 
peak stimuli (t=-0.025,p=0.98), there was a trend for subjects to buy out of the hot, short 
stimulus more often than the hot stimulus with the modified ending (two-tailed, 
t=1.872,p=0.08), indicating that subjects chose to avoid the stimulus with the modified 
ending less frequently, despite its significantly larger AUC.  
Fig. 2.5. Summary of Subject Ratings, Experiment 1. (A) Area Under the Curve (AUC), (B) Peak pain 































































Regression Model  
 
Based on prior findings demonstrating that peak and duration may contribute to 
pain ratings, we used the data each type of rating provided as the dependent variable and 
peak pain and duration as the independent variables in a generalized linear model using 
Matlab software (glmfit.m) to generate an intercept and betas for the pain and duration 
regressors. Results indicated that for the AUC and summary ratings, both peak and 
duration were significant predictors of ratings (p ≤ 0.01 for all cases). However, for the 
willingness to pay, only peak pain was a significant predictor (p < 0.01), and duration 
was not (p=0.9).  
Using the betas generated from the model for each rating type, we plotted each 
individual subject’s predicted ratings against the actual ratings (Figure 2.6). Results 
suggested that each data point was relatively similar for all rating types, with the 
exception of WTP for which predicted pain was similar for the hot, short and hot, double 
peak stimuli, but participants were more willing to pay money to avoid the hot, short 




Study 2.6. Predicted versus reported pain for each rating category. We used a general 
linear model to predict a pain score based on peak and duration administered. We then 
plotted this score for against the subjects’ average reported pain for (A) area under the 
curve (AUC), (B) trial-specific summary scores, and (C) willingness-to-pay ratings. 
Compared to AUC and summary ratings, WTP showed a relative shift in position for the 
high/short stimulus compared to the high/double peak stimulus, results which were 




AUC and Peak Ratings  
For those who performed online ratings only (N=10), both peak pain and AUC 
calculations highly correlated for every stimulation type (r>0.9, p<0.01 for all), and were 
each correlated with summary rating (r=0.75 to 0.8; p<0.01 for all). AUC was no 
different for stimulation 1 with the modified ending compared to stimulation 3 without 
the modified ending (t=-1.67.p=0.12), or for the differences in modified end length 
(stimuli 2 v. 4, t=-1.85, p=0.09). An analogous analysis yielded a similar finding for the 
peak (for stimulus 1 v. 3, t=0.82, p=0.43; for stimulus 2 v. 4, t=1.39,p=0.19).  
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Summary Ratings  
For both groups, we analyzed summary ratings using an ANOVA varied on 
delay or no delay versus group type (Figure 2.7), which was determined based on 
whether the subject made both online and summary ratings, or summary ratings only. 
We found a main effect of group (Fduration(1,75)=7.45, pgroup<0.01), but there was no 
effect of delay (Fdelay(1,75)=0.95, pdelay=0.66).  
 
  
Fig. 2.7. Summary ratings for subjects who made and did not make (b) online ratings in 
Experiment 2. In Experiment 2, the sample was split into two groups, one of whom 





In this study, we examined the sensory and affective mechanisms that influence 
decisions about pain. To do so, we examined subject ratings and willingness to pay 
behavior to determine how this framework applies to decisions between paying to avoid 
and experiencing pain, which is relevant to choices available in a modern health care 
context. In Experiment 1, an associative learning and decision making paradigm was 










































analysis when subjects made pain-related decisions. While we found that the modified-
relief ending stimuli had significantly greater AUC compared to the shorter stimulus at 
the same temperature in Experiment 1 (for example, the hot double peak stimulus versus 
the hot short stimulus), there was no significant difference in terms of summary ratings, 
suggesting that peak pain and duration were driving the evaluation of the overall 
experience. However, subjects were more willing to pay to avoid stimuli with higher 
peak pain, but not necessarily longer-duration pain, supporting prior work that has 
concluded that duration did not factor as prominently as peak pain into the cost-benefit 
analysis (Fredrickson, 2000). Additionally, subjects trended towards significance in 
terms of their increased tendency to buy out of the hot short stimulus compared to the 
hot stimulus with a modified ending, despite its relatively greater AUC. This was untrue 
for the same analysis at a low temperature. These data suggest that while peak is the 
primary driver of summary ratings and willingness to pay money to avoid future pain 
overall, modifying the final moments of the experience and/or including an episode of 
decreased pain may influence the event memory for the aversive event, potentially 
increasing the salience of the end, and influencing decision making in the context of 
medical pain management.  
In Experiment 2, we tested whether reporting moment-to-moment pain and/or a 
delay in pain evaluation would influence summary ratings. We found that reporting 
moment-to-moment pain affected ratings, but experiencing a rating delay did not, 
indicating subjects actually rated pain as more aversive if they had not made online 
ratings. This may mean that performing online ratings, which were used in many of the 
original peak-end effect studies (Kahneman et al., 1993; Redelmeier et al., 2003), may 
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serve to distract the subject from the pain stimulus, later influencing summary ratings 
and decision making. This finding has been demonstrated while participants make pain 
judgments (Ahles et al., 1983; Leventhal et al., 1979) or engage in various cognitive 
tasks (Buhle and Wager, 2010; Buhle et al., 2012) while experiencing pain, and is worth 
consideration when using online ratings in the future. Finally, we observed subjective 
ratings that were consistent with offset analgesia. Given that it involves pain relief 
following peak pain, this finding suggests that offset analgesia may act as a possible 
additional or reward-specific mechanism in modifying the affective experience of pain. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that peak pain is the primary driver of pain 
ratings and monetary decisions about these experiences, but may be mediated by 
affective and sensory mechanisms such as offset analgesia. 
In both experiments, we observed the offset-analgesia phenomenon, described as 
a “disproportionately large decrease in perceived pain following slight decrease in 
noxious thermal stimuli.” (Yelle et al., 2008) In the first experiment, participants were 
administered two blocks of high pain separated by a brief moment of low pain, yet 
subjectively they initially reported high online pain followed by a lower, more mild 
plateau (Figure 4A). These subjective reports were analogous to the end effect reported 
in prior literature (Fredrickson, 2000; Kahneman et al., 1993; Redelmeier and 
Kahneman, 1996; Redelmeier et al., 2003; Zauberman et al., 2006), and indicates that 
offset analgesia may influence the differential between pain administered and pain 
perceived in the second peak, thus playing a greater part in the peak-end effect than 
decision making researchers originally anticipated. In experiment 2, we administered a 
relatively lower amount of pain following a higher peak for 3 of the 4 stimuli, and found 
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that on average, subjects returned to baseline following the drop from peak. In fact, the 
graphical representation of online pain of the three stimuli with a modified ending 
appeared subjectively equivalent to the stimulus that administered no pain following the 
peak at all (Figure 4B). This suggests several potential cognitive mechanisms for the 
affective modulation of pain on the end effect: 1. Given the disparity in pain level 
perception, subjects may observe this as an event separate from the initial peak and 
therefore their rating may reflect a fraction of the experience; 2. If subjects observe 
little-to-no pain following the drop in temperature, they may observe a greater time-to-
rating between the peak pain and the rate prompt which may inflate memory-related 
recency effects; or 3. Subjects may average these moments of very little pain together 
with the high pain, resulting in a lower rating on average compared to other comparable 
stimuli. Since duration-to-rating was not a significant factor in summary ratings in 
Experiment 2, it is unlikely that the second possibility accounts for the mechanism 
linking offset analgesia and pain ratings. Other studies have shown that averages alone 
do not always account for all the factors needed to predict decisions (Ariely, 2008). 
Confirming this finding, and determining the contribution of other memory effects, such 
as recency, in the domain of pain ratings is an important future line of research.  
The effect of duration on these data was less clear, but confirmed the view that 
temporal dynamics contributing to pain evaluation may vary as a function of context. 
(Ariely and Lowenstein, 2000) Duration did influence summary ratings in Experiment 1, 
but this impact did not carry over to affect willingness-to-pay ratings, and had very little 
bearing on ratings in Experiment 2. While some studies have shown a negligible 
contribution of duration, (Fredrickson and Kahneman, 1993; Kahneman et al., 1993) it 
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has also been demonstrated that ratings and choices are less sensitive to duration, and 
that changing aspects of context while experiencing negative stimuli, like in willingness-
to-pay measures, (Vlaev et al., 2009) may influence its relative impact, including 
actively attending to stimuli or adding variability sequences of intensity over time, 
which has been shown to influence both duration assessment (Ariely and Lowenstein, 
2000) and pain ratings.(Stone et al., 2005) Further, duration effects are sensitive across 
relative experience, (Ariely and Carmon, 2000) and it is possible that the stimuli 
subjects experienced in this experiment were not long enough or of significant 
distinction such that participants would have incentive to encode an appreciably 
divergent valuation for each type of duration.  Finally, given the dissociation in effect 
significance of duration on summary compared to decision ratings, the possibility that 
fallacies in pain memory are specific to time or duration should be explored. 
Several issues arising from this study warrant consideration. First, the study 
focused on thermal pain, a specific type of nociception that may activate specific 
physical mechanisms that are relevant to the conclusions made here about offset 
analgesia. Second, we administered a level of pain which was safe and tolerable to the 
participant in this study, which may have limitations in terms of severity, as those 
enduring chronic, surgical, and other types of pain requiring medical treatment are likely 
to subjectively rate their pain as more intense. Finally, we used stimuli that ranged from 
14 to 24 seconds, whereas some other reports of the peak-end effect used stimuli ranging 
on the order of minutes (Redelmeier et al., 2003). Given that prolonged exposure to heat 
stimuli is correlated with increasing pain and tissue damage, it is possible that there are 
sensory and behavioral effects that are not captured with shorter noxious experience. 
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Additionally, pain ratings across different periods of time have been demonstrated as not 
always reliable, with differences in accuracy and types of reporting.(Broderick et al., 
2008; Broderick et al., 2006; Rainville et al., 2004) 
Future studies should aim to reveal the differential contribution of long- and 
short-duration stimuli to the peak-end effect’s influence on ratings, memory, and 
decisions about pain. Further, it is important to explore the applicability of offset 
analgesia to non-thermal and longer-duration stimuli to assess whether it could be 
relevant to the peak-end effect across domains. While its mechanism has been shown to 
involve descending inhibitory pain in the periaqueductal grey (PAG) and medulla, 
longer duration stimuli may recruit the opioid system, thereby potentially altering 
affective states as well. Finally, it is possible that individuals respond differently to 
offset analgesia as they do to other types of pain relief. Exploring the ways in which 
each participant responds in terms of self-report to identical decreases in pain would 
help to disentangle the sensory relative to the affective components of this phenomenon.  
In conclusion, this study supports the theory that peak pain is the primary 
influencing factor in pain ratings, memory, and decisions to endure future pain, but may 
be influenced by affective and sensory factors, such as a decrease in aversive pain 
through offset analgesia. Though duration was largely neglected when making financial 
decisions about pain, it did have an effect on summary ratings. Conversely, end pain did 
not have a significant impact on summary ratings, but subjects trended towards 
increased money spent to avoid the stimulus without the modified ending. Finally, we 
found that while recency, or time-to-rating factors did not impact pain evaluation, the act 
of making an online rating—and possibly visually attending to peak pain—did, such that 
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it worsened reported pain. While the findings for peak pain may not be surprising given 
that pain intensity may carry the most useful information in terms of tissue damage 
which would likely drive self-relevant future decisions, the exact mechanism for the end 
effect remains unknown. Future studies investigating the contribution of offset analgesia 
and the effects of memory and attention on the end effect will be helpful in 
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Chapter 3 was published in a shorter form as a letter to the editor in 
Schizophrenia Research: Reinen J, Smith EE, Insel C, Kribs R, Shohamy 
D., Wager TD, Jarskog LF. (2014). Patients with schizophrenia are 
impaired when learning in the context of pursuing rewards. Schizophrenia 






A fundamental learning process entails using information from prior feedback to 
select responses that maximize reward or avoid punishment. In humans, reward learning 
has been studied using incentives that are delivered probabilistically following a cue or 
choice, which is thought to mimic a non-deterministic, ecologically-valid environment. 
Converging evidence has demonstrated that this type of learning is mediated in part by 
dopamine signaling in the midbrain, ventral striatum, and ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(Aron et al., 2004; Daw et al., 2006; Delgado et al., 2005; Knowlton et al., 1996; 
O'Doherty et al., 2006; O'Doherty et al., 2003; Schonberg et al., 2007). Schizophrenia 
has been associated with dysregulation of dopamine in these neural regions (Abi-
Dargham et al., 1998; Abi-Dargham et al., 2000), and with impairments in probabilistic 
reward learning (Koch et al., 2010; Waltz et al., 2007; Weiler et al., 2009). Further, 
observed relationships between anhedonia and suboptimal performance on such learning 
tasks suggest that deficits in pursuing rewards may contribute to negative symptom 
formation .(Gold et al., 2012; Gold et al., 2008; Somlai et al., 2011; Strauss et al., 2011; 
Waltz et al., 2010a). 
Recent studies have found that patients with schizophrenia are more impaired 
when learning from stimuli that are associated with positive as compared to negative 
feedback. Accordingly, it has been hypothesized that this learning deficit in 
schizophrenia depends specifically on the valence of the feedback (e.g., positive or 
negative) (Strauss et al., 2011; Waltz et al., 2007). A natural extension of this body of 
work might address the question of motivation in terms of how the valence of an 
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outcome (e.g., financial gain) affects learning: is the deficit in reward learning affected 
by whether the outcome of the learning is positive (a gain) or negative (a loss), 
regardless of the valence of the feedback?  
In order to initially examine the dissociation of positive and negative feedback in 
schizophrenia during learning, prior experiments collapsed feedback and outcome 
valence together, such that feedback is provided and is assumed to be a positive outcome 
in and of itself, reward is presented alone, or feedback and an outcome are presented 
simultaneously and are always congruent (Daw et al., 2006; Delgado, 2007; Knowlton et 
al., 1996; Knutson et al., 2003). To answer the motivational question about positive 
versus negative outcomes, feedback needs to be kept constant and only the outcome may 
be varied with respect to the accumulation of a gain or the avoidance of a loss.  
As such, the reward learning paradigm introduced in this study was designed to 
separate feedback from outcome (Figure 3.1A). Similar to other reward learning studies, 
the participant was first presented a choice between two stimuli, then asked to choose 
the stimulus expected to lead to positive feedback, then received feedback about the 
correctness of the choice. In contrast to other studies, in the final stage of a given trial, 
the outcome occurred after receiving feedback, and the outcome was either a gain or a 
loss. This paradigm allows a determination of whether seeking a gain versus avoiding a 
loss leads to differential use of feedback in patients with schizophrenia.  
Given prior reports indicating that patients with schizophrenia often show a 
blunted reaction to the anticipation and occurrence of rewards (Gard et al., 2007), it was 
hypothesized that patients would learn less well when accumulating gains than when 
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avoiding losses. Further, it was expected that patients’ learning impairment for gains 




The research protocol was approved by the Institutional Review Boards of 
NYSPI and Columbia University. The participants included 17 patients with 
schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder and 17 Healthy Controls (HCs; see Table 3.1). 
Patients were recruited through the Lieber Center for Schizophrenia Research and 
Treatment of the New York State Psychiatric Institute (NYSPI). Patient eligibility 
criteria included DSM-IV criteria for schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder 
(diagnoses determined from the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID) (First 
et al., November 2002) and/or the Diagnostic Instrument for Genetic Studies 
(Nurnberger et al., 1994); adherence to one or two second-generation antipsychotic 
medications for > 2 months, with dose stability for >1 month; Calgary Depression Scale 
(CDS) (Addington et al., 1992) rating <10; Simpson Angus Scale (SAS) rating <6.  
 
Measure SZ (Mean/SD) 
Experiment 1  
HC (Mean/SD) 
Experiment 1 
Age 40.9 (11.4)* 29.6 (8.5)* 
Sex (M:F) 10:7 6:10 (1 unk)  
Education (years) 13.6 (2.8)* 15.7 (1.75)* 
2 unknown  
Ethnicity (White: Non- 5:12 7:10 
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White) 
SANS Sum: 24.6 (15.5) 
Global: 7.9 (5.0) 
N/A 
SAPS Sum: 8 (10.6) 




2.5 (3.1) N/A 
 
Table 3.1. Patient and Control Demographics.  Patients and controls were assessed based 
on demographic matching and differences. Despite some group differences, analyses 
showed that they did not correlate with the measures of interest.  
* Denotes significant difference at p < 0.05  
 
HCs were recruited through advertising. HC eligibility criteria included no 
current or past psychiatric or neurological illness, no history of substance dependence, 
no history of psychotropic medication use, and no illicit substance use in the past month.  
All eligible subjects (patients and HCs) provided written informed consent. 
Demographic information for all subjects is shown in Table 3.1. Due to differences in 
age and education between the patient and HC cohorts, subsequent analyses were 
performed, and we found that neither variable correlated with the dependent measures 




Testing took place on two days. On Day 1, participants underwent drug 
screening, clinical assessment, and eligibility interviews. On Day 2, the reward-learning 
task, assessments, and questionnaires were administered.  
 In the reward-learning task, the participant was instructed that each of two 
stimuli—simple, colored geometric shapes—were associated with different chances of 
winning money, and that they must learn, at first through trial and error, to find the 
“lucky” shape (see Supplemental Materials for additional details pertaining to 
instruction). The relationship between a stimulus and correct feedback was probabilistic, 
with one stimulus leading to Correct feedback 70% of the time and Incorrect feedback 
30%, and the other stimulus leading to Correct feedback 30% of the time and Incorrect 
feedback 70% (the stimulus associated with the higher probability was counterbalanced 
across participants). However, in each condition, the probability of receiving reward 
after choosing a particular stimulus gradually started to converge in the middle of the 
task, and remained switched until the completion of the experimental condition (Figure 
S3.1a, and Supplemental Information). This slow probability drift in the second half of 
the experiment was based on prior studies that have used shifting, stochastic reward 
contingencies to promote dynamically updating feedback as opposed to adopting an 
explicit strategy (Daw et al., 2006; Gershman et al., 2009). 
 
Every participant was tested in two conditions, Gain and Loss (Figure 3.1a, b). 
The conditions were presented in separate, non-intermixed sessions, comprised of 10 
blocks of approximately 10 trials per block (see Supplemental Materials for more 
detail). As this was an exploratory study, in an effort to optimize the number of trials 
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needed to ensure adequate learning in the patient group, each condition was comprised 
of 100 or 110 trials.  
 
Figure 3.1. Experimental Task Structure. (a) Gain condition. The task schematic depicts 
the Gain condition when the participant chooses the triangle, receives Correct feedback, 
and is rewarded with $1. (b) Loss condition. In the Loss condition, the participant 
chooses the triangle, receives Incorrect feedback, and loses $0.50.  
 
 
Figure 3.2. Probabilistic aspect of the reward paradigm. (a) Feedback probability. The 
reward contingency for each shape was initially set to a 70%/30% chance of correct 
feedback. However, this contingency gradually changed during each experimental 
condition, eventually reversing by the end. (b) Outcome probability. Correct feedback 
was associated with a 50% chance of receiving either $1 or $0.50 in the gain condition 
or losing $0 or $0.50 in the loss condition. Incorrect feedback was associated with a 
50% chance of receiving $0.50 or $0 in the gain condition and of losing $0.50 or $1 in 
the loss condition. 
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Different pairs of stimuli were used for the Gain and Loss sessions. The order in 
which the conditions were presented, as well as the shape and placement of the stimulus 
pairs, were counterbalanced across participants. The conditions differed only in whether 
the outcome was a gain or a loss; in the latter case, the loss was taken from an 
endowment given at the beginning of the condition (Figure 3.1b). In both conditions the 
sequence of events on a trial was as follows: (1) a choice between two stimuli (3 sec), 
(2) Feedback, consisting of either “Correct!” or “Incorrect!” (1 sec), and (3) a monetary 
Outcome.  
In the Gain condition, following Correct feedback, the outcome was $1 half of 
the time and $0.50 the other half; following Incorrect feedback, the outcome was $0.50 
half of the time and $0 the other half. In the Loss condition, following Correct feedback, 
the outcome was $0 half of the time, and -$0.50 the other half; following Incorrect 
feedback, the outcome was -$0.50 half of the time and -$1 the other half. The 
relationship between feedback and outcome was also probabilistic (Figure 3.1b). At the 
end of the experiment, participants were paid in full the amounts awarded during the 




Percentage Optimal Choice.  
As in prior reward learning studies (Gold et al., 2012; Waltz et al., 2007) 
performance was assessed by measuring participants’ tendency to select the optimal 
	  50	  
choice, which is the choice most often associated with being correct, regardless of the 
feedback on any specific trial.   Within-group differences in each condition, and 
performance before versus after the reversal were assessed using two-tailed, paired-
sample t-tests. One-tailed, one-sample t-tests were used to see if the participants’ 
performance was greater than chance. Subsequent two-tailed, independent samples t-
tests were used to examine group differences separately before the reversal. 
In the Gain condition, HCs showed that their pre-reversal mean percentage of 
optimal choices reached a level substantially greater than chance (t=5.66, p<0.001; 
Figure 3.3). The results for the patients in the Gain condition showed no significant 
learning during the first six blocks, as their performance against chance was not 
significant (t=1.39, p=0.09). However, in the loss condition, both HC and SZ groups 
performed significantly above chance in the pre-reversal blocks (HC:  t=4.55, p<0.001; 
SZ: t=3.83, p<0.001). 
To test our a priori hypotheses regarding differences between patients and HCs 
in learning under Gains vs. Losses, we conducted a series of planned comparisons. 
These revealed that prior to the reversal, patients performed significantly worse than 
HCs in the Gain condition (t=-3.67, p<0.001), but not in the Loss condition (t=-1.23, 
p=0.23; Figure 3.4a). Further, within-group analyses showed that in line with our 
hypotheses, while the patients showed performance differences between Gain and Loss 
conditions (t=-2.12, p=0.05), the HCs, in contrast, did not show performance differences 
between conditions (t = 0.27, p=0.79). Ignoring a priori hypotheses, an ANOVA with 
factors of group (SZ v. HC) and condition (Gain v. Loss) did show a main effect of 
group (F(1,64) = 11.38, p <.01) but not condition. However, the interaction did not reach 
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significance (F(1,64) = 2.37, p = 0.13). ANOVA analyses examining change of 
performance over time did show an effect of block and group (F(1,64) = 6.66 and 13.29, 
respectively, p < 0.01 for both) as expected due to the shift in contingencies. Interactions 
were significant for block by condition (F(1,64) = 2, p = 0.04) and block by group 
(F(1,64) = 4.58, p < 0.01), which is consistent with the idea that the patient group 
performed differently as time progressed.  
 
ROC Analyses for Optimal Choice   
In order to further assess differences in performance in each group, we used a 
receiver operating characteristic analysis to determine whether a binary classifier could 
assign control or patient status based on performance (see Supplemental Materials for 
more information). We found that the classifier was able to successfully do so based on 
optimal choice performance in this task with accuracy above chance. While the 
specificity (true negative rate) was similar in each condition (0.71), the ability of this 
classifier to identify control or patient (true positive rate, or sensitivity) and its accuracy 
were greater in the gain condition (0.76 and 0.74; p < 0.01) relative to the loss condition 
(0.71 and 0.71 , p = 0.02), which was a small effect, but consistent with our hypotheses.  
 
Post-reversal Optimal Choice   
After successfully learning a reward contingency, one would expect a subject’s 
performance to initially sharply decline once the contingency was reversed.  Thus, as a 
secondary measurement of learning, we examined optimal choice following the reversal, 
and predicted below- or at-chance performance. As expected, in the gain condition, HC 
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performance decreased when the probabilities were reversed (t = 3.13, p < 0.01; Figure 
3 and Figure 4b), but the patients were unaffected by the reversal (t = -1.26, p = 0.23). 
In the loss condition, both groups showed a decline in performance when the 
probabilities were reversed (HC: t = 4.08, p < 0.01; SZ: t = 2.63, p = 0.018). Between-
group comparisons showed that post-reversal, patients and HCs did not differ in 
performance in the Loss condition (t=-0.887,p=0.38), but there was a strong trend for a 
difference between them in performance in the Gain condition (t=-1.92, p=0.06).  
 
Figure 3.3. Mean optimal choice across blocks. In the (a) Gain Condition, and the (b) 
Loss Condition. Bullets represent mean optimal choice for a block of trials; error bars 
denote standard error (SE).  
 
Figure 3.4. Differences in performance for each group and condition. Controls and 
patients differed in optimal choice measures of performance both (a) Before The 
Reversal, and (b) After The Reversal in the gain but not the loss condition.  
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Medication and Optimal Choice  
To examine the potential effect of antipsychotic medication dosing, a Pearson 
correlation analysis was conducted between chlorpromazine-equivalent doses (Woods, 
2003) and optimal choice performance. In the Gain and Loss conditions, no significant 
relationship emerged (Gain: R=-0.05, p=0.84; Loss: R=0.30, p=0.24). 
 
Accumulation of Feedback  
Logistic regression was used to examine the cumulative impact of prior choices 
of and prior feedback about a particular shape on the probability that the same shape 
would be selected on the next trial. In this model, we assumed that stimulus choice and 
feedback (Correct or Incorrect) were combined linearly from a sliding window of the 
last 4 trials (N-4, N-3, N-2, and N-1) to predict the participant’s choice on the current 
trial (N). For each participant, the deviance of fit and relative (beta) weight for each of 
the last four trials on subsequent choice were generated from the model. Fit deviance 
across groups were compared using two-tailed independent samples t-tests  (for more 
information, see Supplemental Materials). The findings indicated that the model fit the 
data better for HCs than for patients, with patients showing a larger deviance of fit than 
HC in the Gain (t= 2.66, p<0.01) compared to the Loss condition (t = 1.54, p=0.13). 
These findings are consistent with previous reports using this type of model with patient 
populations (Supplemental Figure S3.1, Rutledge et al., 2009) and suggest that patients 
differ from controls in their integration of information from their experiences over time, 
especially in the Gain condition (see Supplemental Materials for additional details).  
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Percentage Win-Stay and Lose-Shift.  
To test whether gain or loss outcome affects the use of feedback, we examined 
how choosing a particular stimulus on Trial N depended on the feedback of the 
preceding trial, N-1. For each participant, we determined the percentage of times they 
received Correct feedback on Trial N-1 and made the same choice on Trial N (% Win-
Stay), as well as the percentage of times they received Incorrect feedback on Trial N-1 
and reversed their choice on Trial N (% Lose-Shift).  
Like for optimal choice, given the a priori hypotheses, we performed similar 
planned comparisons, and found that the patients were less likely than HCs to win-stay 
in the Gain condition (t=-3.66, p<0.01). In contrast, similar analyses applied to the lose-
shift data did not reveal any significant effects. A two-factor ANOVA (Group and 
Condition) of the Win-Stay data revealed a significant effect of Group (F(1,64)=16.13, 
p=0.002) but not condition, indicating that, overall, patients were less likely to stay with 
a winning choice. The group-by-condition interaction was not significant (F(1,64)=0.79, 
p=0.38). 
 
Negative Symptoms and Optimal Choice 
According to the evidence from prior studies, patients’ performance in the Gain 
condition should be inversely correlated with the degree of negative symptoms. Pearson 
correlation coefficients were used to assess the relationship between optimal-choice 
measures and clinical symptoms as quantified by Global SANS overall scores and 
subscores. Performance in the Gain condition suggested negative correlations with 
negative symptoms as measured by SANS. Specifically, the SANS global score showed 
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a trend toward a negative correlation (r = -0.47, p=0.06), while mean percentage optimal 
choices pre-reversal was negatively correlated with attention (r = -0.55, p=0.02) and a 
trend for affective flattening (r = -0.43, p=0.08).  Likewise, Win-Stay percentage was 
negatively correlated with attention (r = -0.51, p = 0.04). 
 
Discussion 
In support of the primary hypothesis, compared to HCs, patients with 
schizophrenia were impaired in feedback learning, and particularly when learning in the 
context of accumulating gains. This was identified by separating feedback (correct 
versus incorrect) from outcome (monetary gain versus loss) and represents an important 
extension of prior findings that have focused primarily on the valence of feedback (Gold 
et al., 2012; Strauss et al., 2011; Waltz et al., 2007; Waltz et al., 2010b). The current 
data suggest that there exists differential impairments in neural circuitry associated with 
learning that depends on the motivational context for patients with schizophrenia.  
 
Possible mechanisms 
The outcome may be a result of framing effects (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), 
which arise when one’s preference between the same two options differs when they are 
expressed as possible losses rather than possible gains. In particular, people who show a 
disproportionate decision preference to avoid losses relative to seeking gains are said to 
be loss-averse. While healthy people generally demonstrate greater sensitivity to losses 
than equivalent gains in decision-making tasks (Tom et al., 2007). One possibility 
stemming from these data is that patients with schizophrenia may be relatively more 
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loss-averse than HCs. While not extensively studied, one report found that patients with 
schizophrenia showed a notable absence of loss-aversion in a monetary transaction 
decision-making task. (Tremeau et al., 2008) Further study of the relevance of this 
mechanism to the current findings is needed. 
Alternatively, these findings may be based on a combination of motivational and 
cognitive concepts featured in prediction-error models of reward learning (O'Doherty et 
al., 2003; Schonberg et al., 2007; Schultz et al., 1997). In such models, learning on each 
trial is driven by the discrepancy between the participant’s prediction about the outcome 
and the actual outcome, which is used to update the probability estimate that a particular 
choice will lead to particular feedback. The updated probability is then combined with 
the anticipated value of the outcome to yield the expected value of each choice, which 
then drives the participant’s choice on the subsequent trial. However, if the anticipatory 
value and/or the anticipatory hedonia—shown to be blunted in patients with 
schizophrenia (Gard et al., 2007) – is reduced, the basis for an optimal choice will be 
compromised, potentially consistent with the current data.  
However, when the outcome is a potential loss, prediction involves probability 
estimation and anticipatory loss. Evidence suggests that prediction error representing 
loss may involve a qualitatively different neural signature than representing gain 
(Delgado et al., 2008; Pessiglione et al., 2006; Seymour et al., 2007) and thus may be 
relatively less compromised in patients with schizophrenia (Waltz et al., 2009; Waltz et 
al., 2010b). There is in fact neural evidence for blunted anticipatory hedonic reactions in 
schizophrenia from recent neuroimaging studies: when expecting a financial reward, 
patients show less activation in the ventral striatum than do HCs, a region known to be 
	  57	  
part of reward circuitry in humans (Juckel et al., 2006a; Juckel et al., 2006b). In 
addition, patients with schizophrenia deviate from HCs in their calculations of prediction 




Several limitations need to be considered. First, this was an exploratory study 
with a relatively small sample. Replication with a larger sample size is needed to 
confirm the results. Second, only one set of probabilities was used for relating Choice to 
Feedback (70/30). Potentially, at more extreme probabilities (e.g. 80/20), patients’ 
learning may have more closely matched the HCs. The 70/30 split was used in part to 
avoid ceiling effects for the HCs. Third, all patients were taking antipsychotic 
medications which can affect reward learning through activity on dopaminergic systems. 
To limit the confounding effects of antipsychotics, only patients taking second-
generation antipsychotics were enrolled. In part, second generation agents may be less 
likely to produce secondary negative symptoms such as anhedonia. However, Murray et 
al (Murray et al., 2008a) have also demonstrated reward learning deficits in unmedicated 
first-episode patients suggesting that antipsychotics are not a primary determinant of 
these findings. Furthermore, when correlating chlorpromazine-equivalent dosage level 
(Woods, 2003) with percentage optimal choice, the correlations were not significant in 




These findings offer preliminary evidence that the motivational context of 
reward-seeking behavior may impact people with schizophrenia during learning. 
Defining the behavioral and neural mechanisms involved in this deficit may provide a 
basis for the motivational and affective symptoms that have traditionally been difficult 
to characterize. Specifically, future studies should seek to compare the neural systems 
that support reward- and loss-based learning on a trial-by-trial basis such as the ventral 
striatum with those that may underlie the conceptualization of contextual and affective 




Testing Presentation and Instructions 
 
All participants were tested at the New York State Psychiatric Institute on a 
MacBookPro computer using a keypad extension via USB. The task was presented with 
Matlab (MathWorks) using Psychtoolbox software. (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) Before 
starting the experiment, participants were given up to 15 practice trials in order to 
familiarize themselves with the keypad. Before they began the experimental condition, 
each participant read instructions that were similar yet specific to that condition. For 
example, participants were given the following standard reward learning instructions 
prior to starting the gain condition:   
 
“In this game, you will be presented with pictures of shapes, and you will be asked to 
choose one of them. Each shape represents a different chance of winning money. This 
chance can change over time, as well as change every time you play the game. If you 
choose a lucky shape, you will have a better chance of making money, which will be 
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paid to you at the end of this experiment. Your goal is to make as much money as 
possible. In order to make as much money as possible, your job is to find which shape is 
luckier, and choose it. At first you will have to guess. As you play the game, you will 
gradually get better. But, even as you improve, you probably will not be able to get it 
right all the time, so do not get frustrated. This is a game that involves both skill and 
luck.”   
 
In the Loss condition, before beginning the round participants were told they 
would receive $50-80 depending on the length of the version of the experiment, and that 
their goal was to avoid losing this money. Instructions for the Loss condition were 
similar to the language used for the Gain condition, with additional context-appropriate 
changes.  
 
Participants were also explicitly informed that the reward contingency was 
related to the shape itself, and not the side of the screen on which it was presented.  
 
Task Setup and Reward Structure  
Each participant completed both the Gain and Loss experimental conditions. In 
each condition, the reward contingencies associated with the shapes remained stable 
until after the first half of the total trials, at which point they gradually switched and then 
finally re-stabilized at the end. By the end, the reward contingencies had completely 
switched, such that the shape that was the optimal choice at the beginning of the 
experiment was now the sub-optimal choice (see Supplemental Figure S3.1). 
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Participants completed either 100 or 110 trials per condition. The longer task was added 
to optimize the number of trials for adequate learning in the schizophrenia group, and to 
determine whether these patients would eventually acquire the appropriate reward 
contingencies in the gain condition if given additional trials to do so; in subsequent 
analyses, no significant difference was found. For those completing 100 trials, the 
reversal occurred at trial 60, and for those completing 110 trials, the reversal occurred at 
trial 80. For purposes of analysis of performance and graphical presentation of these 
data, all types of experimental conditions were divided into 10 blocks of approximately 
10 trials, depending on the number of trials in the condition. Of these 10 blocks, all trials 
prior to the reversal were divided into 6 blocks, and all trials following the reversal were 
divided into 4 blocks.   
Event timing was such that each participant was given 3 seconds to make a 
choice, and feedback and outcome were each presented for 1 second. Inter-trial and 
inter–stimulus intervals were presented for anywhere between 3 and 7 seconds.  
 
Group Matching  
 
While group matching was not entirely successful, we explored correlations 
between age, education, and all of the dependent measures used in our analyses. No 
significant correlations were found between the patients’ education and age with the 
dependent measures. We outline the statistical findings in Supplementary Tables S3.1 


































-0.20 -0.31 -0.15 -0.39 0.43 0.32 0.31 0.45 
P-Value, 
HC 
0.45 0.23 0.57 0.24 0.08 0.22 0.23 0.07 
R-Value, 
SZ 
-0.07 0.15 -0.14 0.23 0.17 0.25 -0.04 -0.33 
P-Value, 
SZ 
0.78 0.58 0.59 0.37 0.52 0.33 0.89 0.19 
































-0.49 0.15 -0.15 0.08 0.35 0.24 0.39 0.03 
P-Value, 
HC 
0.06 0.58 0.58 0.78 0.20 0.38 0.15 0.91 
R-Value, 
SZ 
0.40 0.26 0.20 0.36 0.05 0.14 -0.41 -0.38 
P-Value, 
SZ 
0.11 0.32 0.43 0.16 0.84 0.59 0.10 0.13 
Supplemental Table S3.2. Correlations between education and each dependent measure 
in each condition.  
 
 
ROC Analyses for Optimal Choice  
We used a receiver operating characteristic analysis to determine whether control 
or patient status could be assigned based on optimal choice performance prior to the 
switch in both the gain and loss conditions. In these analyses, positive predictive value 
was the probability that control status was assigned given a certain optimal choice score. 
Specificity in this case was defined as the probability that someone would be correctly 
classified as a control, whereas sensitivity is the probability that the test can correctly 
identify those who have schizophrenia. True positive rate (sensitivity), false positive rate 
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(1 – specificity), and area under the curve were calculated for every step of the ROC 
curve using in-house code in order to identify optimal overall accuracy in terms of 
sensitivity and specificity. P-values were generated from a binomial test of those 
misclassified against chance.  
 
Logistic Regression Model 
We used a logistic regression model to estimate the impact of prior feedback on 
subsequent choice. We chose to look at a four-trial window of feedback received, such 
that correct feedback was coded as 1 and incorrect feedback was coded as 0. Like in 
previous models, (Rutledge et al., 2009) we assumed that both correct (rewarding) 
feedback and choice were combined to predict the log odds that the participant would 
make the same choice on the current trial N. Thus, we looked at this experience from the 
past 4 feedback experiences from the perspective of a specific shape (Shape A), coded as 
1 if that shape was chosen and rewarded, -1 if the other shape was chosen and rewarded, 
and otherwise 0. Choice was coded for up to 4 trials back as 1 if our specific shape 
(Shape A) was chosen, and -1 if the other choice was chosen. Using Matlab 7.9’s 
glmfit.m and glmval.m functions, we used a matrix containing 8 independent variables 
(4 from the experience of choice and reward 1 through 4 trials back, and 4 from the 
choice values themselves 1 through 4 trials back) to predict the subsequent choice on 
trial N+1:  
 
PchoosingA(N) = Σ(RA (N - i) - RB (N - i) ) + Σ (CA (N - i) - CB (N - i) )
for  i = 1 to 4 trials back
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Where N is the current trial, R is reward, C is choice, and A and B represent the stimulus 
options. Thus, we would expect the probability of choosing stimulus A on trial N will 
increase with the number of times a choice of A has lead to Correct feedback (see the 
leftmost term in the above equation) and decrease with the number of times a choice of 
stimulus B has been associated with Correct feedback (see the next term in the 
equation). To test whether the controls had significantly larger beta weights than 
patients, we used one-tailed, independent samples t-tests. Our findings indicated a trend 
for the HCs to have higher beta weights than the patients, and for these group 
differences to occur more frequently in the Gain than Loss condition. In the Gain 
condition, the first and third trials back were trending towards a significant group 
difference (p= 0.11 and 0.06, respectively), whereas in the Loss condition, only the 
second trial back showed a trend towards a significant group difference (p = 0.08). All 
other data points were not significantly different.  
 
Model fit was assessed using the deviance term returned in Matlab’s glmfit.m for 
the logistic regression calculation. These measures of deviance were found to be 
significantly different between patients and controls in the gain (t= -2.66, p<0.01) but 
not the loss condition (t =1.54, p=0.07), suggesting the possibility that the patients are 
using an alternate strategy in the gain condition.   
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Supplemental Figure 3.1. Logistic regression model. (A) Gain condition; (B) loss 
condition. A logistic regression model was used to fit coefficients representing beta 
weights for the impact of feedback (shown) and choice (not shown) on subsequent 
choice.   
 
Dosing Equivalents 
We calculated correlations between the patients’ equivalent dosage level 
(Woods, 2003) and their percentage optimal choice. We did not find significant 
correlations in either condition (Pearson correlation of chlorpromazine dose(Woods, 
2003) and optimal choice performance:  Gain: R = -0.05, p = 0.84; Loss: R = 0.30, p = 
0.24).  
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Introduction	  	  
A	   great	   deal	   of	   converging	   evidence	   suggests	   that	   midbrain	   dopamine	  
supports	   reinforcement	   learning	   by	   signaling	   a	   reward	   prediction	   error,	   which	  
reflects	   the	   difference	   between	   the	   reward	   received	   and	   the	   reward	   expected	  
(Bayer	  and	  Glimcher,	  2005;	  Hart	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  Schultz	  et	  al.,	  1997).	  The	  prediction	  
error	  allows	  an	  animal	  to	  update	  the	  value	  associated	  with	  the	  cue	  in	  the	  service	  of	  
guiding	   later	   choices.	   In	   incremental	   reward	   learning	   tasks	   in	  humans,	   functional	  
magnetic	   resonance	   imaging	   (fMRI)	   studies	   have	   shown	   that	   trial-­‐by-­‐trial	  
variations	  in	  the	  magnitude	  of	  prediction	  errors	  correlate	  with	  BOLD	  activity	  in	  the	  
nucleus	  accumbens	  and	  the	  medial	  prefrontal	  and	  orbitofrontal	  cortices,	  a	  finding	  
in	   accordance	   with	   anatomical	   data	   indicating	   that	   midbrain	   dopamine	   neurons	  
project	  to	  these	  precise	  regions	  (Daw	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  Hare	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  McClure	  et	  al.,	  
2003;	   O'Doherty	   et	   al.,	   2003;	   Oades	   and	   Halliday,	   1987;	   Schonberg	   et	   al.,	   2007;	  
Williams	  and	  Goldman-­‐Rakic,	  1993).	  	  
Beyond	   the	  progress	   in	   understanding	  basic	  mechanisms	  of	   reward-­‐based	  
learning,	   this	   framework	   additionally	   offers	   a	   promising	   approach	   towards	  
understanding	   learning	   and	   affect	   in	   diseases	   associated	   with	   dopaminergic	  
deficits.	   Most	   prominently,	   schizophrenia	   (SZ)	   is	   a	   disease	   associated	   with	  
abnormal	   dopamine	   function	   and	   is	   also	   characterized	   by	   motivational	   and	  
affective	   symptoms,	   termed	   negative	   symptoms	   (Abi-­‐Dargham	   et	   al.,	   1998;	  
Kirkpatrick	  et	  al.,	   2006).	  A	  developing	  body	  of	   literature	  has	   shown	   that	  patients	  
with	   schizophrenia—especially	   those	  with	  more	   severe	   negative	   symptoms—are	  
impaired	   on	   probabilistic	   learning	   tasks	   that	   involve	   probabilistic	   reinforcement,	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particularly	  when	  trying	  to	  signal	  for	  positive,	  rather	  than	  negative,	  outcomes	  (Gold	  
et	  al.,	  2012;	  Reinen	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  Strauss	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Waltz	  et	  al.,	  2010a).	   	  Studies	  
have	   demonstrated	   that	   these	   impairments	   in	   patients	   with	   schizophrenia	   may	  
stem	  from	  abnormal	  prediction	  error	  responses	  in	  the	  striatum	  during	  anticipation	  
of	   reinforcement	   (Dowd	   and	   Barch,	   2012;	   Grimm	   et	   al.,	   2012),	   and/or	   from	  
abnormalities	   in	   responses	   in	   the	   medial	   and	   orbitofrontal	   cortex	   at	   reward	  
outcome	  (Walter	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Waltz	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Waltz	  et	  al.,	  2010b).	  Despite	  some	  
inconsistencies	  across	  studies,	  these	  findings	  suggest	  a	  neurobiological	  mechanism	  
linking	  between	  learning	  and	  affect	  in	  this	  disease.	  
Interestingly,	  behavioral	  experiments	  in	  schizophrenia	  suggest	  that	  affective	  
abnormalities	  are	  particularly	  related	  to	  the	  anticipation,	  or	  wanting,	  of	  a	  reward.	  
In	   particular,	   self-­‐report	   studies	   suggest	   that	   schizophrenia	   involves	   a	   deficit	   in	  
wanting	  reward,	  but	  not	  in	  enjoying	  it	  (Cohen	  and	  Minor,	  2010;	  Gard	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  
Kring	  and	  Moran,	  2008).	  This	  asymmetry	  relates	  to	  a	  broader	  distinction	  between	  
1)	   anticipation,	   often	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   feeling	   of	   wanting	   the	   reward	   during	  
presentation	  of	   the	  cue,	  and	  2)	   reward	  outcome,	  often	  referred	   to	  as	   the	  hedonic	  
response	  associated	  with	  liking	  or	  consuming	  the	  reward.	  As	  mentioned,	  midbrain	  
dopamine	   neurons	   respond	   at	   both	   stages	   to	   first	   represent	   the	   expectation	   of	  
reward	  at	  the	  cue,	  and	  second	  the	  PE	  at	  reward	  outcome.	  	  
The	  idea	  that	  patients	  with	  schizophrenia	  are	  impaired	  during	  anticipation	  
but	  not	  at	  outcome	  has	   lead	   to	  a	   theory	   that	  a	  suboptimal	  anticipatory	  dopamine	  
signal	  may	  provide	  the	  substrate	  for	  motivational	  symptoms	  of	  the	  disease	  (Gold	  et	  
al.,	   2008;	   Kring	   and	   Barch,	   2014).	   These	   findings	   are	   aligned	   with	   research	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suggesting	   that	   dopamine	   supports	   the	   mechanism	   underling	   feelings	   of	  
anticipation,	  but	  not	  the	  affective	  experience	  of	  hedonic	  experience	  itself	  (Berridge	  
and	  Robinson,	  1998).	  	  	  
In	  spite	  of	  this,	  some	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  the	  reward	  outcome	  may	  not	  
be	  intact,	  either	  (Murray	  et	  al.,	  2008b;	  Walter	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Waltz	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Waltz	  
et	  al.,	  2010b),	  which	  could	   reflect	   that	   the	   informational	   component	  of	  dopamine	  
signaling	   is	   dysfunctional	   at	   both	   stages.	   Nonetheless,	   even	   if	   dopamine	   is	  
separable	   from	   pleasure	   states,	   it	   is	   unclear	   how	   it	   contributes	   to	   affective	  
experience	  at	  each	  stage	  of	  learning,	  updating	  value,	  and	  maximizing	  the	  utility	  of	  
choices.	  	  
Further,	   it	   is	   known	   that	   the	   striatum	   and	   orbitofronal	   cortex	   update	  
information	  from	  reward	  outcome	  to	  be	  reflected	   in	  the	  choice	  value.	  Thus,	   these	  
inconsistencies	  could	  be	  related	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  most	  studies	  to	  date	  use	  paradigms	  
that	  cannot	  distinguish	  between	  choice	  and	  anticipation,	  using	  designs	  in	  which	  the	  
two	  processes	  are	  temporally	  collapsed.	  	  
Here,	  we	  sought	  to	  advance	  understanding	  of	  how	  patients	  with	  SZ	  process	  
choice,	  anticipation	  and	  reward	  outcomes	  and	  how	  these	  signals	  are	  used	  to	  guide	  
choices	  when	  learning	  from	  gains	  from	  losses.	  To	  address	  this,	  we	  designed	  a	  task	  
aimed	  to	  separately	  examine	  each	  of	  these	  three	  stages	  of	  reward	  learning.	  In	  this	  
experiment	   (Figure	   4.1),	   subjects	  made	   a	   choice,	   then	   received	   verbal	   feedback,	  
and	  then	  received	  a	  monetary	  outcome,	  consisting	  of	  a	  gain	   in	  the	  gain	  condition,	  
and	   loss	   (or	   avoidance	   of)	   in	   the	   loss	   condition.	   Importantly,	   because	   the	  
associations	  between	  the	  choice,	  feedback,	  and	  the	  outcome	  were	  probabilistic,	  this	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allowed	   us	   to	   dissociate	   each	   of	   these	   stages	   in	   time	   and	   compare	   across	   them.	  	  
Further,	   given	   prior	   data	   indicating	   different	   types	   of	   learning	   performance	   in	  
schizophrenia	   as	   a	   function	   of	   learning	   from	   positive	   or	   negative	   outcomes,	   we	  
separated	  the	  motivational	  context	  to	  determine	  whether	  there	  were	  differences	  in	  
behavior	  and	  BOLD	  activity	  across	  conditions.	  	  
For	   each	   trial,	   we	   calculated	   a	   quantitative	   informational	   parametric	  
regressor	  at	  each	  time	  point,	  comprised	  of	  choice	  value,	  feedback	  prediction	  error,	  
and	   reward	   prediction	   error,	   respectively,	   and	   used	   fMRI	   to	   examine	   BOLD	  
responses	   in	  brain	   regions	   consistently	   shown	   to	   reflect	   reward	  and	  value	   in	   the	  
healthy	   brain,	   namely,	   the	   ventral	   striatum	   and	   orbitofrontal	   cortex.	   Next,	   to	  
examine	   the	   relationship	   between	   affective	   symptoms	   and	   information	  
representation,	   we	   performed	   hypothesis-­‐driven	   correlational	   tests	   for	   each	   of	  
these	   time	   points	   compared	   to	   affective	   flattening,	   anhedonia,	   and	   apathy	   in	   the	  
gain	   condition	   only.	   We	   hypothesized	   that,	   based	   on	   prior	   research	   revealing	  
deficiencies	   both	   in	   behavioral	   anticipation	   and	   orbitofronal	   abnormalities	  
specifically	  during	  reward	  (but	  not	   loss)	  outcome,	  both	  anticipatory	  and	  outcome	  
signals	   would	   be	   deficient	   in	   both	   of	   these	   specific	   brain	   regions	   in	   the	   gain	  
condition,	   and	   that	   anticipatory	   signals	   would	   be	   correlated	   with	   motivational	  
deficits	  (apathy)	  while	  outcome	  signals	  would	  be	  correlated	  with	  affective	  deficits	  
(anhedonia,	  affective	  flattening)	  in	  these	  regions.	  	  
	  
Methods	  	  
Healthy	  Participants	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Twenty-­‐five	   right-­‐handed,	   English-­‐speaking	   participants	   between	   the	   ages	  
of	  18	  and	  55	  participated	  in	  the	  study	  (for	  demographics,	  see	  Table	  4.1).	  Prior	  to	  
participation,	   all	   subjects	   provided	   informed	   consent	   consistent	   with	   processes	  
approved	  by	  the	  Columbia	  University’s	  and	  New	  York	  State	  Psychiatric	   Institute’s	  
Institutional	   Review	   Boards.	   All	   subjects	   completed	   screening	   for	   drug	   use,	  
pregnancy,	   adequate	   vision,	   history	   of	   substance	   abuse,	   psychiatric	   and	  
neurological	  disorders,	  and	  use	  of	  psychotropic	  medication.	  	  
	  
	  
Table	   4.1.	   Participant	   demographics.	   Participants	   were	   matched	   on	   gender,	   age,	  
and	  education.	  None	  of	  these	  factors	  differed	  significantly	  between	  groups.	  	  
	  
Patient	  Participants	  
Twenty-­‐eight	   right-­‐handed,	   English	   speaking	   outpatients	   with	  
schizophrenia	  between	  the	  ages	  of	  18	  and	  55	  also	  participated	  in	  the	  study	  (Table	  
4.1).	   	  All	  patient	  participants	  were	  recruited	  at	  the	  Lieber	  Center	  at	  the	  New	  York	  
State	   Psychiatric	   Institute	   and	   met	   DSM-­‐IV	   criteria	   for	   schizophrenia	   or	  
schizoaffective	   disorder	   as	   indicated	   through	   clinical	   interviews	   using	   the	  
Structured	   Clinical	   Interview	   for	   DSM-­‐IV	   and	   medical	   records	   (First	   et	   al.,	  
November	   2002).	   Before	   any	   study	   procedures	   were	   completed,	   patients	   were	  
consented,	  screened,	  and	  assessed	  by	  clinicians.	  This	  assessment	   included	  clinical	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ratings,	   including	   the	  Simpson	  Angus	  Scale	  (SAS),	   the	  Scale	   for	   the	  Assessment	  of	  
Positive	  Symptoms	  (SAPS),	  the	  Scale	  for	  Assessment	  of	  Negative	  Symptoms	  (SANS)	  
and	   the	   Calgary	   Depression	   Scale	   (CDS)	   (Addington	   et	   al.,	   1992;	   Andreasen	   and	  
Olsen,	   1982).	   One	   left-­‐handed	   subject	   was	   tested	   behaviorally,	   but	   this	   subject’s	  
data	  was	   not	   included	   in	   the	   functional	   imaging	   analysis.	   All	   patient	   participants	  
were	   taking	   at	   least	   one	   atypical	   antipsychotic	   drug	   (excluding	   clozapine)	   for	   at	  
two	  months	  or	  more,	  and	  were	  on	  a	  stable	  dose	  for	  at	  least	  one	  month	  prior	  to	  the	  
day	  of	  testing.	  All	  participants	  received	  a	  total	  of	  $250	  for	  study	  participation	  and	  
won	  additional	  earnings	  based	  on	  performance.	  	  
Three	  patient	  participants	  and	  one	  healthy	  control	  were	  removed	  for	  poor	  
learning.	  Additionally,	  3	  patients	  and	  2	  controls	  were	  excluded	  from	  fMRI	  analyses	  
due	   to	   technical	   problems	   during	   fMRI	   data	   acquisition	   or	   excessive	   movement,	  
and	  one	  patient	  was	  excluded	  for	  handedness.	  	  Consequently,	  the	  imaging	  analysis	  
included	  22	  subjects	  in	  each	  group,	  and	  for	  the	  behavioral	  analysis,	  25	  patients	  and	  
24	  healthy	  controls	  were	  included.	  	  
	  
Procedures	  and	  Task	  	  
Testing	   procedures	   occurred	   in	   two	   sessions.	   In	   the	   first	   session,	   each	  
subject	  completed	  drug	  and	  medical	  history	  screening,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  series	  of	  reward	  
sensitivity	  questionnaires,	  two	  working	  memory	  tasks,	  and	  a	  short	  practice	  session.	  
The	  practice	  session	  was	  comprised	  of	  a	  comparable	  but	  distinct	  reward	  learning	  
task	   designed	   to	   familiarize	   the	   subjects	   with	   the	   experimenter,	   task	   structure,	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testing	   environment,	   and	   appropriate	   button	   response,	   but	   with	   distinct	   stimuli,	  
contingency,	  and	  outcome	  structure.	  	  
Subjects	  participated	   in	   the	   second	  session	  at	   the	  Neurological	   Institute	  at	  
Columbia	  University	  Medical	   Center,	   during	  which	   they	   completed	   a	   leaning	   task	  
while	  undergoing	  fMRI.	  Each	  participant	  performed	  two	  counterbalanced	  phases	  of	  
110s	   trials	  of	  a	  stochastic,	  probabilistic	   learning	   task,	  one	   in	  which	  subjects	  were	  
instructed	  that	  their	  goal	  was	  to	  make	  as	  much	  money	  as	  possible	  (gain	  condition),	  
and	  another	  in	  which	  the	  goal	  was	  to	  avoid	  losing	  money	  (loss	  condition).	  For	  the	  
purpose	  of	  this	  paper,	  we	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  data	  obtained	  in	  the	  gain	  condition,	  but	  
for	   contrast,	  will	   present	   some	   selected	   data	   from	   the	   loss	   condition	   as	  well.	   On	  
each	  trial	  (Figure	  4.1),	  subjects	  were	  allowed	  3	  seconds	  to	  make	  a	  choice	  between	  
one	  of	  two	  stimuli	  comprised	  of	  geometric,	  colored	  shapes.	  After	  a	  jittered	  interval,	  
subjects	   received	   written	   verbal	   feedback	   regarding	   whether	   their	   choice	   was	  
“Correct”	  or	  “Incorrect”	  (1s).	  Finally,	  after	  a	  second	  jittered	  interval,	  subjects	  were	  
given	  a	  monetary	  outcome	  related	  to	  their	  performance,	  which	  was	  presented	  as	  a	  
high-­‐resolution	   image	   of	   the	   actual	   currency	   that	   they	   received.	   Trials	   were	  
separated	   by	   a	   jittered	   interval,	   as	   well.	   Subjects	   were	   aware	   that	   they	   would	  
receive	   the	   actual	   reward	   presented	   during	   the	   task	   following	   completion	   of	   the	  
study.	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Figure 4.1. Probabilistic structure. The task schematic above depicts the reward learning 
task used in the behavioral and imaging studies henceforth for the gain condition. This 
task was designed to separate the parts of the decision making process. Specifically, in 
this task, subjects made a choice between two colored shape stimuli, received verbal 
feedback, and then received a monetary outcome. Each stage was separated by a jittered 




The	   association	   between	   cues	   and	   outcomes	   was	   probabilistic.	   In	   each	  
condition,	   one	   of	   the	   available	   shapes	  was	   the	   “optimal”	   stimulus,	  which	   yielded	  
“Correct”	  feedback	  70%	  of	  the	  time,	  whereas	  the	  other	  stimulus	  yielded	  “Correct”	  
feedback	   only	   30%	   of	   the	   time.	   Stimuli,	   which	   were	   colored	   shapes,	   were	  
counterbalanced	  for	  condition	  and	  optimal	  shape.	  Through	  trial	  and	  error,	  subjects	  
had	   to	   determine	   which	   shape	   was	   better,	   and	   choose	   it	   to	   maximize	  monetary	  
earnings.	  	  
Reward	   outcome	   was	   linked	   to	   feedback	   probabilistically.	   In	   the	   gain	  
condition,	  when	   a	   subject	  was	   correct,	   they	   received	   $1.00	  50%	  of	   the	   time,	   and	  
$0.50	   the	   other	   50%	   of	   the	   time.	  When	   incorrect,	   a	   subject	  would	   receive	   $0.50	  
50%	   of	   the	   time,	   and	   $0	   the	   other	   50%	   of	   the	   time	   (Table	   4.2).	   In	   the	   loss	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condition,	  subjects	  were	  first	  given	  an	  $80	  endowment	  with	  which	  to	  complete	  the	  
task.	  When	  a	  subject	  was	  correct,	  they	  lost	  $0	  50%	  of	  the	  time,	  and	  $0.50	  the	  other	  
50%	  of	   the	   time.	  When	   incorrect,	   they	   lost	   $1.00	  50%	  of	   the	   time,	   and	  $0.50	   the	  
other	  50%	  of	  the	  time	  (Table	  4.2)	  When	  subjects	  fail	  to	  make	  a	  choice,	  they	  receive	  
a	  notice	  that	  they	  should	  respond	  in	  time,	  and	  then	  receive	  no	  earnings	  in	  the	  gain	  
condition,	  and	  lost	  $1	  in	  the	  loss	  condition.	  
	  
Table	  4.2.	  Chance	  of	  reward	  outcome.	  Breakdown	  of	  potential	  rewards	  or	  
losses	  following	  feedback	  in	  the	  gain	  (left)	  and	  loss	  (right)	  conditions.	  	  
	  
Behavioral	  analysis.	  	  	  
To	   obtain	   a	   general	   overview	   of	   subject	   performance,	   we	   calculated	   the	  
proportion	  of	  times	  the	  subject	  chose	  the	  optimal	  choice	  for	  each	  block	  of	  ten	  trials	  
across	  time,	  for	  each	  group	  separately.	  	  Next,	  based	  on	  findings	  from	  prior	  research,	  
we	  wanted	  to	  assess	  whether	  subjects	  were	  becoming	  faster	  throughout	  the	  task	  in	  
terms	   of	   their	   choice	   reaction	   times	   (speeding)	   as	   they	   learned	   to	   anticipate	   a	  
reward	  outcome	  (O'Doherty	  et	  al.,	  2006),	  but	  not	  necessarily	  a	  neutral	  or	  negative	  
outcome.	  To	  do	  this,	  we	  calculated	  reaction	  time	  for	  each	  condition	  during	  the	  first,	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second,	   and	   last	   third	   of	   trials	   for	   each	   group	   separately,	   and	   compared	   the	   first	  
and	  last	  phases.	  	  
	  
Reinforcement	  learning	  model.	  	  
In	  order	   to	  assess	  how	  subjects	  updated	   feedback	  and	  outcome	  over	   time,	  
we	   used	   a	   variant	   of	   a	   two-­‐stage	   reinforcement	   learning	   model	   (Daw,	   2011;	  
Schonberg	   et	   al.,	   2007;	   Sutton	   and	  Barto,	   1998).	   Assuming	   that	   correct	   feedback	  
and	   better-­‐than-­‐expected	   monetary	   outcome	   were	   reinforcers,	   subjects’	   choices	  
were	  modeled	  as	  a	  function	  of	  prior	  experience	  at	  each	  stage:	  	  
Qs1, ch(t )=Qs1, t +αs1*Δs1, t
Δs1, t = fb(t) -Qs1, ch(t )
Qs2, fb(t )=Qs2, t +αs2*Δs2, t
Δs2, t = rew(t) -Qs2, fb(t )
	  
To	  do	  so,	  we	  calculated	  stage-­‐specific	  cumulative	  values	  (Q)	  at	  each	  trial	  (t)	  
given	   the	   subject's	   history	   of	   choices	   (ch)	   made,	   and	   feedback	   (fb)	   and	   reward	  
(rew)	   received	   during	   two	   stages:	   choice	   to	   verbal	   feedback	   (s1),	   and	   verbal	  
feedback	  to	  monetary	  payoff	  (s2).	  For	  each	  subject,	  we	  estimated	  free	  learning	  rate	  
parameters	  (α1	  and	  α2)	  separately	  for	  each	  stage,	  given	  the	  values	  and	  choices	  at	  
each	  trial	  that	  maximize	  the	  likelihood	  of	  the	  model.	  The	  two	  learning	  rates	  reflect	  
how	  frequently	  a	  subject	  updates	  information	  across	  all	  trials	  in	  each	  condition,	  as	  
measured	  by	   their	  choices.	  Critically,	   the	  ability	   to	  update	   the	  cue	  value	  relies	  on	  
information	   in	   the	   form	   of	   prediction	   error	   (PE),	   the	   difference	   between	   value	  
expected	  and	  outcome	  received,	  which	  was	  calculated	  separately	  for	  each	  stage	  at	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each	  trial	  (Δs1	  and	  Δs2),	  and	  was	  driven	  by	  the	  monetary	  reward	  in	  the	  stage	  1	  PE.	  	  
We	   assumed	   that	   subjects	   made	   their	   choices	   according	   to	   a	   standard	   softmax	  
(beta)	  distribution	   related	   to	   the	  value	  of	   the	   first	   stage,	   given	   that	   there	  was	  no	  
action	   in	   the	   second	   stage;	   this	   and	   the	   eligibility	  parameter	  were	   estimated	  and	  
utilized	  in	  a	  similar	  manner	  to	  prior	  work	  (Daw,	  2011).	  To	  estimate	  chosen	  value	  
for	  use	  as	  a	  parametric	  regressor,	  we	  accounted	  non-­‐chosen	  option	  by	  calculating	  
the	   probability	   of	   the	   choice	   made	   from	   the	   softmax	   equation	   (Boorman	   et	   al.,	  
2009;	  Daw	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  Wimmer	  et	  al.,	  2012)	  
Pc, tα exp(β(Qc, t +ϕI(c,ct −1))) 	  
	   Following	   subject-­‐specific	   learning	   rates	   estimation,	   we	   chose	   group-­‐
specific	   learning	  rates	  based	  on	  the	  mean	   learning	  rates	  and	  the	  median	  softmax.	  
These	   group	   level	   values	   were	   later	   used	   to	   calculate	   PE	   separately	   for	   verbal	  
feedback	   and	   monetary	   outcome,	   and	   were	   used	   as	   trial-­‐specific	   parametric	  
regressors	  in	  the	  GLM	  for	  the	  imaging	  data.	  	  
	  
FMRI	  methods.	  	  
All	  scanning	  took	  place	  at	  the	  Neurological	  Institute	  at	  Columbia	  University	  
Medical	   Center	   on	   a	   1.5T	   GE	   Signal	   Twin	   Speed	   Excite	   HD	   Scanner	   using	   a	   one-­‐
channel	   head	   coil.	   We	   acquired	   both	   a	   high-­‐resolution	   T1-­‐weighed	   structural	  
imaging	  using	   a	   spoil	   gradient	   recoil	   sequence	   (1x1x1	  mm	  voxel),	   and	   functional	  
(blood	  oxygen	  level	  dependent;	  BOLD)	   images	  using	  a	  T2*-­‐weighed	  spiral	   in-­‐and-­‐
out	  sequence	  (TR	  =	  2000ms,	  TE	  =	  28ms,	  flip	  angle	  =	  84	  degrees,	  slice	  thickness	  =	  3,	  
FOV	  =	  22.4mm,	  64x64	  matrix).	  There	  were	  10	  runs	  total,	  5	  each	  of	  counterbalanced	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gain	  and	  loss,	  with	  a	  total	  of	  264	  volumes	  acquired	  during	  each	  run.	  Five	  discarded	  
volumes	  were	   collected	   prior	   to	   the	   onset	   of	   the	   first	   trial	   to	   allow	   for	  magnetic	  
stabilization.	   Images	   were	   spike-­‐corrected	   using	   in-­‐house	   code	   by	   identifying	  
volumes	   with	   means	   >2	   standard	   deviations	   relative	   to	   the	   global	   mean	   and	  
replacing	  them	  with	  value	  of	  the	  adjacent	  volumes.	  	  	  
Functional	  images	  were	  preprocessed	  with	  SPM8	  (Wellcome	  Department	  of	  
Imaging	   Neuroscience,	   London,	   UK)	   and	   analyzed	   with	   the	   NeuroElf	  
(http://neuroelf.net/)	   software	   package.	   Functional	   images	   were	   first	   slice-­‐time	  
corrected	  and	  realigned	  to	  the	  first	  volume	  of	  each	  run	  to	  correct	  for	  motion.	  Next,	  
images	   were	   then	   warped	   to	   Montreal	   Neurological	   Institute	   template	   and	  
smoothed	  with	  a	  6mm	  Gaussian	  kernel.	  Data	  was	  forced	  to	  single	  precision	  in	  order	  
to	  decrease	  the	  impact	  of	  rounding	  errors.	  	  
After	  all	  images	  were	  preprocessed,	  we	  implemented	  a	  first-­‐level	  statistical	  
analysis	  using	  a	  standard	  general	  linear	  model	  with	  our	  data.	  The	  model	  included	  
three	  boxcar	  regressors	  of	  interest	  for	  each	  interval,	  including	  1)	  choice,	  comprised	  
of	   the	   time	   interval	   including	   the	   onset	   of	   the	   shape	   cues	   up	   until	   the	   subject’s	  
reaction	  time	  to	  button	  press,	  2)	  feedback,	  or	  the	  1-­‐second	  feedback	  receipt,	  and	  3)	  
reward	   outcome,	   or	   the	   1-­‐second	   receipt	   of	   monetary	   outcome.	   The	   mean	  
parametric	  regressors	  for	  choice	  value	  and	  prediction	  error	  were	  included	  for	  the	  
choice,	  feedback,	  and	  monetary	  outcome	  intervals,	  as	  described	  above.	  	  A	  temporal	  
filter	   (Fourier	   transform,	  200ms)	  and	  motion	  parameters	  were	   incorporated	   into	  
the	   model	   as	   regressors	   of	   no	   interest.	   For	   whole-­‐brain	   correction,	   non-­‐brain	  
regions	  were	  masked	  prior	  to	  calculating	  family-­‐wise	  error	  (FWE)	  thresholds	  of	  p	  <	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0.05	   were	   estimated	   using	   AlphaSim	  MoteCarlo	   simulation	   (Ward,	   2000)	   with	   a	  
smoothing	   kernel	   that	  was	   estimated	   for	   each	   contrast	   ranging	   from	  7.7	   to	   10.2.	  
For	  each	  regressor,	  mean	  global	  signal	  was	  treated	  as	  a	  covariate.	  	  Finally,	  as	  noted	  
in	   the	  results	   sections,	   some	  analyses	   for	  which	  we	  had	  a	  priori	  hypotheses	  used	  
small	   volume	   correction	   (SVC)	   for	   regions	   of	   interest	   (ROI)	   as	   specified	   at	   a	  




Two-­‐sample	  t-­‐test	  analyses	  revealed	  that	  patients	  were	  slower	  than	  controls	  
throughout	  the	  experiment	  in	  the	  gain	  (t	  =	  -­‐3.37,	  p	  <	  0.01)	  and	  loss	  conditions	  (t	  =	  -­‐
2.52,	  p	  =0.015).	  To	  determine	  whether,	  like	  in	  prior	  studies	  (O'Doherty	  et	  al.,	  2004;	  
O'Doherty	   et	   al.,	   2006),	   reaction	   time	   becomes	   faster	   over	   time	   after	   subjects	  
learned	  to	  expect	  rewards	  from	  their	  choices,	  we	  used	  a	  one-­‐tailed,	  one-­‐sample	  t-­‐
test	  to	  determine	  whether	  subjects	  did,	   in	  fact,	  have	  significantly	  smaller	  reaction	  
times	  in	  late	  relative	  to	  early	  stages,	  as	  would	  be	  in	  line	  with	  a	  priori	  hypotheses.	  
Results	   indicated	   (Figure	   4a)	   that	   in	   the	   gain	   condition,	   while	   control	   subjects	  
were	   faster	   in	   the	   late	   compared	   to	   the	  early	   stage	   (t=1.85,	  p=0.04),	   patients	  did	  
not	  speed	  to	  rewards	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  experiment	  (t=0.32,	  p=0.38).	  In	  the	  loss	  
condition,	  similar	  analyses	  yielded	  non-­‐significant	  effects	  for	  both	  groups	  (controls:	  
t	  =	  0.51,	  p	  =0.31;	  patients:	  t	  =	  0.61,	  p	  =	  0.28).	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Figure 4.2. Reaction time. Reaction time, shown to decrease as subjects learn to 
anticipate rewards, was averaged during the early, middle, and late stages of the task. 
While controls showed reward-related speeding in the gain condition, patients did not.  
 
	  
To	   acquire	   a	   raw	  estimate	  of	   performance	  over	   time,	  we	   categorized	   each	  
choice	   as	   optimal	   or	   non-­‐optimal,	   based	   on	  whether	   the	   subject	   chose	   the	   shape	  
that	   was	   more	   frequently	   rewarded.	   Mean	   performance	   for	   each	   subject	   was	  
calculated	   for	   11	   blocks	   of	   10	   trials	   for	   each	   condition	   (Figure	   4b).	   An	   ANOVA	  
(block,	   condition,	   and	   group	   factors	   by	   performance	   as	   measured	   by	   optimal	  
choice)	   indicated	   that	   subjects	   in	  both	  groups	  did	  show	  a	  change	   in	  performance	  
over	  11	  blocks	  (F	  =	  6.7,	  p	  <0.01),	  and	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  group	  did	  reveal	  a	  difference	  
in	   performance	   between	   patients	   and	   controls	   (F	   =	   16.9,	   p<0.01).	   The	   effect	   of	  
condition	  was	  not	  significant	  (F	  =	  1.3,	  p	  =	  0.25).	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Figure 4.3. Mean optimal choice across blocks in fMRI study. Optimal choice, or the 
percentage of times a subject chose the optimal shape, was calculated across eleven 
blocks for each group in each condition. Both groups were able to learn to choose the 
optimal shape successfully learn over time.  
 
 
We	  also	  used	  a	  reinforcement	  learning	  model	  described	  in	  the	  prior	  section	  
to	  estimate	  learning	  rates	  for	  each	  subject	  in	  each	  condition,	  which	  is	  different	  from	  
optimal	  choice	   in	  that	   it	  measures	  the	  rate	  by	  which	  subjects	  update	   information.	  
From	   there,	   learning	   rates	   for	   each	   stage	   and	   condition	  were	   first	   estimated	   for	  
each	  subject,	  and	  then	  analyzed	  on	  the	  group	  level	  (Figure	  4.5).	  Other	  parameters	  
generated	   by	   the	   model	   included	   softmax,	   lambda,	   and	   model	   likelihood.	   Model	  
likelihood	  was	   tested	  using	   t-­‐tests,	  and	  we	   found	  that	   the	   fit	   for	  both	  groups	  was	  
significantly	  better	   than	   chance	   (gain:	   controls	   t	  =	   -­‐7.46,	  p	  <	  0.001;	  patients	   t	  =	   -­‐
7.16,	   p	   <	   0.001;	   loss:	   controls	   t	   =	   -­‐9.06,	   p	   <	   0.001,	   patients	   t	   =	   -­‐8.74,	   p	   <	   0.001).	  
There	  was	  no	   significant	  difference	  between	   the	   learning	   rates	   for	   each	   group	  at	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either	  stage	  (LR1:	  t	  =	  -­‐0.15,	  p	  =	  0.88;	  LR2:	  t	  =	  0.10,	  p	  =	  0.92)	  for	  the	  gain	  condition.	  
In	   the	   loss	   condition,	   there	   was	   no	   significant	   difference	   between	   groups	   for	  
learning	  rate	  1	  (t	  =	  0.08,	  p	  =	  0.94),	  but	  the	  patients	  had	  a	  higher	  learning	  rate	  than	  
the	   controls	   for	   learning	   rate	   2	   (t	   =	   -­‐2.49,	   p	   =	   0.02),	   indicating	   a	   faster	   rate	   of	  
updating	   the	   loss	   outcome	   information.	   Based	   on	   prior	   findings	   that	   rate	   of	  
updating	   rewards	   is	   related	   to	   negative	   symptoms,	   planned	   correlations	   were	  
calculated	   between	   the	   learning	   rates	   and	   SANS,	   anhedonia,	   flat	   affect,	   and	  
avolition	  scores.	  Following	  Bonferroni	   correction,	  a	   correlation	  emerged	  between	  
affective	   flattening	  and	   learning	  rate	  1	   in	   the	  gain	  condition	  (r	  =	  0.58,	  p	  =	  0.003),	  
suggesting	   that	   subjects	   with	   more	   severe	   affective	   flattening	   used	   a	   shorter	  
history	   of	   rewards	   to	   update	   value	   over	   time.	   Finally,	   these	   learning	   rate	   values	  




Figure 4.4. Model parameters.  A two-stage learning model was used to generate 
parameters for (A) learning rate 1 (choice to feedback) and learning rate 2 (feedback to 
outcome) for the (left) gain condition, and (right) loss condition. Learning rates denote 
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the rate at which a subject updates information from the experience; a value of 1 is 
associated with more switch-based behavior, and a lower value is associated with more 
incremental updating.  
	  
FMRI	  Results	  	  
Choice	  value	  
First,	  we	  used	  a	  priori	  anatomical	  regions	  from	  the	  Harvard-­‐Oxford	  Atlas	  of	  
left	  and	  right	  ventral	  striatum	  to	  see	  if	  each	  group	  showed	  a	  correlation	  with	  choice	  
value,	   which	   was	   small	   volume	   corrected	   (SVC)	   in	   each	   region.	   In	   the	   gain	  
condition,	  while	  controls	  showed	  no	  significant	  correlation	  with	  choice	  value	  in	  the	  
bilateral	   ventral	   striatum,	   patients	   did	   show	   a	   positive	   correlation	   with	   choice	  
value	   in	   the	   right	   ventral	   striatum,	   analyses	   revealed	   a	   negative	   relationship	  
between	  in	  the	  left	  (Table	  4.3).	  A	  direct	  group	  contrast	  did	  reveal	  a	  cluster	  in	  the	  
left	   striatum	  whose	  peak	  survived	  correction,	   indicating	  more	  activity	   in	  controls	  
than	   patient	   (peak	   -­‐9,	   18,	   0,	   df	   =	   42,	   peak	   t-­‐value	   =	   3.28,	   p=0.005).	   	   In	   the	   loss	  
condition,	   analyses	   in	   controls	   revealed	   one	  peak	   cluster	   that	   showed	   a	   negative	  
correlation	   with	   choice	   value	   in	   the	   striatum	   (Table	   4.3),	   but	   analyses	   in	   the	  
patients	  and	  direct	  group	  contrasts	  yielded	  no	  significant	  results.	  	  
We	  next	   examined	   regions	   of	   orbitofrontal	   cortex	   as	  BOLD	   activity	   in	   this	  
region	  correlated	  with	  choice	  value	  (for	  calculation	  for	  choice	  value,	  see	  Methods).	  
Again,	   we	   used	   an	   anatomical	   ROI	   from	   the	   Harvard-­‐Oxford	   Atlas	   to	   define	   this	  
region	  and	  examine	  responses	  in	  and	  between	  each	  group.	  	  While	  both	  controls	  and	  
patients	  showed	  a	  positive	  response	  in	  the	  orbitofronal	  cortex	  that	  correlated	  with	  
choice	  value	  in	  the	  gain	  condition,	   in	  a	  direct	  contrast,	  a	  region	  of	  the	  medial	  OFC	  
did	   emerge	   as	   being	   significantly	   more	   responsive	   in	   the	   control	   relative	   to	   the	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patient	  group	  (SVC	  corrected,	  cluster	  peak	  -­‐12,	  36,	  -­‐15,	  df	  =	  42,	  peak	  t-­‐value	  =	  3.51,	  
p	  =	  0.013;	  Table	   4.3).	  Direct	  contrasts	  between	  groups	  yielded	  no	  results	   for	   the	  
loss	  condition.	  	  
	  
	  
Table	   4.3.	   Responses	   to	   choice	   value	   in	   regions	   of	   interest.	   	   BOLD	   activity	  
correlated	  with	  choice	  value	  in	  each	  group	  and	  anatomical	  ROI.	  Direct	  comparisons	  
showed	   significant	   differences	   for	   HC	   >	   SZ	   in	   both	   left	   nucleus	   accumbens	   and	  
medial	  orbitofrontal	  cortex	  (small	  volume	  corrected,	  p	  <	  0.05)	  for	  the	  gain,	  but	  not	  




Figure 4.5. Choice value in the gain condition in healthy controls. During the choice 
interval, the probability of choice value in the behavioral data was calculated for each 
subject on each trial and used as a parametric regressor in the GLM. In accordance with 
a priori hypotheses, correlations with this value in the gain condition were observed in 
an anatomical ROI of the medial prefrontal cortex in both groups. However, a small 
volume corrected direct contrast revealed attenuated activity in the patient group relative 
to the control group. (Results are shown within the orbitofrontal mask at p<0.05 for 
display; peak value of the cluster corrects with small volume correction). This same 
contrast was not significant in the loss condition.  
 
 
Whole-­‐brain	  analyses	  corrected	  at	  FWE	  p	  <	  0.05	  revealed	  that	  choice	  value	  
in	   controls	   positively	   correlated	   with	   several	   regions,	   including	   medial	  
orbitofrontal	   cortex,	   hippocampus,	   precentral	   gyrus,	   and	   cerebellum	   (FWE	  
corrected	   at	   p<0.05).	   Patients	   were	   negatively	   correlated	   with	   parietal	   lobe,	  
positively	   with	   insula,	   and	   negatively	   and	   positively	   correlated	   with	   regions	   in	  
precentral	  gyrus	  and	  parietal	  lobe	  (FWE	  corrected	  at	  p<0.05),	  but	  the	  orbitofrontal	  
cluster	   did	   not	   survive	   correction.	   A	   whole-­‐brain	   corrected	   direct	   contrast	   only	  
revealed	  a	  region	  in	  the	  temporal	  lobe,	  for	  which	  controls	  showed	  greater	  activity	  
than	  patients.	  	  
In	   the	   loss	   condition,	   analyses	   examining	   responses	   to	   choice	   value	   in	  
controls	  only	  revealed	  regions	  in	  the	  cerebellum	  that	  survived	  whole	  brain	  at	  FWE	  
(p	  <	  0.05)	  correction.	   In	  patients,	  clusters	   in	  right	  and	   left	   temporal	   lobe,	  cuneus,	  
anterior	  cingulate,	  and	  occipital	  lobe	  survived	  correction	  at	  a	  similar	  threshold.	  	  
	  
Verbal	  feedback	  prediction	  error	  
We	   first	   wanted	   to	   establish	   whether	   or	   not—as	   expected—there	   existed	  
prediction	  error-­‐related	  activity	  in	  striatum	  during	  verbal	  feedback.	  We	  found	  that	  
both	   groups	   showed	   a	   response	   to	   prediction	   error	   in	   the	   ventral	   striatum	  ROIs	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bilaterally	   in	   both	   the	   gain	   and	   loss	   conditions	   (Table	  4.4).	   A	   direct	   comparison	  
between	   controls	   and	   patients	   did	   not	   reveal	   any	   significant	   results	   for	   small	  
volume	  corrected	  ROI	  analyses	  in	  either	  condition.	  	  	  
	  
Table	   4.4.	   Responses	   to	   verbal	   feedback	   prediction	   error	   in	   regions	   of	   interest.	  	  
Both	  patients	  and	  controls	  showed	  a	  response	  to	  feedback	  prediction	  error	  in	  both	  
conditions,	   which	   was	   related	   to	   anticipation	   of	   a	   reward	   or	   loss	   avoidance	  
outcome	   (small	   volume	   corrected,	   p	   <	   0.05).	   	   Direct	   comparisons	   yielded	   no	  
significant	  findings.	  	  
	  
Feedback	  prediction	  error	  response	  in	  the	  medial	  OFC	  also	  showed	  activity	  
in	   both	   groups,	   as	   well.	   A	   direct	   comparison	   also	   revealed	   no	   significant	   group	  
differences	  for	  either	  condition	  	  (Figure	  4.3).	  	  	  
Whole-­‐brain	   corrected	   results	   (FWE	   p	   <	   0.05)	   in	   controls	   in	   the	   gain	  
condition	  showed	  regions	  in	  cuneus,	  precuneus,	  and	  occipital	  lobe	  in	  controls,	  and	  
a	  diffuse	  region	  of	  activation	  across	  the	  brain	   in	  patients.	   In	  the	   loss	  condition,	  at	  
similar	   thresholds,	   controls	   showed	  positive	  correlation	  with	   feedback	  prediction	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error	   responses	   in	   bilateral	   striatum	   and	   vmPFC,	   and	   negative	   correlation	   with	  
feedback	  prediction	  error	  in	  anterior	  cingulate	  and	  inferior	  frontal	  gyrus.	  Patients	  
showed	  no	   corrected	  negative	   correlations	   in	   the	   loss	   condition,	  but	  did	   respond	  
significantly	   to	   feedback	   prediction	   error	   in	   bilateral	   striatum,	   amygdala,	   and	  
lateral	  prefrontal	  cortex.	  	  
	  
Figure	  4.6.	  Response	  to	  verbal	  feedback	  prediction	  error	  in	  the	  striatum	  in	  controls	  
and	   patients.	   Anatomical	   ROI	   analyses	   of	   ventral	   striatum	   showed	   comparable	  
responses	   in	   both	   groups	   to	   a	   parametric	   regressor	   of	   prediction	   error	   during	  
verbal	   feedback.	  (Results are shown within the ventral striatum mask at p<0.05 in the 
gain condition only for display; peak value of these cluster corrects with small volume 
correction. Data from the loss condition yields a similar map). 
	  
	  
Monetary	  reward	  outcome	  prediction	  error	  
Similar	   to	   feedback	   prediction	   error,	   we	   also	   examined	   response	   in	   the	  
striatum	  to	  reward	  prediction	  error.	  As	  expected,	  both	  groups	  showed	  a	  response	  
in	  striatum	  to	  reward	  prediction	  error	   in	  both	  conditions,	  but	  prediction	  error	   in	  
the	   orbitofrontal	   cortex,	   while	   significantly	   correlated	   with	   BOLD	   in	   the	   gain	  
condition	   for	   both	   groups,	  was	   significant	   in	   the	   loss	   condition	   only	   for	   controls	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and	   not	   patients	   (Table	   4.5)	   Direct	   group	   contrast	   of	   response	   to	   reward	  
prediction	   error	   in	   the	   striatum	   and	   orbitofronal	   cortex	   revealed	   no	   results	   that	  
survived	  correction	  for	  either	  condition	  (Figure	  4.6).	  	  
	  
Table	   4.5.	   Responses	   to	   reward	   outcome	   prediction	   error	   in	   regions	   of	   interest.	  	  
Like	   for	   the	   feedback	   regressor,	   both	   groups	   showed	   significant	   response	   to	   the	  
reward	   outcome	   prediction	   error	   BOLD	   correlate	   in	   both	   striatum	   and	  
orbitofrontal	  cortex	  in	  the	  gain	  condition,	  but	  no	  direct	  group	  differences	  emerged	  
(small	  volume	  corrected,	  p	  <	  0.05).	   	  Patients	  did	  not	  show	  significant	  response	   in	  




Figure	   4.7.	   Response	   to	   monetary	   outcome	   prediction	   error	   in	   the	   striatum	   in	  
controls	   and	   patients.	   Anatomical	   ROI	   analyses	   of	   ventral	   striatum	   showed	  
comparable	   responses	   in	   both	   groups	   correlated	   with	   a	   parametric	   regressor	   of	  
prediction	   error	   during	   monetary	   outcome.	   Like	   verbal	   feedback,	   direct	   group	  
comparisons	  yielded	  null	  results.	  	  (Results are shown within the ventral striatum mask 
at p<0.05 in the gain condition for display; peak value of these cluster corrects with 
small volume correction).	  
	  
FWE	  corrected	  whole-­‐brain	  analysis	  in	  controls	  and	  patients	  in	  the	  gain	  condition	  
showed	  regions	  including	  prefrontal	  cortex,	  striatum,	  and	  medial	  temporal	  lobe.	  In	  
a	   direct	   contrast,	   no	   results	   survived	  whole-­‐brain	   correction.	   Analyses	   at	   similar	  
thresholds	  revealed	  that	  in	  the	  loss	  condition,	  patients	  showed	  a	  positive	  response	  
in	  the	  striatum,	  and	  a	  negative	  response	  in	  occipital	  lobe	  and	  cerebellum.	  Controls	  
showed	   a	   positive	   response	   in	   medial	   PFC,	   striatum,	   hippocampus,	   insula,	   and	  
midbrain,	  and	  a	  negative	  response	  in	  occipital	  lobe.	  	  
	  
Feedback	  versus	  outcome	  prediction	  error	  
In	   order	   to	   address	   our	   initial	   hypotheses,	   we	   examined	   the	   relative	  
representation	  of	  prediction	  error	  in	  each	  of	  our	  ROIs	  during	  the	  feedback	  versus	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outcome	  intervals	  of	  the	  task.	  In	  the	  striatum	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  orbitofrontal	  cortex,	  
patients	   showed	  more	   of	   a	   response	   to	   feedback	   compared	   to	   reward	   outcome,	  
whereas	   controls	   showed	   a	   very	   different	   effect	   in	   that	   these	   regions	   responded	  
about	   the	   same	   to	   each	   event	   (striatum)	   or	   more	   to	   reward	   than	   to	   feedback	  
(orbitofrontal	   cortex).	   The	   interaction	   of	   this	   contrast	   between	   groups	   showed	  
similar	   significant	   clusters	   in	   both	   regions,	   and	   notably,	   the	   orbitofrontal	   cortex	  
region	   was	   also	   significant	   following	   whole-­‐brain	   correction	   (Figure	   4.8)	   in	   the	  
gain,	   but	   not	   loss	   conditions.	   Other	   regions	   that	  were	   significantly	   responsive	   to	  
whole-­‐brain	   correction	   for	   the	   group	   contrast	   showed	   a	   similar	   pattern	   to	  
orbitofrontal	  cortex	  response	  in	  that	  outcome	  response	  was	  greater	  than	  feedback,	  
and	  included	  the	  anterior	  cingulate,	  inferior	  frontal	  gyrus,	  and	  insula.	  	  
	  
Figure	   4.8.	   Relative	   response	   to	   prediction	   error	   during	   verbal	   feedback	   >	  
monetary	   outcome.	   Both	   ROI	   analyses	   and	   whole-­‐brain	   FWE	   corrected	   analyses	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showed	   a	   significant	   interaction,	   suggesting	   that	   the	   pattern	   by	   which	   patients	  
represent	   feedback	   versus	   reward	   prediction	   error	   is	   abnormal	   in	   the	   cortex.	   In	  
striatum,	   patients	   showed	   more	   correlated	   activity	   with	   feedback	   than	   reward	  
outcome	   prediction	   error	   in	   both	   striatum	   and	   orbitofrontal	   cortex,	   whereas	  
controls	  showed	  similar	  responses	   in	  striatum	  to	  both	   feedback	  events,	  but	  more	  
response	  in	  orbitofrontal	  cortex	  to	  reward	  than	  feedback	  learning	  signals.	  	  	  
	  
Relationship	  to	  patient	  symptoms	  
We	  examined	  BOLD	  activity	  during	   each	   event	   that	  we	  believed,	   based	  on	  
our	   hypotheses,	   may	   be	   related	   to	   negative	   symptoms.	   Since	   this	   study	   was	  
designed	   to	   examine	   the	   relationship	   between	   anticipation	   and	   outcome	   in	  
patients,	   we	   first	   examined	   the	   feedback	   prediction	   error	   versus	   outcome	  
prediction	  error	  contrast	  as	  it	  related	  to	  affective	  symptoms,	  specifically,	  anhedonia	  
and	   affective	   flattening	   in	   the	   gain,	   but	   not	   loss	   condition.	   We	   found	   that	   after	  
implementing	   whole-­‐brain	   correction	   at	   p<0.05,	   both	   anhedonia	   and	   affective	  
flattening	   revealed	   that	   regions	   of	   medial	   PFC	   and	   anterior	   cingulate	   were	  
negatively	  correlated	  with	  the	  feedback	  –	  outcome	  PE	  contrast.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  
region,	   affective	   flattening	   was	   related	   to	   several	   other	   structures	   in	   the	   same	  
direction,	  including	  dorsal	  regions	  of	  striatum,	  hippocampus,	  and	  insula.	  	  Next,	  we	  
examined	   choice	   value	   as	   it	   related	   to	   motivational	   symptoms,	   namely,	   apathy.	  
Analyses	  revealed	  a	  large	  cluster	  also	  in	  medial	  PFC,	  such	  that	  more	  severe	  apathy	  
symptoms	  were	  related	  to	  decreased	  association	  with	  choice	  value	  in	  this	  region.	  	  
	  
Discussion	  	  
The	   findings	   from	   this	   study	   revealed	   learning	   deficits	   in	   patients	   with	  
schizophrenia	   on	   a	   behavioral	   level,	   and	   prediction	   error	   and	   value	   deficits	   on	   a	  
	  91	  
neural	   processing	   level.	   Behaviorally,	   the	   patient	   group	   performed	   worse	   than	  
controls	   on	   the	   probabilistic	   learning	   task,	   and	   unlike	   controls,	   failed	   to	   reflect	  
anticipation	  of	  reward	  through	  a	  lack	  of	  reward-­‐related	  reaction	  time	  speeding	  in	  
the	  gain	  condition.	   In	   these	  same	  patients,	  examination	  of	  BOLD	  activity	  revealed	  
deficits	   in	   the	  striatum	  and	  OFC	   in	  value	   representation	  during	  choice,	   as	  well	  as	  
abnormalities	   in	   the	   relationship	   of	   updating	   information	   during	   anticipating	  
relative	   to	   reward	   outcome	   in	   the	   prefrontal	   cortex	   in	   the	   gain,	   but	   not	   loss	  
conditions.	  	  	  
We	   examined	   the	  prediction	   error	   learning	   signal,	  which	   serves	   to	  update	  
the	   cue	   value	   that	   informs	   and	  motivates	   choices,	   separately	   while	   patients	   and	  
controls	  were	  receiving	  anticipatory	  feedback	  information,	  and	  while	  they	  received	  
a	  reward	  outcome	   in	   two	  a	  priori	   regions	  of	   interest.	  We	   found	   that	  patients	  and	  
controls	  showed	  bilateral	  responses	  in	  the	  striatum	  to	  anticipatory	  signals	  during	  
verbal	   feedback	   and	   during	   reward	   outcome.	   Direct	   group	   comparisons	   during	  
each	  event	  separately	  in	  the	  nucleus	  accumbens	  yielded	  no	  significant	  results.	  	  
However,	  when	  we	  next	  compared	  the	  way	  information	  was	  updated	  across	  
feedback	  and	  reward	  events,	  we	  observed	  that	  the	  controls	  showed	  a	  very	  specific	  
pattern	   in	   which	   there	   was	   little	   to	   no	   significant	   difference	   in	   the	   striatum	   for	  
prediction	   error-­‐related	   BOLD	   activity	   during	   both	   events,	   but	   the	   orbitofrontal	  
cortex	  was	  significantly	  more	  active	  in	  processing	  reward	  outcome	  prediction	  error	  
than	  feedback	  prediction	  error.	  Patients,	  however,	  showed	  the	  opposite	  response:	  
they	  responded	  significantly	  more	   to	  anticipatory	   feedback	   than	  reward	  outcome	  
in	  both	  striatum	  and	  orbitofrontal	  cortex.	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While	  it	   is	  known	  that	  both	  these	  structures	  respond	  to	  prediction	  error,	  a	  
body	   of	   literature	   suggests	   that	   they	   represent	   different	   types	   of	   value	   and	  
information	  signals.	  Striatum	  is	  known	  to	  contribute	  to	  stimulus-­‐response	  learning,	  
and	   responds	   somewhat	   indiscriminatingly	   to	   salient	   events	   that	   occur	   in	   the	  
environment,	   whereas	   the	   orbitofrontal	   cortex,	   which	   also	   represents	   prediction	  
error,	   may	   play	   a	   specific	   role	   in	   updating	   and	   representing	   value,	   and	   possibly	  
converging	   prediction	   error	   with	   other	   sensory,	   mnemonic,	   and	   affective	  
information	   so	   that	   it	  may	   be	   used	   to	   guide	   choices	   in	   a	  more	  multidimensional	  
way	  (Hare	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Roy	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Schoenbaum	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  	  
We	  aimed	  to	  determine	  whether	  a	  deficit	   in	  information	  processing	  during	  
learning	  could	  contribute	  to	  abnormal	  value	  representations	  that	  may	  contribute	  to	  
the	  motivational	  or	  affective	  symptoms	  of	  schizophrenia.	  These	   findings	  certainly	  
suggest	   that	   there	   is	   a	   deficit	   in	   cue	   value	   representation	   that	   is	   selective	   to	  
learning	   when	   motivated	   by	   rewards	   as	   opposed	   to	   losses,	   as	   well	   as	   an	  
abnormality	   in	   the	  way	   that	   information	   is	   updated	  during	   feedback	   and	   reward	  
outcome.	  While	   these	   specific	   results	   do	  not	   speak	   to	   the	   affective	   component	   of	  
the	   symptoms,	   they	  may	   indicate	   that	   reward	  outcomes	  are	   inefficiently	  updated	  
by	   the	   orbitofrontal	   cortex,	   possibly	   leading	   to	   a	   dysfunction	   in	   representing	  
complex	  outcomes	  or	  value,	  and	  converting	  them	  to	  a	  reward	  prediction	  signal	  at	  
the	  cue.	  	  	  
While	  functional	  imaging	  data	  has	  a	  correlational	  relationship	  to	  dopamine	  
function,	   these	   findings	   are	   aligned	   in	   the	   broader	   sense	   of	   the	   literature.	   For	  
instance,	   several	   studies	   have	   shown	   that	   there	   is	   an	   over	   expression	   of	   D2	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receptors	  in	  the	  striatum	  in	  schizophrenia,	  and	  an	  extension	  of	  this	  work	  supports	  
the	   theory	   that	   hyperactive	   dopamine	   in	   this	   region	   may	   be	   accompanied	   by	   a	  
hypoactive	  dopamine	  response	  in	  the	  prefrontal	  cortex	  (Abi-­‐Dargham	  et	  al.,	  1998;	  
Simpson	   et	   al.,	   2010),	   possibly	   extending	   to	   regions	   that	   process	   and	   integrate	  
value	  signals,	  like	  the	  orbitofrontal	  cortex.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  address	  the	  affective	  component	  of	  the	  disease,	  we	  examined	  the	  
relationship	   between	   information	   updating	   and	   symptoms,	   and	   found	   that	   there	  
were	   several	   clusters	   generated	   from	   the	   contrast	   of	   feedback	   versus	   reward	  
prediction	   error	   contrast	   that	   were	   related	   to	   affective	   symptom	   severity.	  
Specifically,	   reports	   of	   affective	   flattening	   and	   anhedonia	  were	   associated	  with	   a	  
difference	  between	  the	  feedback	  PE	  regressor	  compared	  to	  the	  reward	  outcome	  PE	  
regressor	   in	  medial	  PFC.	  Thus,	   it	  appears	  as	   if	   there	   is	  something	  about	  the	  trade	  
off	   of	   anticipating	   compared	   to	   updating	   reward	   outcome	   experience	   and	   its	  
representation	   in	   orbitofrontal	   cortex	   that	   is	   abnormal	   in	   patients	   with	  
schizophrenia,	   and	   especially	   those	   with	   negative	   symptoms.	   Additionally,	   we	  
examined	   the	   relationship	  between	  motivational	   symptoms	  and	  choice	  value.	  We	  
found	   that	   apathy-­‐	   a	   symptom	   related	   to	   lack	   of	   motivation	   or	   affective	  
engagement-­‐	   was	   negatively	   correlated	   with	   choice	   value-­‐related	   activity	   in	  
ventromedial	  PFC,	  suggesting	  that	  this	  area	  was	  failing	  to	  represent	  choice	  value	  in	  
subjects	  who	  were	  more	  apathetic.	  
In	  summary,	  we	  did	  find	  abnormalities	  in	  the	  patient	  group	  in	  both	  striatum	  
and	  OFC	  in	  two	  ways:	  first,	  that	  both	  were	  significantly	  less	  correlated	  with	  choice	  
value	  in	  patients	  relative	  to	  controls,	  and	  second,	  that	  the	  relative	  response	  in	  these	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regions	  were	   greater	   during	   feedback	   than	   reward	  outcome	   in	  patients,	  whereas	  
they	  were	  greater	  for	  outcome	  than	  feedback	  in	  orbitofronal	  cortex	  in	  the	  healthy	  
controls.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  in	  prior	  studies,	  because	  choice	  is	  often	  collapsed	  across	  
anticipation	   periods,	   that	   it	   is	   actually	   the	   connection	   between	   reward	   outcome	  
and	   choice	   value	   that	   is	   deficient	   and	   not	   the	   anticipatory	   period	   itself.	   Further,	  
behavioral	   and	   motivational	   symptoms	   were	   related	   to	   the	   functional	   imaging	  
findings.	   These	   subjects	   did	   show	   a	   lack	   of	   reward-­‐related	   speeding,	   which	  
indicated	  a	  possible	  behavioral	   correlate	   revealing	  a	  deficit	   in	  anticipating	  choice	  
value.	  	  
There	   are	   several	   limitations	   to	   this	   study.	   First,	  we	  were	  working	  with	   a	  
small	   sample	   of	   patients,	   and	   as	   such,	   correlations	   within	   this	   group	   should	   be	  
taken	  with	  this	  consideration	  in	  mind.	  Second,	  these	  subjects	  were	  medicated	  with	  
second-­‐generation	   antipsychotics,	   which	   are	   known	   to	   alter	   dopamine	   function,	  
and	   thus	   likely	   alter	   reward	   response.	   Additionally,	   we	   are	   not	   able	   to	   properly	  
determine	  whether	  informative	  or	  affective	  processes	  (or	  both)	  caused	  cue	  value	  to	  
be	  abnormal.	  While	   there	   is	  evidence	  to	  suggest	   that	   information	   from	  prediction	  
error	  is	  abnormally	  updated	  in	  patients	  relative	  to	  controls	  and	  that	  this	  is	  related	  
to	  motivational	   and	   affective	   symptoms,	   we	   cannot	   say	  whether	   the	   informative	  
feedback	  is	  driving	  the	  symptoms,	  or	  if	  the	  symptoms	  are	  driving	  the	  inappropriate	  
updating	   of	   prediction	   error.	   Finally,	   as	   mentioned,	   this	   task	   is	   not	   able	   to	  
completely	  separate	  anticipation	  from	  outcome.	  Choice	  and	  feedback	  both	  involve	  a	  
degree	   of	   anticipation,	   and	   feedback	   per	   se	   has	   been	   shown	   to	   evoke	   reward-­‐
related	   responses	   in	   control	   subjects	   (Foerde	   and	   Shohamy,	   2011).	   Future	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directions	  should	  explore	  these	  processes	  in	  unmedicated	  and	  prodromal	  subjects,	  
as	  well	  as	  explore	  ways	  to	  isolate	  choice	  and	  hedonic	  experience	  more	  discretely.	  	  
In	   conclusion,	   we	   found	   that	   patients	  with	   schizophrenia	   showed	   relative	  
attenuation	   in	  representing	  choice	  value	   in	  OFC	  and	  striatum	  relative	   to	  controls,	  
and	  showed	  an	  abnormal	  representation	  of	  PE	  while	  updating	  anticipatory	  versus	  
hedonic	  signals.	  While	  some	  of	  these	  data	  may	  appear	  to	  contradict	  some	  findings	  
to	   date	   that	   suggest	   deficits	   are	   selective	   to	   anticipation,	   it	   does	   speak	   to	   the	  
concept	  that	  reward	  information	  is	  improperly	  processed	  in	  this	  population.	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General	  Discussion	  	  
	  
1.	  Behavioral	  indicators	  of	  affect	  as	  a	  modulator	  of	  learning	  	  
The	   studies	   presented	   above	   all	   provide	   evidence	   that	   affect	   and	   learning	  
may	   interact	   to	  modulate	   learning,	  memory,	   and	  decision	  making.	  Understanding	  
the	   role	   that	   affect	   plays	   in	   information	   encoding	   may	   allow	   for	   a	   better	  
understanding	   of	   decision	   processes	   that	   do	   not	   adhere	   to	   utility	   maximization	  
theories,	   and	   those	   that	   occur	   in	   disease.	   Study	  1	   (Chapter	   2)	   provided	   evidence	  
that	  in	  an	  aversive	  context,	  an	  unexpected	  and	  relatively	  less	  painful	  sensory	  event	  
may	  produce	  a	  positive	  prediction	  error,	  thus	  possibly	  altering	  event	  memory	  and	  
valuation.	   In	   this	   study,	  participants	  were	  willing	   to	  pay	  more	   to	  avoid	  a	   shorter,	  
less	  net	  painful	  experience	  than	  a	  longer	  one	  that	  included	  moments	  of	  relief.	  This	  
indicates	   that	   reward	   signals	   may	   alter	   memory	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   leads	   to	  
alterations	  in	  preferences	  and	  avoidance	  behavior.	  While	  choosing	  to	  endure	  more	  
pain,	  quantitatively,	  may	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  poor	  decision,	  it	  indicates	  that	  the	  presence	  
of	   a	   positive	   event	   influences	   the	   encoding	  of	   the	   experience	  with	   a	   qualitatively	  
different	   value	   signal	   associated	   with	   that	   memory,	   causing	   it	   to	   be	   a	   more	  
desirable—and	   less	   aversive—choice	   in	   the	   future.	   	   Thus,	   these	   findings	   suggest	  
that	  pain	  relief	  may	  be	  associated	  with	  value	  signals	  that	  impact	  economic	  decision	  
making.	  	  
	  
2.	  How	  does	  dopamine	  contribute	  to	  learning,	  motivation,	  and	  affect?	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   Along	  with	  prior	  findings	  (Baliki	  et	  al.,	  2010),	  data	  from	  Study	  1	  (Chapter	  2)	  
may	  be	   in	  part	  due	   to	   the	  generation	  of	  a	  positive	  prediction	  error,	  as	   it	  was—at	  
least	   initially—a	   surprising	   event	   that	  was	   better	   than	   expected.	   This	   prediction	  
error	  framework	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  supported	  by	  dopamine	  neurons	  in	  the	  midbrain,	  
a	   signal	   that	   anatomically	   extends	   to	  many	  neural	   systems	   that	   support	   decision	  
making	   behavior	   in	   various	   ways.	  While	   none	   of	   the	   studies	   in	   this	   dissertation	  
include	   data	   that	   directly	   measure	   dopamine	   activity,	   given	   copious	   amounts	   of	  
converging	   evidence,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   these	   prediction	   errors	   are	   related	   to	   the	  
behavioral	  findings	  in	  several	  ways.	  	  
	   First,	  the	  prediction	  error	  framework	  is	  aligned	  with	  our	  behavioral	  findings	  
in	   Study	   2	   (Chapter	   3)	   in	   that	   patients	   with	   schizophrenia,	   a	   disease	   associated	  
with	   abnormal	   dopamine	   signaling,	   showed	   deficits	   in	   probabilistic	   learning,	   a	  
paradigm	  know	  to	  be	  dependent	  on	  striatal	  targets	  that	  represent	  prediction	  error	  
(Knowlton	   et	   al.,	   1996).	   Second,	   these	   patients,	  who	  were	  medicated	  with	   drugs	  
shown	  in	  prior	  studies	  to	  augment	  the	  negative	  prediction	  error	  signal	  (Pessiglione	  
et	  al.,	  2006)	  showed	  better	  learning	  from	  losses	  as	  compared	  to	  gains,	  a	  finding	  in	  
line	   with	   other	   studies	   suggesting	   that	   similar	   pharmacological	   agents	   may	  
contribute	  to	  this	  imbalance	  in	  contextual	  learning	  (Gold	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Reinen	  et	  al.,	  
2014;	  Strauss	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Waltz	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  There	  were	  also	  trending	  correlations	  
with	   behavioral	   deficits	   and	   negative	   symptoms	   scores	   from	   Study	   2,	   such	   that	  
those	  with	  higher	  negative	  symptoms	  showed	  worse	  performance	  on	  the	  negative	  
symptoms	   task,	  and	   in	  Study	  3,	  patients	  showed	  no	  speeding	   to	  reward,	  whereas	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controls	  did.	  All	  of	  these	  findings	  suggest	  a	  relationship	  between	  the	  affective	  and	  
motivational	  symptoms	  of	  the	  disease	  and	  learning	  abnormalities.	  	  
	   From	   our	   BOLD	   imaging	   data,	   we	   expected	   to	   see	   prediction	   error	  
represented	   in	   certain	   neural	   regions	   based	   on	   the	   wealth	   of	   literature	  
demonstrating	  that	  learning	  signals	  project	  to	  these	  brain	  structures	  in	  animals	  and	  
humans.	  Specifically,	  we	  tested	  regions	  in	  ventral	  striatum	  and	  orbitofronal	  cortex	  
for	   prediction	   error	   learning	   signals	   during	   anticipation	   and	   outcome.	   Patients	  
showed	  relatively	  intact	  prediction	  error	  responses	  in	  the	  striatum	  overall,	  as	  some	  
other	  groups	  have	  also	  found	  (Dowd	  and	  Barch,	  2012)	  but	  others	  have	  not	  (Juckel	  
et	   al.,	   2006a;	   Juckel	   et	   al.,	   2006b).	  However,	   these	   patients	   showed	   an	   abnormal	  
tradeoff	   of	   prediction	   error	   response	   during	   anticipation	   versus	   outcome	   in	   the	  
orbitofronal	  cortex,	  and	  further,	  showed	  blunted	  responses	  to	  choice	  value.	  These	  
data	  suggest	  that	  prediction	  error	  itself	  during	  anticipation	  may	  not	  be	  deficient	  at	  
all,	   rather	   the	  outcome	  experience	  may	  be	  abnormal	   in	   the	  prefrontal	  cortex,	  and	  
thus,	   the	  choice	  value	   is	  not	  properly	  updated.	  While	  other	  groups	  have	  shown	  a	  
similar	   finding	   in	   terms	  of	   abnormal	  prediction	  error	   in	  medial	  prefrontal	   cortex	  
(Waltz	  et	  al.,	  2010b),	  this	  finding	  in	  particular	  is	  unique	  since	  the	  task	  in	  Studies	  2	  
and	  3	  represent	  a	  dynamic	  hedonic	  signal	  that	  is	  present	  as	  the	  participant	  updates	  
value	   during	   learning,	   and	   not	   after	   learning,	   such	   is	   common	   in	   tasks	   like	   the	  
monetary	  incentive	  delay	  (MID),	  which	  train	  subjects	  outside	  of	  the	  scanner	  prior	  
to	  testing.	  	  
	   These	   data	   imply	   that	   the	   function	   of	   the	   orbitofrontal	   cortex	   in	   updating	  
learning	   information	   is	   abnormal	   in	   schizophrenia.	  While	  prediction	  error	   in	   this	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region	   is	   correlated	   with	   increasing	   value,	   it	   is	   unknown	   whether	   this	   region	   is	  
actually	   required	   for	   value	   per	   se	   or	   hedonic	   sensation.	   However,	   while	  
orbitofronal	   regions	   are	   likely	   not	   solely	   responsible	   for	   supporting	   hedonic	  
sensory	  experiences	  (Berridge	  and	  Kringelbach,	  2013;	  Schoenbaum	  et	  al.,	  2011),	  it	  
has	  been	   suggested	   that	   the	  OFC	   is	   a	   structure	   that	   is	   uniquely	   anatomically	   and	  
functionally	  situated	  to	   integrate	  many	  cognitive,	  affective,	  and	  sensory	  functions,	  
and	   allows	   humans	   to	   maintain	   the	   cognitive	   structure	   necessary	   to	   attribute	  
affective	  meaning	  to	  a	  choice	  or	  goal	  value	  (Berridge	  and	  Kringelbach,	  2013;	  Roy	  et	  
al.,	   2012).	   Thus,	   while	   converging	   evidence	   demonstrates	   that	   patients	   with	  
schizophrenia	   report	   intact	   self	   report	   of	   hedonic	   experience,	   this	   could	   reflect	  
basic	   salience	   and	   hedonic	   processing,	   but	   it	   may	   not	   completely	   reflect	   the	  
complex	   nature	   of	   goal-­‐directed,	   complex	   affective	   processes	   that	   are	   conceived	  
from	  the	  integration	  of	  experiences	  by	  merging	  past	  and	  present	  experience	  in	  the	  
orbitofrontal	  cortex	  in	  order	  to	  create	  an	  operable	  construct	  of	  value.	  	  
	   There	  are,	  however,	   several	   aspects	  of	   these	   findings	   that	  be	  explained	  by	  
systems	   that	   are	   separate	   from	   the	   prediction	   error	   framework.	   For	   instance,	  
factors	   of	   motivation	   and	   context,	   while	   likely	   partially	   supported	   by	   midbrain	  
neurons	   (Murty	   and	   Adcock,	   2013),	   may	   also	   involve	   integration	   with	   other	  
systems	   as	   well.	   For	   example,	   motivation	   certainly	   would	   necessarily	   involve	  
anticipatory	  value	  signals	  that	  are	  supported	  by	  dopamine	  signaling,	  but	  there	  are	  
likely	  other	  more	  explicit	  goals	  that	  drive	  motivation-­‐related	  actions,	  for	  instance,	  
dorsal	  regions	  of	  the	  prefrontal	  cortex	  are	  thought	  of	  to	  support	  working	  memory	  
(Wager	   and	   Smith,	   2003)	   that	  may	   help	   one	   to	   keep	   a	   goal	   accessible	   for	   longer	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periods	   of	   time,	   and	   to	  use	   these	   resources	   to	   compute	   effort	   in	   a	  more	   efficient	  
way.	   Further,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   there	   are	   affective	   experiences	   associated	   with	  
motivation	   that	   may	   only	   be	   triggered,	   but	   not	   directly	   supported,	   by	   reward	  
processing.	   Human	   experiences	   of	   desire,	   joy,	   and	   bliss	   all	   describe	  motivational	  
and	   hedonic	   experiences,	   but	   the	   linguistic	   precision	   of	   these	   concepts	   implies	   a	  
more	   abstract,	   consuming	   experience	   of	   affect.	   Understanding	   the	  mechanism	   of	  
interaction	   of	   reward,	   affective	   experience,	  memories,	   and	   social	   value	  may	   help	  
disentangle	  how	  these	  complex	  concepts	  of	  reward	  may	  (or	  may	  not)	  be	  deficient	  
in	  patient	  populations.	  	  
	   Finally,	   these	   data	   suggest	   that	   there	   is	   a	   significant	   effect	   of	   context	   in	  
reward	   learning.	   In	   Study	   1,	   we	   observed	   that	   the	   expectation	   of	   pain	   created	   a	  
baseline	  context	  for	  which	  decreased	  levels	  of	  pain	  provided	  enough	  of	  a	  subjective	  
positive	   change	   that	   it	  was	   perceived	   as	   a	   relatively	   positive	   event,	   even	   though	  
other	   theories	  may	  stipulate	   that	  pain	   is	  pain,	   regardless	  of	   context.	  Nonetheless,	  
subjects	  chose	   to	   re-­‐experience	  a	   longer	  pain	  event	  with	  a	  period	  of	   relief	  over	  a	  
shorter	   one.	   In	   Study	   2,	   we	   saw	   that	   when	   patients	   with	   schizophrenia	   learn	   to	  
earn	   money	   in	   a	   loss,	   but	   not	   a	   gain,	   context,	   their	   performance	   is	   improved.	  
Regardless	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   task	   was	   identically	   matched	   in	   both	   conditions,	  
these	  medicated	  patients	  learned	  better	  in	  the	  loss	  condition.	  While	  the	  prediction	  
error	   framework	   may	   account	   for	   many	   of	   these	   findings,	   we	   currently	   do	   not	  
completely	   understand	   mechanistically	   how	   the	   effect	   of	   context	   itself	   impacts	  
learning,	  and	  is	  a	  viable	  direction	  for	  future	  research.	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3.	  Implications	  for	  negative	  symptoms	  of	  schizophrenia	  	  
	   An	  important	  question-­‐	  both	  in	  order	  to	  address	  the	  debilitating	  symptoms	  
of	   schizophrenia	   and	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	   scientific	   model	   of	   dopamine’s	   role	   in	  
reward	   learning-­‐	   is	   how,	   mechanistically,	   symptoms	   involving	   motivational	   and	  
affective	   deficits	   are	   related	   to	   deficits	   in	   acquiring	   the	   association	   between	  
rewards	  and	  predictive	  cues.	  	  
One	   issue	   with	   testing	   this	   theory	   to	   date	   is	   how	   to	   address	   the	   causal	  
mechanism.	   In	   other	   words,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   say	   whether	   these	   individuals	   have	  
learning	   deficits	   because	   their	   emotional	   or	   sensory	   experience	   with	   reward	   is	  
deficient	   and	   therefore	   they	   have	   limited	   experience	  with	  which	   to	   anticipate	   or	  
update,	  or	  because	  they	  have	  deficiencies	  in	  anticipating	  it	  because	  there	  exists	  an	  
abnormality	  in	  the	  neurobiological	  structures	  that	  support	  this	  function.	  However,	  
being	   able	   to	   examine	   the	   neural	   responses	   at	   each	   stage	   of	   learning-­‐	   choice,	  
anticipation,	  and	  outcome-­‐	  does	  allow	  one	  to	  acquire	   information	  that	  can	  add	  to	  
the	   converging	   evidence	   that	   contributes	   to	   the	   scientific	   understanding	   of	   this	  
deficit.	  We	  addressed	  this	  in	  Study	  3,	  and	  the	  data	  suggest	  several	  things.	  	  
First,	   as	  mentioned,	   patient	   self	   reports	   in	  prior	   studies	   suggest	   that	   their	  
affective	   response	   is	   intact	   during	   hedonic	   experience,	   but	   our	   data	   show	  
abnormalities	  in	  the	  way	  that	  orbitofrontal	  cortex	  updates	  the	  reward	  information	  
at	   the	   time	   of	   outcome.	  Whether	   this	   just	   contributes	   to	   the	   deficits	   in	   updating	  
choice	   value	   or	   also	   the	   actual	   experience	   of	   pleasure-­‐	   perhaps	   in	   a	   way	   that	   is	  
indecipherable	   to	   the	   subject-­‐	   is	   unclear.	  However,	   the	   deficits	   in	   reinforcement-­‐
related	  speeding	  and	   in	  choice	  value	   in	   the	  orbitofrontal	  cortex	  definitely	  suggest	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that	  the	  choice	  value	  itself	  is	  not	  efficiently	  represented,	  likely	  leading	  to	  deficits	  in	  
learning.	  Several	  prior	  studies	  conclude	  very	  specifically	  that	  this	  is	  due	  to	  a	  deficit	  
in	   anticipation,	   but	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   prior	   studies	   also	   collapsed	   across	  
anticipation	  and	  choice	   (Waltz	  et	  al.,	  2010b),	  and	   thus	  anticipation	  was	   therefore	  
confounded	  with	  choice.	   In	  our	  paradigm,	  we	  critically	  separate	  these	  factors	  and	  
show	   that	   the	   anticipation	   period	   is	   actually	   quite	   active	   in	   the	   patient	   brain,	  
perhaps	  a	  compensatory	  mechanism	  for	  the	  deficits	  in	  representing	  choice	  value.	  	  
Future	  research	  should	  examine	  the	  connectivity	  and	  relationships	  between	  
the	   representation	   of	   affective	   and	   hedonic	   experience	   in	   brain	   regions	   and	   the	  
orbitofrontal	   cortex,	   and	   determine	  whether	   this	   deficit	   is	   related	   to	   a	   network-­‐
based	  connectivity	  deficiency.	  
	  
4.	  Limitations	  and	  Future	  Directions	  
There	   are	   several	   limitations	   in	   these	   studies.	   First,	   each	   study	   has	   a	  
relatively	  small	  sample	  size,	  and	  thus	  correlational	  evidence	  in	  particular	  must	  be	  
evaluated	   with	   this	   consideration	   in	   mind.	   However,	   it	   is	   also	   of	   note	   that	   the	  
results	   of	   these	   studies	   do	  mirror	   expected	   findings	   based	   on	   comparisons	  with	  
prior	  research,	  so	  our	  conclusions	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  based	  on	  an	  unrepresentative	  
sample.	  	  	  	  
Second,	  Study	  3,	  from	  which	  we	  draw	  many	  of	  our	  mechanistic	  conclusions,	  
relied	  on	  data	  comprised	  of	  the	  BOLD	  signal,	  which	  by	  nature	  is	  correlational	  with	  
neural	   activity,	   but	   based	   on	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   evidence	   showing	   that	   metabolic	  
processes	  are	  aligned	  with	  neuronal	  responses	  (Logothetis	  et	  al.,	  2001).	  BOLD	  data	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does,	  however,	  allow	  for	  us	  to	  collect	  data	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  minimally	  invasive	  in	  a	  
patient	  population,	  and	   is	  such	   the	  best	  current	   tool	   for	  addressing	   the	  questions	  
stated	   above.	   While	   BOLD	   is	   a	   valuable	   tool	   with	   relatively	   good	   temporal	  
resolution,	   obtaining	   measures	   of	   direct	   dopamine	   binding-­‐	   such	   as	   in	   PET	  
imaging-­‐	  would	  be	  useful	  alongside	  the	  functional	  MRI	  learning	  data.	  	  
Third,	  this	  study	  was	  unable	  to	  determine	  the	  causal	  role	  of	  the	  interaction	  
between	  negative	  symptoms	  and	  learning.	  While	  the	  studies	  above	  have	  provided	  
important	  data	  necessary	  to	  further	  understand	  this	  mechanism,	  applying	  learning	  
tasks	  in	  which	  reward	  outcome	  experience	  or	  pre-­‐experimental	  affect	  is	  modulated	  
may	  be	  helpful	  to	  examine	  this	  mechanism	  first	  in	  healthy	  controls.	  	  
Fourth,	   It	   is	   possible	   that	   more	   complex	   value	   signals—such	   as	   social	  
feedback	   and	   rewards	   that	   incorporate	   abstraction—are	   related	   to	   more	   severe	  
limitations	   due	   to	   known	   dysfunction	   in	   prefrontal	   cortex	   associated	   with	  
schizophrenia.	  This	  study	  was	  limited	  in	  that	  we	  used	  money	  and	  verbal	  feedback	  
as	   outcomes,	   and	  while	   both	   do	   involve	   contextual	  meaning	   and	   are	   likely	   to	   be	  
more	   complex	   that	   simple	   juice	   rewards,	   there	   still	   exist	  many	   ecologically	   valid	  
rewards	  that	  do	  not	  compare	  in	  complexity.	  The	  deficits	  observed	  in	  Study	  3	  in	  the	  
orbitofronal	  cortex	  may	  shift—	  for	  better	  or	  worse—	  if	  rewards	  are	  more	  abstract,	  
affective,	  or	  rely	  on	  contextual	  or	  social	  cues,	  and	  future	  studies	  should	  address	  this	  
question	  with	  varying	  levels	  of	  reward	  complexity	  and	  abstraction.	  	  
Fifth,	   the	   studies	   examining	   the	   nature	   of	   learning	   in	   patients	   with	  
schizophrenia	  used	  cohort	   samples	  entirely	   comprised	  of	  patients	  on	  medication.	  
As	  mentioned	  in	  prior	  sections,	  it	  has	  been	  demonstrated	  that	  dopaminergic	  drugs	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may	  modulate	  learning	  (Cools	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Insel	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  Pessiglione	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  
Rutledge	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   Studies	   in	   prodromal,	   unmedicated,	   and	   first-­‐generation	  
episode	   patients	  would	   help	   to	   determine	  whether	   the	   gain/loss	   differential	   and	  
learning	   impairments	   are	   a	   function	   of	   these	   drugs	   themselves,	   or	   caused	   by	  
symptoms	  or	  biological	  mechanism	  stemming	  from	  the	  disease	  itself.	  	  
Further,	  schizophrenia	  is	  associated	  not	  only	  with	  a	  spectrum	  of	  debilitating	  
symptoms,	   but	   also	   with	   cognitive	   symptoms	   that	   may	   accompany,	   or	   even	  
underlie,	  motivational	  and	  learning	  deficits.	  As	  such,	  considering	  the	  psychometrics	  
of	   this	   task	   in	   these	   subjects	   is	   critical.	   Concerns	   regarding	   construct	   validity,	  
strategy	  development,	   task	   length,	   floor/ceiling	  effects,	   statistical	  power,	  practice	  
effects,	  and	  the	  ability	  of	  a	  paradigm	  to	  assess	  fine-­‐grained	  –	  as	  opposed	  to	  general	  
–	   deficits	   have	   been	   cited	   as	   major	   concerns	   for	   behavioral	   studies	   that	   try	   to	  
identify	  the	  cognitive	  and	  neural	  abnormalities	  of	  schizophrenia	  (Barch	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  
Barch	  et	  al.,	  2008;	   Insel	  et	  al.,	  2011).	   	   In	   fMRI	  studies,	  questions	  about	   test-­‐retest	  
reliability	  and	  individual	  or	  voxel-­‐specific	  BOLD	  variability	  have	  all	  been	  addressed	  
as	   possible	   sources	   of	   unknown	   psychometric	   integrity	   (Barch	   and	   Mathalon,	  
2011).	  	  
In	   the	   reward	   learning	   used	   in	   Studies	   2	   and	  3,	   it	   is	  worth	   noting	   several	  
limitations	  for	  their	  use	  in	  this	  population.	  One	  consideration	  is	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  
develop	   a	  more	   explicit	   strategy	   for	   this	   task	   if	   a	   subject	   should	  determine	  what	  
(s)he	  believes	  to	  be	  the	  optimal	  shape,	  and	  choose	  it	  based	  on	  a	  top-­‐down,	  model-­‐
based	   approach,	   as	   opposed	   to	   relying	   on	   a	   combination	   of	   past	   reward	  
experiences.	   This	  may	   then	   lead	   to	   a	  measurement	   of	   ability	   to	   develop	   strategy	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rather	   than	   sensitivity	   to	   past	   rewards	   as	   a	   vehicle	   by	   which	   to	   guide	   choice.	  
Another	   consideration	   is	   that	   the	   length	   of	   reward	   learning	   paradigms	   often	  
requires	   a	   large	   number	   of	   trials	   to	   achieve	   a	   threshold	   of	   statistical	   power	  
sufficient	   for	   analyses,	   especially	   those	   that	   involve	   reinforcement	   and	   temporal	  
difference	  models.	  We	  were	  not	  able	  to	  maximize	  the	  number	  of	  trials	  in	  this	  study,	  
as	  we	  did	  not	  want	  to	  tax	  the	  patient	  participants	  in	  the	  scanner.	  	  	  
However,	  we	  did	  address	  some	  of	  these	  concerns	  in	  our	  design	  and	  analysis.	  
While	  we	  were	  not	  able	  to	  achieve	  as	  many	  trials	  in	  these	  studies	  as	  most	  reward	  
learning	   tasks	   in	  healthy	  controls,	  we	  were	  able	   to	  determine	   that	  our	  model	   fits	  
were	   sufficient	   based	   on	   testing	   their	   likelihood	   against	   chance.	   Second,	   we	  
counterbalanced	   each	   experimental	   phase	   condition	   in	   order	   to	   account	   for	  
possible	  practice	  effects.	  Finally,	  neither	  group	  showed	  floor	  or	  ceiling	  effects	  at	  the	  
contingency	  used,	  indicating	  this	  was	  not	  a	  concern.	  	  
One	   further	  consideration	   in	   terms	  of	  construct	  validity	   is	   related	   to	  other	  
deficits	  of	  schizophrenia	  that	  could	  account	  for	  the	  findings	  described	  in	  this	  thesis.	  
Specifically,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  attention	  may	  explain	  some	  
of	   the	   deficits	   in	   learning,	   as	   this	   has	   been	   an	   established	   deficit	   of	   the	   disease	  
(Braff,	  1993;	  Perlstein	  et	  al.,	  1998),	  and	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  especially	  abnormal	  
in	  affective	  contexts	  (Anticevic	  et	  al.,	  2012a;	  Anticevic	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Eich	  and	  Smith,	  
2014).	   The	   reward	   task	   at	   hand	   not	   only	   requires	   attention	   for	   encoding	   past	  
reward	   experiences,	   but	   hinges	   on	   affective	   and	   motivational	   context,	   thereby	  
leaving	   open	   the	   possibility	   that	   attention,	   while	   in	   some	  ways	   a	   crucial	   part	   of	  
learning	  per	  se,	  is	  the	  primary	  mechanism	  of	  the	  deficit.	  The	  interaction	  of	  learning	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and	  attention	  processes	  should	  be	  further	  explored	  as	   it	  pertains	  to	  patients	  with	  
schizophrenia	  who	  have	  negative	  symptoms.	  	  	  	  
Finally,	   this	  study	  was	  conducted	   in	  adult	  patients	  who	  had	  developed	   the	  
disease,	  in	  some	  cases,	  years	  ago,	  and	  have	  been	  on	  medication	  for	  months	  to	  years.	  
Examining	   learning	   mechanisms	   and	   performance	   as	   symptoms	   develop	   in	  
prodromal	  patients	  may	  help	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  whether	  learning	  deficits	  are	  present	  
during	  the	  developmental	  and	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  disease,	  or	  whether	  they	  possibly	  
emerge	  later	  as	  negative	  symptoms	  and	  atrophy	  occur	  as	  schizophrenia	  progresses.	  	  




Abi-­‐Dargham,	  A.,	  Gil,	  R.,	  Krystal,	  J.,	  Baldwin,	  R.M.,	  Seibyl,	  J.P.,	  Bowers,	  M.,	  van	  Dyck,	  
C.H.,	  Charney,	  D.S.,	  Innis,	  R.B.,	  Laruelle,	  M.,	  1998.	  Increased	  striatal	  dopamine	  
transmission	  in	  schizophrenia:	  confirmation	  in	  a	  second	  cohort.	  The	  American	  
journal	  of	  psychiatry	  155(6),	  761-­‐767.	  
Abi-­‐Dargham,	  A.,	  Rodenhiser,	  J.,	  Printz,	  D.,	  Zea-­‐Ponce,	  Y.,	  Gil,	  R.,	  Kegeles,	  L.S.,	  Weiss,	  
R.,	  Cooper,	  T.B.,	  Mann,	  J.J.,	  Van	  Heertum,	  R.L.,	  Gorman,	  J.M.,	  Laruelle,	  M.,	  2000.	  
Increased	  baseline	  occupancy	  of	  D2	  receptors	  by	  dopamine	  in	  schizophrenia.	  Proc	  
Natl	  Acad	  Sci	  U	  S	  A	  97(14),	  8104-­‐8109.	  
Abler,	  B.,	  Greenhouse,	  I.,	  Ongur,	  D.,	  Walter,	  H.,	  Heckers,	  S.,	  2008.	  Abnormal	  reward	  
system	  activation	  in	  mania.	  Neuropsychopharmacology	  33(9),	  2217-­‐2227.	  
Adcock,	  R.A.,	  Thangavel,	  A.,	  Whitfield-­‐Gabrieli,	  S.,	  Knutson,	  B.,	  Gabrieli,	  J.D.,	  2006.	  
Reward-­‐motivated	  learning:	  mesolimbic	  activation	  precedes	  memory	  formation.	  
Neuron	  50(3),	  507-­‐517.	  
Addington,	  D.,	  Addington,	  J.,	  Maticka-­‐Tyndale,	  E.,	  Joyce,	  J.,	  1992.	  Reliability	  and	  
validity	  of	  a	  depression	  rating	  scale	  for	  schizophrenics.	  Schizophrenia	  research	  
6(3),	  201-­‐208.	  
Ahles,	  T.A.,	  Blanchard,	  E.B.,	  Ruckdeschel,	  J.C.,	  1983.	  The	  multidimensional	  nature	  of	  
cancer-­‐related	  pain.	  Pain	  17(3),	  277-­‐288.	  
Anderson,	  S.W.,	  Bechara,	  A.,	  Damasio,	  H.,	  Tranel,	  D.,	  Damasio,	  A.R.,	  1999.	  
Impairment	  of	  social	  and	  moral	  behavior	  related	  to	  early	  damage	  in	  human	  
prefrontal	  cortex.	  Nature	  neuroscience	  2(11),	  1032-­‐1037.	  
Andreasen,	  N.C.,	  Olsen,	  S.,	  1982.	  Negative	  v	  positive	  schizophrenia.	  Definition	  and	  
validation.	  Archives	  of	  general	  psychiatry	  39(7),	  789-­‐794.	  
Anticevic,	  A.,	  Repovs,	  G.,	  Barch,	  D.M.,	  2012a.	  Emotion	  effects	  on	  attention,	  amygdala	  
activation,	  and	  functional	  connectivity	  in	  schizophrenia.	  Schizophrenia	  bulletin	  
38(5),	  967-­‐980.	  
Anticevic,	  A.,	  Repovs,	  G.,	  Corlett,	  P.R.,	  Barch,	  D.M.,	  2011.	  Negative	  and	  nonemotional	  
interference	  with	  visual	  working	  memory	  in	  schizophrenia.	  Biological	  psychiatry	  
70(12),	  1159-­‐1168.	  
Anticevic,	  A.,	  Van	  Snellenberg,	  J.X.,	  Cohen,	  R.E.,	  Repovs,	  G.,	  Dowd,	  E.C.,	  Barch,	  D.M.,	  
2012b.	  Amygdala	  Recruitment	  in	  Schizophrenia	  in	  Response	  to	  Aversive	  Emotional	  
Material:	  A	  Meta-­‐analysis	  of	  Neuroimaging	  Studies.	  Schizophrenia	  bulletin	  38(3),	  
608-­‐621.	  
	  109	  
Ariely,	  D.,	  1998.	  Combining	  Experiences	  Over	  Time:	  The	  Effects	  of	  Duration,	  
Intensity	  Changes	  and	  On-­‐Line	  Measurements	  on	  Retrospective	  Pain	  Evaluations.	  
Journal	  of	  Behavioral	  Decision	  Making	  11,	  19-­‐45.	  
Ariely,	  D.,	  2008.	  Better	  than	  average?	  When	  can	  we	  say	  that	  subsampling	  of	  items	  is	  
better	  than	  statistical	  summary	  representations?	  Perception	  &	  psychophysics	  
70(7),	  1325-­‐1326;	  discussion	  1335-­‐1326.	  
Ariely,	  D.,	  Carmon,	  Z.,	  2000.	  Gestalt	  Characteristics	  of	  Experiences:	  The	  Defining	  
Features	  of	  Summarized	  Events.	  J	  Behav	  Dec	  Making	  13,	  191-­‐201.	  
Ariely,	  D.,	  Lowenstein,	  G.,	  2000.	  When	  Does	  Duration	  Matter	  in	  Judgment	  and	  
Decision	  Making?	  .	  Journal	  of	  Experimental	  Psychology	  129(4),	  508-­‐523.	  
Aron,	  A.R.,	  Shohamy,	  D.,	  Clark,	  J.,	  Myers,	  C.,	  Gluck,	  M.A.,	  Poldrack,	  R.A.,	  2004.	  Human	  
midbrain	  sensitivity	  to	  cognitive	  feedback	  and	  uncertainty	  during	  classification	  
learning.	  Journal	  of	  neurophysiology	  92(2),	  1144-­‐1152.	  
Atlas,	  L.Y.,	  Bolger,	  N.,	  Lindquist,	  M.A.,	  Wager,	  T.D.,	  2010.	  Brain	  mediators	  of	  
predictive	  cue	  effects	  on	  perceived	  pain.	  The	  Journal	  of	  neuroscience	  :	  the	  official	  
journal	  of	  the	  Society	  for	  Neuroscience	  30(39),	  12964-­‐12977.	  
Babul,	  N.,	  Darke,	  A.C.,	  1994.	  Reliability	  and	  accuracy	  of	  memory	  for	  acute	  pain.	  Pain	  
57(1),	  131-­‐132.	  
Baliki,	  M.N.,	  Geha,	  P.Y.,	  Fields,	  H.L.,	  Apkarian,	  A.V.,	  2010.	  Predicting	  value	  of	  pain	  
and	  analgesia:	  nucleus	  accumbens	  response	  to	  noxious	  stimuli	  changes	  in	  the	  
presence	  of	  chronic	  pain.	  Neuron	  66(1),	  149-­‐160.	  
Barberini,	  C.L.,	  Morrison,	  S.E.,	  Saez,	  A.,	  Lau,	  B.,	  Salzman,	  C.D.,	  2012.	  Complexity	  and	  
competition	  in	  appetitive	  and	  aversive	  neural	  circuits.	  Frontiers	  in	  neuroscience	  6,	  
170.	  
Barch,	  D.M.,	  2008.	  Emotion,	  motivation,	  and	  reward	  processing	  in	  schizophrenia	  
spectrum	  disorders:	  what	  we	  know	  and	  where	  we	  need	  to	  go.	  Schizophrenia	  
bulletin	  34(5),	  816-­‐818.	  
Barch,	  D.M.,	  Carter,	  C.S.,	  Arnsten,	  A.,	  Buchanan,	  R.W.,	  Cohen,	  J.D.,	  Geyer,	  M.,	  Green,	  
M.F.,	  Krystal,	  J.H.,	  Nuechterlein,	  K.,	  Robbins,	  T.,	  Silverstein,	  S.,	  Smith,	  E.E.,	  Strauss,	  
M.,	  Wykes,	  T.,	  Heinssen,	  R.,	  2009.	  Selecting	  paradigms	  from	  cognitive	  neuroscience	  
for	  translation	  into	  use	  in	  clinical	  trials:	  proceedings	  of	  the	  third	  CNTRICS	  meeting.	  
Schizophrenia	  bulletin	  35(1),	  109-­‐114.	  
Barch,	  D.M.,	  Carter,	  C.S.,	  Committee,	  C.E.,	  2008.	  Measurement	  issues	  in	  the	  use	  of	  
cognitive	  neuroscience	  tasks	  in	  drug	  development	  for	  impaired	  cognition	  in	  
schizophrenia:	  a	  report	  of	  the	  second	  consensus	  building	  conference	  of	  the	  
CNTRICS	  initiative.	  Schizophrenia	  bulletin	  34(4),	  613-­‐618.	  
	  110	  
Barch,	  D.M.,	  Dowd,	  E.C.,	  2010.	  Goal	  representations	  and	  motivational	  drive	  in	  
schizophrenia:	  the	  role	  of	  prefrontal-­‐striatal	  interactions.	  Schizophrenia	  bulletin	  
36(5),	  919-­‐934.	  
Barch,	  D.M.,	  Mathalon,	  D.H.,	  2011.	  Using	  brain	  imaging	  measures	  in	  studies	  of	  
procognitive	  pharmacologic	  agents	  in	  schizophrenia:	  psychometric	  and	  quality	  
assurance	  considerations.	  Biological	  psychiatry	  70(1),	  13-­‐18.	  
Barrett,	  L.F.,	  Mesquita,	  B.,	  Ochsner,	  K.N.,	  Gross,	  J.J.,	  2007.	  The	  experience	  of	  
emotion.	  Annual	  review	  of	  psychology	  58,	  373-­‐403.	  
Bartra,	  O.,	  McGuire,	  J.T.,	  Kable,	  J.W.,	  2013.	  The	  valuation	  system:	  a	  coordinate-­‐based	  
meta-­‐analysis	  of	  BOLD	  fMRI	  experiments	  examining	  neural	  correlates	  of	  subjective	  
value.	  NeuroImage	  76,	  412-­‐427.	  
Bayer,	  H.M.,	  Glimcher,	  P.W.,	  2005.	  Midbrain	  dopamine	  neurons	  encode	  a	  
quantitative	  reward	  prediction	  error	  signal.	  Neuron	  47(1),	  129-­‐141.	  
Becerra,	  L.,	  Breiter,	  H.C.,	  Wise,	  R.,	  Gonzalez,	  R.G.,	  Borsook,	  D.,	  2001.	  Reward	  
circuitry	  activation	  by	  noxious	  thermal	  stimuli.	  Neuron	  32(5),	  927-­‐946.	  
Beese,	  A.,	  Morley,	  S.,	  1993.	  Memory	  for	  acute	  pain	  experience	  is	  specifically	  
inaccurate	  but	  generally	  reliable.	  Pain	  53(2),	  183-­‐189.	  
Bermudez,	  M.A.,	  Gobel,	  C.,	  Schultz,	  W.,	  2012.	  Sensitivity	  to	  temporal	  reward	  
structure	  in	  amygdala	  neurons.	  Current	  biology	  :	  CB	  22(19),	  1839-­‐1844.	  
Bermudez,	  M.A.,	  Schultz,	  W.,	  2010a.	  Responses	  of	  amygdala	  neurons	  to	  positive	  
reward-­‐predicting	  stimuli	  depend	  on	  background	  reward	  (contingency)	  rather	  
than	  stimulus-­‐reward	  pairing	  (contiguity).	  Journal	  of	  neurophysiology	  103(3),	  
1158-­‐1170.	  
Bermudez,	  M.A.,	  Schultz,	  W.,	  2010b.	  Reward	  magnitude	  coding	  in	  primate	  amygdala	  
neurons.	  Journal	  of	  neurophysiology	  104(6),	  3424-­‐3432.	  
Berridge,	  K.C.,	  Kringelbach,	  M.L.,	  2008.	  Affective	  neuroscience	  of	  pleasure:	  reward	  
in	  humans	  and	  animals.	  Psychopharmacology	  199(3),	  457-­‐480.	  
Berridge,	  K.C.,	  Kringelbach,	  M.L.,	  2013.	  Neuroscience	  of	  affect:	  brain	  mechanisms	  of	  
pleasure	  and	  displeasure.	  Current	  opinion	  in	  neurobiology	  23(3),	  294-­‐303.	  
Berridge,	  K.C.,	  Robinson,	  T.E.,	  1998.	  What	  is	  the	  role	  of	  dopamine	  in	  reward:	  
hedonic	  impact,	  reward	  learning,	  or	  incentive	  salience?	  Brain	  Res	  Brain	  Res	  Rev	  
28(3),	  309-­‐369.	  
	  111	  
Boorman,	  E.D.,	  Behrens,	  T.E.,	  Woolrich,	  M.W.,	  Rushworth,	  M.F.,	  2009.	  How	  green	  is	  
the	  grass	  on	  the	  other	  side?	  Frontopolar	  cortex	  and	  the	  evidence	  in	  favor	  of	  
alternative	  courses	  of	  action.	  Neuron	  62(5),	  733-­‐743.	  
Braff,	  D.L.,	  1993.	  Information	  processing	  and	  attention	  dysfunctions	  in	  
schizophrenia.	  Schizophrenia	  bulletin	  19(2),	  233-­‐259.	  
Brainard,	  D.H.,	  1997.	  The	  Psychophysics	  Toolbox.	  Spat	  Vis	  10(4),	  433-­‐436.	  
Broderick,	  J.E.,	  Schwartz,	  J.E.,	  Vikingstad,	  G.,	  Pribbernow,	  M.,	  Grossman,	  S.,	  Stone,	  
A.A.,	  2008.	  The	  accuracy	  of	  pain	  and	  fatigue	  items	  across	  different	  reporting	  
periods.	  Pain	  139(1),	  146-­‐157.	  
Broderick,	  J.E.,	  Stone,	  A.A.,	  Calvanese,	  P.,	  Schwartz,	  J.E.,	  Turk,	  D.C.,	  2006.	  Recalled	  
pain	  ratings:	  a	  complex	  and	  poorly	  defined	  task.	  J	  Pain	  7(2),	  142-­‐149.	  
Buhle,	  J.,	  Wager,	  T.D.,	  2010.	  Performance-­‐dependent	  inhibition	  of	  pain	  by	  an	  
executive	  working	  memory	  task.	  Pain	  149(1),	  19-­‐26.	  
Buhle,	  J.T.,	  Stevens,	  B.L.,	  Friedman,	  J.J.,	  Wager,	  T.D.,	  2012.	  Distraction	  and	  placebo:	  
two	  separate	  routes	  to	  pain	  control.	  Psychol	  Sci	  23(3),	  246-­‐253.	  
Cohen,	  A.S.,	  Minor,	  K.S.,	  2010.	  Emotional	  experience	  in	  patients	  with	  schizophrenia	  
revisited:	  meta-­‐analysis	  of	  laboratory	  studies.	  Schizophrenia	  bulletin	  36(1),	  143-­‐
150.	  
Cohen,	  M.X.,	  Frank,	  M.J.,	  2009.	  Neurocomputational	  models	  of	  basal	  ganglia	  
function	  in	  learning,	  memory	  and	  choice.	  Behav	  Brain	  Res	  199(1),	  141-­‐156.	  
Cools,	  R.,	  Frank,	  M.J.,	  Gibbs,	  S.E.,	  Miyakawa,	  A.,	  Jagust,	  W.,	  D'Esposito,	  M.,	  2009.	  
Striatal	  dopamine	  predicts	  outcome-­‐specific	  reversal	  learning	  and	  its	  sensitivity	  to	  
dopaminergic	  drug	  administration.	  The	  Journal	  of	  neuroscience	  :	  the	  official	  journal	  
of	  the	  Society	  for	  Neuroscience	  29(5),	  1538-­‐1543.	  
Damasio,	  A.R.,	  1996.	  The	  somatic	  marker	  hypothesis	  and	  the	  possible	  functions	  of	  
the	  prefrontal	  cortex.	  Philosophical	  transactions	  of	  the	  Royal	  Society	  of	  London.	  
Series	  B,	  Biological	  sciences	  351(1346),	  1413-­‐1420.	  
Daw,	  N.D.,	  2011.	  Trial-­‐by-­‐trial	  data	  analysis	  using	  computational	  models,	  in:	  
Delgado,	  M.R.,	  Phelps,	  E.A.,	  Robbins,	  T.W.	  (Eds.),	  Decision	  Making,	  Affect,	  and	  
Learning	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
Daw,	  N.D.,	  O'Doherty,	  J.P.,	  Dayan,	  P.,	  Seymour,	  B.,	  Dolan,	  R.J.,	  2006.	  Cortical	  
substrates	  for	  exploratory	  decisions	  in	  humans.	  Nature	  441(7095),	  876-­‐879.	  
Delgado,	  M.R.,	  2007.	  Reward-­‐related	  responses	  in	  the	  human	  striatum.	  Ann	  N	  Y	  
Acad	  Sci	  1104,	  70-­‐88.	  
	  112	  
Delgado,	  M.R.,	  Jou,	  R.L.,	  Ledoux,	  J.E.,	  Phelps,	  E.A.,	  2009.	  Avoiding	  negative	  outcomes:	  
tracking	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  avoidance	  learning	  in	  humans	  during	  fear	  conditioning.	  
Frontiers	  in	  behavioral	  neuroscience	  3,	  33.	  
Delgado,	  M.R.,	  Li,	  J.,	  Schiller,	  D.,	  Phelps,	  E.A.,	  2008.	  The	  role	  of	  the	  striatum	  in	  
aversive	  learning	  and	  aversive	  prediction	  errors.	  Philos	  Trans	  R	  Soc	  Lond	  B	  Biol	  Sci	  
363(1511),	  3787-­‐3800.	  
Delgado,	  M.R.,	  Miller,	  M.M.,	  Inati,	  S.,	  Phelps,	  E.A.,	  2005.	  An	  fMRI	  study	  of	  reward-­‐
related	  probability	  learning.	  Neuroimage	  24(3),	  862-­‐873.	  
Derbyshire,	  S.W.,	  Osborn,	  J.,	  2008.	  Enhancement	  of	  offset	  analgesia	  during	  
sequential	  testing.	  Eur	  J	  Pain	  12(8),	  980-­‐989.	  
Derbyshire,	  S.W.,	  Osborn,	  J.,	  2009.	  Offset	  analgesia	  is	  mediated	  by	  activation	  in	  the	  
region	  of	  the	  periaqueductal	  grey	  and	  rostral	  ventromedial	  medulla.	  Neuroimage	  
47(3),	  1002-­‐1006.	  
Dolan,	  P.,	  Kahneman,	  D.,	  2008.	  Interpretations	  Of	  Utility	  And	  Their	  Implications	  For	  
The	  Valuation	  Of	  Health.	  The	  Economic	  Journal	  118(525),	  215-­‐234.	  
Dowd,	  E.C.,	  Barch,	  D.M.,	  2010.	  Anhedonia	  and	  emotional	  experience	  in	  
schizophrenia:	  neural	  and	  behavioral	  indicators.	  Biological	  psychiatry	  67(10),	  902-­‐
911.	  
Dowd,	  E.C.,	  Barch,	  D.M.,	  2012.	  Pavlovian	  reward	  prediction	  and	  receipt	  in	  
schizophrenia:	  relationship	  to	  anhedonia.	  PloS	  one	  7(5),	  e35622.	  
Eich,	  T.S.,	  Smith,	  E.E.,	  2014.	  Schizophrenia	  and	  emotional	  rubbernecking.	  Cognitive,	  
affective	  &	  behavioral	  neuroscience	  14(1),	  202-­‐208.	  
Erskine,	  A.,	  Morley,	  S.,	  Pearce,	  S.,	  1990.	  Memory	  for	  pain:	  a	  review.	  Pain	  41(3),	  255-­‐
265.	  
Farkas,	  M.,	  Polgar,	  P.,	  Kelemen,	  O.,	  Rethelyi,	  J.,	  Bitter,	  I.,	  Myers,	  C.E.,	  Gluck,	  M.A.,	  Keri,	  
S.,	  2008.	  Associative	  learning	  in	  deficit	  and	  nondeficit	  schizophrenia.	  Neuroreport	  
19(1),	  55-­‐58.	  
First,	  M.B.,	  Spitzer,	  R.L.,	  Miriam,	  G.,	  Williams,	  J.B.W.,	  November	  2002.	  Structured	  
Clinical	  Interview	  for	  DSM-­‐IV-­‐TR	  Axis	  I	  Disorders,	  Research	  Version,	  Patient	  
Edition.	  (SCID-­‐I/NP).	  Biometrics	  Research,	  New	  York	  State	  Psychiatric	  Institute	  
New	  York.	  
Foerde,	  K.,	  Knowlton,	  B.J.,	  Poldrack,	  R.A.,	  2006.	  Modulation	  of	  competing	  memory	  
systems	  by	  distraction.	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  National	  Academy	  of	  Sciences	  of	  the	  
United	  States	  of	  America	  103(31),	  11778-­‐11783.	  
	  113	  
Foerde,	  K.,	  Shohamy,	  D.,	  2011.	  Feedback	  timing	  modulates	  brain	  systems	  for	  
learning	  in	  humans.	  The	  Journal	  of	  neuroscience	  :	  the	  official	  journal	  of	  the	  Society	  
for	  Neuroscience	  31(37),	  13157-­‐13167.	  
Foley,	  K.A.,	  Cady,	  R.,	  Martin,	  V.,	  Adelman,	  J.,	  Diamond,	  M.,	  Bell,	  C.F.,	  Dayno,	  J.M.,	  Hu,	  
X.H.,	  2005.	  Treating	  early	  versus	  treating	  mild:	  timing	  of	  migraine	  prescription	  
medications	  among	  patients	  with	  diagnosed	  migraine.	  Headache	  45(5),	  538-­‐545.	  
Frank,	  M.J.,	  Seeberger,	  L.C.,	  O'Reilly	  R,	  C.,	  2004.	  By	  carrot	  or	  by	  stick:	  cognitive	  
reinforcement	  learning	  in	  parkinsonism.	  Science	  306(5703),	  1940-­‐1943.	  
Fredrickson,	  B.L.,	  2000.	  Extracting	  meaning	  from	  past	  affective	  experiences:	  The	  
importance	  of	  peaks,	  ends,	  and	  specific	  emotions.	  Cognition	  and	  Emotion	  14(4),	  
577-­‐606.	  
Fredrickson,	  B.L.,	  Kahneman,	  D.,	  1993.	  Duration	  neglect	  in	  retrospective	  
evaluations	  of	  affective	  episodes.	  Journal	  of	  personality	  and	  social	  psychology	  
65(1),	  45-­‐55.	  
Gard,	  D.E.,	  Kring,	  A.M.,	  Gard,	  M.G.,	  Horan,	  W.P.,	  Green,	  M.F.,	  2007.	  Anhedonia	  in	  
schizophrenia:	  distinctions	  between	  anticipatory	  and	  consummatory	  pleasure.	  
Schizophrenia	  research	  93(1-­‐3),	  253-­‐260.	  
Gershman,	  S.J.,	  Pesaran,	  B.,	  Daw,	  N.D.,	  2009.	  Human	  reinforcement	  learning	  
subdivides	  structured	  action	  spaces	  by	  learning	  effector-­‐specific	  values.	  The	  
Journal	  of	  neuroscience	  :	  the	  official	  journal	  of	  the	  Society	  for	  Neuroscience	  29(43),	  
13524-­‐13531.	  
Geuter,	  S.,	  Eippert,	  F.,	  Hindi	  Attar,	  C.,	  Buchel,	  C.,	  2013.	  Cortical	  and	  subcortical	  
responses	  to	  high	  and	  low	  effective	  placebo	  treatments.	  NeuroImage	  67,	  227-­‐236.	  
Gold,	  J.M.,	  Waltz,	  J.A.,	  Matveeva,	  T.M.,	  Kasanova,	  Z.,	  Strauss,	  G.P.,	  Herbener,	  E.S.,	  
Collins,	  A.G.,	  Frank,	  M.J.,	  2012.	  Negative	  symptoms	  and	  the	  failure	  to	  represent	  the	  
expected	  reward	  value	  of	  actions:	  behavioral	  and	  computational	  modeling	  
evidence.	  Archives	  of	  general	  psychiatry	  69(2),	  129-­‐138.	  
Gold,	  J.M.,	  Waltz,	  J.A.,	  Prentice,	  K.J.,	  Morris,	  S.E.,	  Heerey,	  E.A.,	  2008.	  Reward	  
processing	  in	  schizophrenia:	  a	  deficit	  in	  the	  representation	  of	  value.	  Schizophrenia	  
bulletin	  34(5),	  835-­‐847.	  
Goldberg,	  R.J.,	  Yarzebski,	  J.,	  Lessard,	  D.,	  Gore,	  J.M.,	  2000.	  Decade-­‐long	  trends	  and	  
factors	  associated	  with	  time	  to	  hospital	  presentation	  in	  patients	  with	  acute	  
myocardial	  infarction:	  the	  Worcester	  Heart	  Attack	  study.	  Arch	  Intern	  Med	  160(21),	  
3217-­‐3223.	  
	  114	  
Grimm,	  O.,	  Vollstadt-­‐Klein,	  S.,	  Krebs,	  L.,	  Zink,	  M.,	  Smolka,	  M.N.,	  2012.	  Reduced	  
striatal	  activation	  during	  reward	  anticipation	  due	  to	  appetite-­‐provoking	  cues	  in	  
chronic	  schizophrenia:	  a	  fMRI	  study.	  Schizophrenia	  research	  134(2-­‐3),	  151-­‐157.	  
Hare,	  T.A.,	  O'Doherty,	  J.,	  Camerer,	  C.F.,	  Schultz,	  W.,	  Rangel,	  A.,	  2008.	  Dissociating	  the	  
role	  of	  the	  orbitofrontal	  cortex	  and	  the	  striatum	  in	  the	  computation	  of	  goal	  values	  
and	  prediction	  errors.	  The	  Journal	  of	  neuroscience	  :	  the	  official	  journal	  of	  the	  
Society	  for	  Neuroscience	  28(22),	  5623-­‐5630.	  
Hart,	  A.S.,	  Rutledge,	  R.B.,	  Glimcher,	  P.W.,	  Phillips,	  P.E.,	  2014.	  Phasic	  dopamine	  
release	  in	  the	  rat	  nucleus	  accumbens	  symmetrically	  encodes	  a	  reward	  prediction	  
error	  term.	  The	  Journal	  of	  neuroscience	  :	  the	  official	  journal	  of	  the	  Society	  for	  
Neuroscience	  34(3),	  698-­‐704.	  
Heerey,	  E.A.,	  Gold,	  J.M.,	  2007.	  Patients	  with	  schizophrenia	  demonstrate	  dissociation	  
between	  affective	  experience	  and	  motivated	  behavior.	  Journal	  of	  abnormal	  
psychology	  116(2),	  268-­‐278.	  
Hornak,	  J.,	  Bramham,	  J.,	  Rolls,	  E.T.,	  Morris,	  R.G.,	  O'Doherty,	  J.,	  Bullock,	  P.R.,	  Polkey,	  
C.E.,	  2003.	  Changes	  in	  emotion	  after	  circumscribed	  surgical	  lesions	  of	  the	  
orbitofrontal	  and	  cingulate	  cortices.	  Brain	  :	  a	  journal	  of	  neurology	  126(Pt	  7),	  1691-­‐
1712.	  
Insel,	  C.,	  Reinen,	  J.,	  Weber,	  J.,	  Wager,	  T.D.,	  Jarskog,	  L.F.,	  Shohamy,	  D.,	  Smith,	  E.E.,	  
2014.	  Antipsychotic	  dose	  modulates	  behavioral	  and	  neural	  responses	  to	  feedback	  
during	  reinforcement	  learning	  in	  schizophrenia.	  Cognitive,	  affective	  &	  behavioral	  
neuroscience	  14(1),	  189-­‐201.	  
Insel,	  T.R.,	  Morris,	  S.E.,	  Heinssen,	  R.K.,	  2011.	  Standardization,	  integration,	  and	  
sharing-­‐leveraging	  research	  investments.	  Biological	  psychiatry	  70(1),	  5-­‐6.	  
Jantsch,	  H.H.,	  Gawlitza,	  M.,	  Geber,	  C.,	  Baumgartner,	  U.,	  Kramer,	  H.H.,	  Magerl,	  W.,	  
Treede,	  R.D.,	  Birklein,	  F.,	  2009.	  Explicit	  episodic	  memory	  for	  sensory-­‐discriminative	  
components	  of	  capsaicin-­‐induced	  pain:	  immediate	  and	  delayed	  ratings.	  Pain	  143(1-­‐
2),	  97-­‐105.	  
Jensen,	  M.P.,	  Mardekian,	  J.,	  Lakshminarayanan,	  M.,	  Boye,	  M.E.,	  2008.	  Validity	  of	  24-­‐h	  
recall	  ratings	  of	  pain	  severity:	  biasing	  effects	  of	  "Peak"	  and	  "End"	  pain.	  Pain	  137(2),	  
422-­‐427.	  
Juckel,	  G.,	  Schlagenhauf,	  F.,	  Koslowski,	  M.,	  Filonov,	  D.,	  Wustenberg,	  T.,	  Villringer,	  A.,	  
Knutson,	  B.,	  Kienast,	  T.,	  Gallinat,	  J.,	  Wrase,	  J.,	  Heinz,	  A.,	  2006a.	  Dysfunction	  of	  
ventral	  striatal	  reward	  prediction	  in	  schizophrenic	  patients	  treated	  with	  typical,	  
not	  atypical,	  neuroleptics.	  Psychopharmacology	  (Berl)	  187(2),	  222-­‐228.	  
	  115	  
Juckel,	  G.,	  Schlagenhauf,	  F.,	  Koslowski,	  M.,	  Wustenberg,	  T.,	  Villringer,	  A.,	  Knutson,	  B.,	  
Wrase,	  J.,	  Heinz,	  A.,	  2006b.	  Dysfunction	  of	  ventral	  striatal	  reward	  prediction	  in	  
schizophrenia.	  Neuroimage	  29(2),	  409-­‐416.	  
Kahneman,	  D.,	  Fredrickson,	  B.L.,	  Schrieber,	  C.A.,	  Redelmeier,	  D.A.,	  1993.	  When	  More	  
Pain	  Is	  Preferred	  to	  Less:	  Adding	  a	  Better	  End.	  Psychol	  Sci	  4(6),	  401-­‐405.	  
Kahneman,	  D.,	  Tversky,	  A.,	  1979.	  Prospect	  Theory:	  An	  Analysis	  of	  Decision	  Under	  
Risk.	  Econometrica	  47(2),	  263-­‐292.	  
Kahneman,	  D.,	  Wakker,	  P.,	  Sarin,	  R.,	  1997.	  Back	  to	  Bentham?	  Explorations	  of	  
experienced	  utility	  Quarterly	  Journal	  of	  Economics	  112,	  375-­‐405.	  
Kensinger,	  E.A.,	  2009.	  Remembering	  the	  Details:	  Effects	  of	  Emotion.	  Emotion	  
review	  :	  journal	  of	  the	  International	  Society	  for	  Research	  on	  Emotion	  1(2),	  99-­‐113.	  
Kensinger,	  E.A.,	  Schacter,	  D.L.,	  2007.	  Remembering	  the	  specific	  visual	  details	  of	  
presented	  objects:	  neuroimaging	  evidence	  for	  effects	  of	  emotion.	  Neuropsychologia	  
45(13),	  2951-­‐2962.	  
Kirkpatrick,	  B.,	  Fenton,	  W.S.,	  Carpenter,	  W.T.,	  Jr.,	  Marder,	  S.R.,	  2006.	  The	  NIMH-­‐
MATRICS	  consensus	  statement	  on	  negative	  symptoms.	  Schizophrenia	  bulletin	  
32(2),	  214-­‐219.	  
Kirsch,	  P.,	  Ronshausen,	  S.,	  Mier,	  D.,	  Gallhofer,	  B.,	  2007.	  The	  influence	  of	  
antipsychotic	  treatment	  on	  brain	  reward	  system	  reactivity	  in	  schizophrenia	  
patients.	  Pharmacopsychiatry	  40(5),	  196-­‐198.	  
Knowlton,	  B.J.,	  Mangels,	  J.A.,	  Squire,	  L.R.,	  1996.	  A	  neostriatal	  habit	  learning	  system	  
in	  humans.	  Science	  273(5280),	  1399-­‐1402.	  
Knutson,	  B.,	  Adcock,	  R.A.,	  2005.	  Remembrance	  of	  rewards	  past.	  Neuron	  45(3),	  331-­‐
332.	  
Knutson,	  B.,	  Fong,	  G.W.,	  Bennett,	  S.M.,	  Adams,	  C.M.,	  Hommer,	  D.,	  2003.	  A	  region	  of	  
mesial	  prefrontal	  cortex	  tracks	  monetarily	  rewarding	  outcomes:	  characterization	  
with	  rapid	  event-­‐related	  fMRI.	  Neuroimage	  18(2),	  263-­‐272.	  
Kober,	  H.,	  Barrett,	  L.F.,	  Joseph,	  J.,	  Bliss-­‐Moreau,	  E.,	  Lindquist,	  K.,	  Wager,	  T.D.,	  2008.	  
Functional	  grouping	  and	  cortical-­‐subcortical	  interactions	  in	  emotion:	  a	  meta-­‐
analysis	  of	  neuroimaging	  studies.	  Neuroimage	  42(2),	  998-­‐1031.	  
Koch,	  K.,	  Schachtzabel,	  C.,	  Wagner,	  G.,	  Schikora,	  J.,	  Schultz,	  C.,	  Reichenbach,	  J.R.,	  
Sauer,	  H.,	  Schlosser,	  R.G.,	  2010.	  Altered	  activation	  in	  association	  with	  reward-­‐
related	  trial-­‐and-­‐error	  learning	  in	  patients	  with	  schizophrenia.	  Neuroimage	  50(1),	  
223-­‐232.	  
	  116	  
Koyama,	  Y.,	  Koyama,	  T.,	  Kroncke,	  A.P.,	  Coghill,	  R.C.,	  2004.	  Effects	  of	  stimulus	  
duration	  on	  heat	  induced	  pain:	  the	  relationship	  between	  real-­‐time	  and	  post-­‐
stimulus	  pain	  ratings.	  Pain	  107(3),	  256-­‐266.	  
Kring,	  A.M.,	  Barch,	  D.M.,	  2014.	  The	  motivation	  and	  pleasure	  dimension	  of	  negative	  
symptoms:	  Neural	  substrates	  and	  behavioral	  outputs.	  European	  
neuropsychopharmacology	  :	  the	  journal	  of	  the	  European	  College	  of	  
Neuropsychopharmacology.	  
Kring,	  A.M.,	  Moran,	  E.K.,	  2008.	  Emotional	  response	  deficits	  in	  schizophrenia:	  
insights	  from	  affective	  science.	  Schizophrenia	  bulletin	  34(5),	  819-­‐834.	  
Kringelbach,	  M.L.,	  Berridge,	  K.C.,	  2009.	  Towards	  a	  functional	  neuroanatomy	  of	  
pleasure	  and	  happiness.	  Trends	  in	  cognitive	  sciences	  13(11),	  479-­‐487.	  
Kringelbach,	  M.L.,	  Rolls,	  E.T.,	  2004.	  The	  functional	  neuroanatomy	  of	  the	  human	  
orbitofrontal	  cortex:	  evidence	  from	  neuroimaging	  and	  neuropsychology.	  Progress	  
in	  neurobiology	  72(5),	  341-­‐372.	  
Kroenke,	  K.,	  2003.	  Patients	  presenting	  with	  somatic	  complaints:	  epidemiology,	  
psychiatric	  comorbidity	  and	  management.	  Int	  J	  Methods	  Psychiatr	  Res	  12(1),	  34-­‐
43.	  
Leknes,	  S.,	  Tracey,	  I.,	  2008.	  A	  common	  neurobiology	  for	  pain	  and	  pleasure.	  Nat	  Rev	  
Neurosci	  9(4),	  314-­‐320.	  
Leventhal,	  H.,	  Brown,	  D.,	  Shacham,	  S.,	  Engquist,	  G.,	  1979.	  Effects	  of	  preparatory	  
information	  about	  sensations,	  threat	  of	  pain,	  and	  attention	  on	  cold	  pressor	  distress.	  
Journal	  of	  personality	  and	  social	  psychology	  37(5),	  688-­‐714.	  
Li,	  J.,	  Schiller,	  D.,	  Schoenbaum,	  G.,	  Phelps,	  E.A.,	  Daw,	  N.D.,	  2011.	  Differential	  roles	  of	  
human	  striatum	  and	  amygdala	  in	  associative	  learning.	  Nature	  neuroscience	  14(10),	  
1250-­‐1252.	  
Lindquist,	  K.A.,	  Wager,	  T.D.,	  Kober,	  H.,	  Bliss-­‐Moreau,	  E.,	  Barrett,	  L.F.,	  2012.	  The	  
brain	  basis	  of	  emotion:	  a	  meta-­‐analytic	  review.	  The	  Behavioral	  and	  brain	  sciences	  
35(3),	  121-­‐143.	  
Lisman,	  J.E.,	  Grace,	  A.A.,	  2005.	  The	  hippocampal-­‐VTA	  loop:	  controlling	  the	  entry	  of	  
information	  into	  long-­‐term	  memory.	  Neuron	  46(5),	  703-­‐713.	  
Logothetis,	  N.K.,	  Pauls,	  J.,	  Augath,	  M.,	  Trinath,	  T.,	  Oeltermann,	  A.,	  2001.	  
Neurophysiological	  investigation	  of	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  fMRI	  signal.	  Nature	  412(6843),	  
150-­‐157.	  
Lowenstein,	  G.,	  Prelec,	  D.,	  1993.	  Preferences	  for	  sequences	  of	  outcomes.	  
Psychological	  Review	  100(1),	  91-­‐108.	  
	  117	  
McClure,	  S.M.,	  Berns,	  G.S.,	  Montague,	  P.R.,	  2003.	  Temporal	  prediction	  errors	  in	  a	  
passive	  learning	  task	  activate	  human	  striatum.	  Neuron	  38(2),	  339-­‐346.	  
Mobbs,	  D.,	  Yu,	  R.,	  Rowe,	  J.B.,	  Eich,	  H.,	  FeldmanHall,	  O.,	  Dalgleish,	  T.,	  2010.	  Neural	  
activity	  associated	  with	  monitoring	  the	  oscillating	  threat	  value	  of	  a	  tarantula.	  
Proceedings	  of	  the	  National	  Academy	  of	  Sciences	  of	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  
107(47),	  20582-­‐20586.	  
Morrison,	  S.E.,	  Salzman,	  C.D.,	  2009.	  The	  convergence	  of	  information	  about	  
rewarding	  and	  aversive	  stimuli	  in	  single	  neurons.	  The	  Journal	  of	  neuroscience	  :	  the	  
official	  journal	  of	  the	  Society	  for	  Neuroscience	  29(37),	  11471-­‐11483.	  
Morrison,	  S.E.,	  Salzman,	  C.D.,	  2011.	  Representations	  of	  appetitive	  and	  aversive	  
information	  in	  the	  primate	  orbitofrontal	  cortex.	  Annals	  of	  the	  New	  York	  Academy	  
of	  Sciences	  1239,	  59-­‐70.	  
Murray,	  G.K.,	  Cheng,	  F.,	  Clark,	  L.,	  Barnett,	  J.H.,	  Blackwell,	  A.D.,	  Fletcher,	  P.C.,	  Robbins,	  
T.W.,	  Bullmore,	  E.T.,	  Jones,	  P.B.,	  2008a.	  Reinforcement	  and	  reversal	  learning	  in	  
first-­‐episode	  psychosis.	  Schizophrenia	  bulletin	  34(5),	  848-­‐855.	  
Murray,	  G.K.,	  Corlett,	  P.R.,	  Clark,	  L.,	  Pessiglione,	  M.,	  Blackwell,	  A.D.,	  Honey,	  G.,	  Jones,	  
P.B.,	  Bullmore,	  E.T.,	  Robbins,	  T.W.,	  Fletcher,	  P.C.,	  2008b.	  Substantia	  nigra/ventral	  
tegmental	  reward	  prediction	  error	  disruption	  in	  psychosis.	  Mol	  Psychiatry	  13(3),	  
239,	  267-­‐276.	  
Murty,	  V.P.,	  Adcock,	  R.A.,	  2013.	  Enriched	  Encoding:	  Reward	  Motivation	  Organizes	  
Cortical	  Networks	  for	  Hippocampal	  Detection	  of	  Unexpected	  Events.	  Cerebral	  
cortex.	  
Nurnberger,	  J.I.,	  Jr.,	  Blehar,	  M.C.,	  Kaufmann,	  C.A.,	  York-­‐Cooler,	  C.,	  Simpson,	  S.G.,	  
Harkavy-­‐Friedman,	  J.,	  Severe,	  J.B.,	  Malaspina,	  D.,	  Reich,	  T.,	  1994.	  Diagnostic	  
interview	  for	  genetic	  studies.	  Rationale,	  unique	  features,	  and	  training.	  NIMH	  
Genetics	  Initiative.	  Archives	  of	  general	  psychiatry	  51(11),	  849-­‐859;	  discussion	  863-­‐
844.	  
O'Doherty,	  J.,	  Dayan,	  P.,	  Schultz,	  J.,	  Deichmann,	  R.,	  Friston,	  K.,	  Dolan,	  R.J.,	  2004.	  
Dissociable	  roles	  of	  ventral	  and	  dorsal	  striatum	  in	  instrumental	  conditioning.	  
Science	  304(5669),	  452-­‐454.	  
O'Doherty,	  J.P.,	  Buchanan,	  T.W.,	  Seymour,	  B.,	  Dolan,	  R.J.,	  2006.	  Predictive	  neural	  
coding	  of	  reward	  preference	  involves	  dissociable	  responses	  in	  human	  ventral	  
midbrain	  and	  ventral	  striatum.	  Neuron	  49(1),	  157-­‐166.	  
O'Doherty,	  J.P.,	  Dayan,	  P.,	  Friston,	  K.,	  Critchley,	  H.,	  Dolan,	  R.J.,	  2003.	  Temporal	  
difference	  models	  and	  reward-­‐related	  learning	  in	  the	  human	  brain.	  Neuron	  38(2),	  
329-­‐337.	  
	  118	  
Oades,	  R.D.,	  Halliday,	  G.M.,	  1987.	  Ventral	  tegmental	  (A10)	  system:	  neurobiology.	  1.	  
Anatomy	  and	  connectivity.	  Brain	  research	  434(2),	  117-­‐165.	  
Ochsner,	  K.N.,	  2008.	  The	  social-­‐emotional	  processing	  stream:	  five	  core	  constructs	  
and	  their	  translational	  potential	  for	  schizophrenia	  and	  beyond.	  Biological	  
psychiatry	  64(1),	  48-­‐61.	  
Pecina,	  S.,	  Berridge,	  K.C.,	  2005.	  Hedonic	  hot	  spot	  in	  nucleus	  accumbens	  shell:	  where	  
do	  mu-­‐opioids	  cause	  increased	  hedonic	  impact	  of	  sweetness?	  The	  Journal	  of	  
neuroscience	  :	  the	  official	  journal	  of	  the	  Society	  for	  Neuroscience	  25(50),	  11777-­‐
11786.	  
Pelli,	  D.G.,	  1997.	  The	  VideoToolbox	  software	  for	  visual	  psychophysics:	  
Transforming	  numbers	  into	  movies.	  Spat	  Vis	  10,	  437-­‐442.	  
Perlstein,	  W.M.,	  Carter,	  C.S.,	  Barch,	  D.M.,	  Baird,	  J.W.,	  1998.	  The	  Stroop	  task	  and	  
attention	  deficits	  in	  schizophrenia:	  a	  critical	  evaluation	  of	  card	  and	  single-­‐trial	  
Stroop	  methodologies.	  Neuropsychology	  12(3),	  414-­‐425.	  
Pessiglione,	  M.,	  Seymour,	  B.,	  Flandin,	  G.,	  Dolan,	  R.J.,	  Frith,	  C.D.,	  2006.	  Dopamine-­‐
dependent	  prediction	  errors	  underpin	  reward-­‐seeking	  behaviour	  in	  humans.	  
Nature	  442(7106),	  1042-­‐1045.	  
Phelps,	  E.A.,	  LeDoux,	  J.E.,	  2005.	  Contributions	  of	  the	  amygdala	  to	  emotion	  
processing:	  from	  animal	  models	  to	  human	  behavior.	  Neuron	  48(2),	  175-­‐187.	  
Poldrack,	  R.A.,	  Clark,	  J.,	  Pare-­‐Blagoev,	  E.J.,	  Shohamy,	  D.,	  Creso	  Moyano,	  J.,	  Myers,	  C.,	  
Gluck,	  M.A.,	  2001.	  Interactive	  memory	  systems	  in	  the	  human	  brain.	  Nature	  
414(6863),	  546-­‐550.	  
Polgar,	  P.,	  Farkas,	  M.,	  Nagy,	  O.,	  Kelemen,	  O.,	  Rethelyi,	  J.,	  Bitter,	  I.,	  Myers,	  C.E.,	  Gluck,	  
M.A.,	  Keri,	  S.,	  2008.	  How	  to	  find	  the	  way	  out	  from	  four	  rooms?	  The	  learning	  of	  
"chaining"	  associations	  may	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  neuropsychology	  of	  the	  deficit	  
syndrome	  of	  schizophrenia.	  Schizophrenia	  research	  99(1-­‐3),	  200-­‐207.	  
Prevost,	  C.,	  Liljeholm,	  M.,	  Tyszka,	  J.M.,	  O'Doherty,	  J.P.,	  2012.	  Neural	  correlates	  of	  
specific	  and	  general	  Pavlovian-­‐to-­‐Instrumental	  Transfer	  within	  human	  amygdalar	  
subregions:	  a	  high-­‐resolution	  fMRI	  study.	  The	  Journal	  of	  neuroscience	  :	  the	  official	  
journal	  of	  the	  Society	  for	  Neuroscience	  32(24),	  8383-­‐8390.	  
Prevost,	  C.,	  McCabe,	  J.A.,	  Jessup,	  R.K.,	  Bossaerts,	  P.,	  O'Doherty,	  J.P.,	  2011.	  
Differentiable	  contributions	  of	  human	  amygdalar	  subregions	  in	  the	  computations	  
underlying	  reward	  and	  avoidance	  learning.	  The	  European	  journal	  of	  neuroscience	  
34(1),	  134-­‐145.	  
	  119	  
Rainville,	  P.,	  Doucet,	  J.C.,	  Fortin,	  M.C.,	  Duncan,	  G.H.,	  2004.	  Rapid	  deterioration	  of	  
pain	  sensory-­‐discriminative	  information	  in	  short-­‐term	  memory.	  Pain	  110(3),	  605-­‐
615.	  
Read,	  D.,	  Lowenstein,	  G.,	  1999.	  Enduring	  Pain	  for	  Money:	  Decisions	  Based	  on	  the	  
Perception	  and	  Memory	  of	  Pain.	  J	  Behav	  Dec	  Making	  12,	  1-­‐17.	  
Redelmeier,	  D.A.,	  Kahneman,	  D.,	  1996.	  Patients'	  memories	  of	  painful	  medical	  
treatments:	  real-­‐time	  and	  retrospective	  evaluations	  of	  two	  minimally	  invasive	  
procedures.	  Pain	  66(1),	  3-­‐8.	  
Redelmeier,	  D.A.,	  Katz,	  J.,	  Kahneman,	  D.,	  2003.	  Memories	  of	  colonoscopy:	  a	  
randomized	  trial.	  Pain	  104(1-­‐2),	  187-­‐194.	  
Reinen,	  J.,	  Smith,	  E.E.,	  Insel,	  C.,	  Kribs,	  R.,	  Shohamy,	  D.,	  Wager,	  T.D.,	  Jarskog,	  L.F.,	  
2014.	  Patients	  with	  schizophrenia	  are	  impaired	  when	  learning	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
pursuing	  rewards.	  Schizophrenia	  research	  152(1),	  309-­‐310.	  
Rescorla,	  R.A.,	  Wagner,	  A.R.,	  1972.	  A	  theory	  of	  Pavlovian	  conditioning:	  Variations	  in	  
the	  effectiveness	  of	  reinforcement	  and	  nonreinforcement.	  Appleton-­‐Century-­‐Crofts.	  
Roberts,	  W.T.,	  Timmis,	  A.D.,	  2007.	  Patients	  with	  cardiac	  chest	  pain	  should	  call	  
emergency	  services.	  BMJ	  335(7621),	  669.	  
Roy,	  M.,	  Shohamy,	  D.,	  Wager,	  T.D.,	  2012.	  Ventromedial	  prefrontal-­‐subcortical	  
systems	  and	  the	  generation	  of	  affective	  meaning.	  Trends	  in	  cognitive	  sciences	  
16(3),	  147-­‐156.	  
Rutledge,	  R.B.,	  Lazzaro,	  S.C.,	  Lau,	  B.,	  Myers,	  C.E.,	  Gluck,	  M.A.,	  Glimcher,	  P.W.,	  2009.	  
Dopaminergic	  drugs	  modulate	  learning	  rates	  and	  perseveration	  in	  Parkinson's	  
patients	  in	  a	  dynamic	  foraging	  task.	  The	  Journal	  of	  neuroscience	  :	  the	  official	  
journal	  of	  the	  Society	  for	  Neuroscience	  29(48),	  15104-­‐15114.	  
Schlagenhauf,	  F.,	  Sterzer,	  P.,	  Schmack,	  K.,	  Ballmaier,	  M.,	  Rapp,	  M.,	  Wrase,	  J.,	  Juckel,	  
G.,	  Gallinat,	  J.,	  Heinz,	  A.,	  2009.	  Reward	  feedback	  alterations	  in	  unmedicated	  
schizophrenia	  patients:	  relevance	  for	  delusions.	  Biological	  psychiatry	  65(12),	  
1032-­‐1039.	  
Schoenbaum,	  G.,	  Roesch,	  M.R.,	  Stalnaker,	  T.A.,	  2006.	  Orbitofrontal	  cortex,	  decision-­‐
making	  and	  drug	  addiction.	  Trends	  in	  neurosciences	  29(2),	  116-­‐124.	  
Schoenbaum,	  G.,	  Takahashi,	  Y.,	  Liu,	  T.L.,	  McDannald,	  M.A.,	  2011.	  Does	  the	  
orbitofrontal	  cortex	  signal	  value?	  Annals	  of	  the	  New	  York	  Academy	  of	  Sciences	  
1239,	  87-­‐99.	  
Schonberg,	  T.,	  Daw,	  N.D.,	  Joel,	  D.,	  O'Doherty,	  J.P.,	  2007.	  Reinforcement	  learning	  
signals	  in	  the	  human	  striatum	  distinguish	  learners	  from	  nonlearners	  during	  
	  120	  
reward-­‐based	  decision	  making.	  The	  Journal	  of	  neuroscience	  :	  the	  official	  journal	  of	  
the	  Society	  for	  Neuroscience	  27(47),	  12860-­‐12867.	  
Schultz,	  W.,	  Dayan,	  P.,	  Montague,	  P.R.,	  1997.	  A	  neural	  substrate	  of	  prediction	  and	  
reward.	  Science	  275(5306),	  1593-­‐1599.	  
Selten,	  J.P.,	  Gernaat,	  H.B.,	  Nolen,	  W.A.,	  Wiersma,	  D.,	  van	  den	  Bosch,	  R.J.,	  1998.	  
Experience	  of	  negative	  symptoms:	  comparison	  of	  schizophrenic	  patients	  to	  patients	  
with	  a	  depressive	  disorder	  and	  to	  normal	  subjects.	  The	  American	  journal	  of	  
psychiatry	  155(3),	  350-­‐354.	  
Seymour,	  B.,	  Daw,	  N.,	  Dayan,	  P.,	  Singer,	  T.,	  Dolan,	  R.,	  2007.	  Differential	  encoding	  of	  
losses	  and	  gains	  in	  the	  human	  striatum.	  The	  Journal	  of	  neuroscience	  :	  the	  official	  
journal	  of	  the	  Society	  for	  Neuroscience	  27(18),	  4826-­‐4831.	  
Seymour,	  B.,	  O'Doherty,	  J.P.,	  Koltzenburg,	  M.,	  Wiech,	  K.,	  Frackowiak,	  R.,	  Friston,	  K.,	  
Dolan,	  R.,	  2005.	  Opponent	  appetitive-­‐aversive	  neural	  processes	  underlie	  predictive	  
learning	  of	  pain	  relief.	  Nature	  neuroscience	  8(9),	  1234-­‐1240.	  
Shohamy,	  D.,	  Adcock,	  R.A.,	  2010.	  Dopamine	  and	  adaptive	  memory.	  Trends	  in	  
cognitive	  sciences	  14(10),	  464-­‐472.	  
Shohamy,	  D.,	  Wagner,	  A.D.,	  2008.	  Integrating	  memories	  in	  the	  human	  brain:	  
hippocampal-­‐midbrain	  encoding	  of	  overlapping	  events.	  Neuron	  60(2),	  378-­‐389.	  
Simpson,	  E.H.,	  Kellendonk,	  C.,	  Kandel,	  E.,	  2010.	  A	  possible	  role	  for	  the	  striatum	  in	  
the	  pathogenesis	  of	  the	  cognitive	  symptoms	  of	  schizophrenia.	  Neuron	  65(5),	  585-­‐
596.	  
Sloan,	  D.M.,	  Bradley,	  M.M.,	  Dimoulas,	  E.,	  Lang,	  P.J.,	  2002.	  Looking	  at	  facial	  
expressions:	  Dysphoria	  and	  facial	  EMG.	  Biological	  Psychology	  60,	  79-­‐90.	  
Smith,	  K.S.,	  Berridge,	  K.C.,	  Aldridge,	  J.W.,	  2011.	  Disentangling	  pleasure	  from	  
incentive	  salience	  and	  learning	  signals	  in	  brain	  reward	  circuitry.	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  
National	  Academy	  of	  Sciences	  of	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  108(27),	  E255-­‐264.	  
Smolderen,	  K.G.,	  Spertus,	  J.A.,	  Nallamothu,	  B.K.,	  Krumholz,	  H.M.,	  Tang,	  F.,	  Ross,	  J.S.,	  
Ting,	  H.H.,	  Alexander,	  K.P.,	  Rathore,	  S.S.,	  Chan,	  P.S.,	  2010.	  Health	  care	  insurance,	  
financial	  concerns	  in	  accessing	  care,	  and	  delays	  to	  hospital	  presentation	  in	  acute	  
myocardial	  infarction.	  JAMA	  303(14),	  1392-­‐1400.	  
Somlai,	  Z.,	  Moustafa,	  A.A.,	  Keri,	  S.,	  Myers,	  C.E.,	  Gluck,	  M.A.,	  2011.	  General	  functioning	  
predicts	  reward	  and	  punishment	  learning	  in	  schizophrenia.	  Schizophrenia	  research	  
127(1-­‐3),	  131-­‐136.	  
Squire,	  L.R.,	  1992.	  Declarative	  and	  nondeclarative	  memory:	  multiple	  brain	  systems	  
supporting	  learning	  and	  memory.	  Journal	  of	  cognitive	  neuroscience	  4(3),	  232-­‐243.	  
	  121	  
Stone,	  A.A.,	  Broderick,	  J.E.,	  Kaell,	  A.T.,	  DelesPaul,	  P.A.,	  Porter,	  L.E.,	  2000.	  Does	  the	  
peak-­‐end	  phenomenon	  observed	  in	  laboratory	  pain	  studies	  apply	  to	  real-­‐world	  
pain	  in	  rheumatoid	  arthritics?	  J	  Pain	  1(3),	  212-­‐217.	  
Stone,	  A.A.,	  Schwartz,	  J.E.,	  Broderick,	  J.E.,	  Shiffman,	  S.S.,	  2005.	  Variability	  of	  
momentary	  pain	  predicts	  recall	  of	  weekly	  pain:	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  peak	  (or	  
salience)	  memory	  heuristic.	  Pers	  Soc	  Psychol	  Bull	  31(10),	  1340-­‐1346.	  
Strauss,	  G.P.,	  Frank,	  M.J.,	  Waltz,	  J.A.,	  Kasanova,	  Z.,	  Herbener,	  E.S.,	  Gold,	  J.M.,	  2011.	  
Deficits	  in	  positive	  reinforcement	  learning	  and	  uncertainty-­‐driven	  exploration	  are	  
associated	  with	  distinct	  aspects	  of	  negative	  symptoms	  in	  schizophrenia.	  Biological	  
psychiatry	  69(5),	  424-­‐431.	  
Sutton,	  R.S.,	  Barto,	  A.G.,	  1998.	  Reinforcement	  learning:	  an	  introduction.	  MIT,	  
Cambridge,	  MA.	  
Taylor,	  S.F.,	  Kang,	  J.,	  Brege,	  I.S.,	  Tso,	  I.F.,	  Hosanagar,	  A.,	  Johnson,	  T.D.,	  2012.	  Meta-­‐
analysis	  of	  functional	  neuroimaging	  studies	  of	  emotion	  perception	  and	  experience	  
in	  schizophrenia.	  Biological	  psychiatry	  71(2),	  136-­‐145.	  
Tremeau,	  F.,	  Brady,	  M.,	  Saccente,	  E.,	  Moreno,	  A.,	  Epstein,	  H.,	  Citrome,	  L.,	  Malaspina,	  
D.,	  Javitt,	  D.,	  2008.	  Loss	  aversion	  in	  schizophrenia.	  Schizophrenia	  research	  103(1-­‐
3),	  121-­‐128.	  
Tversky,	  A.,	  Kahneman,	  D.,	  1981.	  The	  framing	  of	  decisions	  and	  the	  psychology	  of	  
choice.	  Science	  211(4481),	  453-­‐458.	  
Vlaev,	  I.,	  Seymour,	  B.,	  Dolan,	  R.J.,	  Chater,	  N.,	  2009.	  The	  price	  of	  pain	  and	  the	  value	  of	  
suffering.	  Psychol	  Sci	  20(3),	  309-­‐317.	  
Wager,	  T.D.,	  Smith,	  E.E.,	  2003.	  Neuroimaging	  studies	  of	  working	  memory:	  a	  meta-­‐
analysis.	  Cognitive,	  affective	  &	  behavioral	  neuroscience	  3(4),	  255-­‐274.	  
Walter,	  H.,	  Heckers,	  S.,	  Kassubek,	  J.,	  Erk,	  S.,	  Frasch,	  K.,	  Abler,	  B.,	  2010.	  Further	  
evidence	  for	  aberrant	  prefrontal	  salience	  coding	  in	  schizophrenia.	  Front	  Behav	  
Neurosci	  3,	  62.	  
Walter,	  H.,	  Kammerer,	  H.,	  Frasch,	  K.,	  Spitzer,	  M.,	  Abler,	  B.,	  2009.	  Altered	  reward	  
functions	  in	  patients	  on	  atypical	  antipsychotic	  medication	  in	  line	  with	  the	  revised	  
dopamine	  hypothesis	  of	  schizophrenia.	  Psychopharmacology	  (Berl)	  206(1),	  121-­‐
132.	  
Waltz,	  J.A.,	  Frank,	  M.J.,	  Robinson,	  B.M.,	  Gold,	  J.M.,	  2007.	  Selective	  reinforcement	  
learning	  deficits	  in	  schizophrenia	  support	  predictions	  from	  computational	  models	  
of	  striatal-­‐cortical	  dysfunction.	  Biological	  psychiatry	  62(7),	  756-­‐764.	  
	  122	  
Waltz,	  J.A.,	  Frank,	  M.J.,	  Wiecki,	  T.V.,	  Gold,	  J.M.,	  2010a.	  Altered	  probabilistic	  learning	  
and	  response	  biases	  in	  schizophrenia:	  behavioral	  evidence	  and	  
neurocomputational	  modeling.	  Neuropsychology	  25(1),	  86-­‐97.	  
Waltz,	  J.A.,	  Gold,	  J.M.,	  2007.	  Probabilistic	  reversal	  learning	  impairments	  in	  
schizophrenia:	  further	  evidence	  of	  orbitofrontal	  dysfunction.	  Schizophrenia	  
research	  93(1-­‐3),	  296-­‐303.	  
Waltz,	  J.A.,	  Schweitzer,	  J.B.,	  Gold,	  J.M.,	  Kurup,	  P.K.,	  Ross,	  T.J.,	  Salmeron,	  B.J.,	  Rose,	  E.J.,	  
McClure,	  S.M.,	  Stein,	  E.A.,	  2009.	  Patients	  with	  schizophrenia	  have	  a	  reduced	  neural	  
response	  to	  both	  unpredictable	  and	  predictable	  primary	  reinforcers.	  
Neuropsychopharmacology	  34(6),	  1567-­‐1577.	  
Waltz,	  J.A.,	  Schweitzer,	  J.B.,	  Ross,	  T.J.,	  Kurup,	  P.K.,	  Salmeron,	  B.J.,	  Rose,	  E.J.,	  Gold,	  J.M.,	  
Stein,	  E.A.,	  2010b.	  Abnormal	  responses	  to	  monetary	  outcomes	  in	  cortex,	  but	  not	  in	  
the	  basal	  ganglia,	  in	  schizophrenia.	  Neuropsychopharmacology	  35(12),	  2427-­‐2439.	  
Watanabe,	  N.,	  Sakagami,	  M.,	  Haruno,	  M.,	  2013.	  Reward	  prediction	  error	  signal	  
enhanced	  by	  striatum-­‐amygdala	  interaction	  explains	  the	  acceleration	  of	  
probabilistic	  reward	  learning	  by	  emotion.	  The	  Journal	  of	  neuroscience	  :	  the	  official	  
journal	  of	  the	  Society	  for	  Neuroscience	  33(10),	  4487-­‐4493.	  
Weiler,	  J.A.,	  Bellebaum,	  C.,	  Brune,	  M.,	  Juckel,	  G.,	  Daum,	  I.,	  2009.	  Impairment	  of	  
probabilistic	  reward-­‐based	  learning	  in	  schizophrenia.	  Neuropsychology	  23(5),	  571-­‐
580.	  
Williams,	  S.M.,	  Goldman-­‐Rakic,	  P.S.,	  1993.	  Characterization	  of	  the	  dopaminergic	  
innervation	  of	  the	  primate	  frontal	  cortex	  using	  a	  dopamine-­‐specific	  antibody.	  
Cerebral	  cortex	  3(3),	  199-­‐222.	  
Wimmer,	  G.E.,	  Daw,	  N.D.,	  Shohamy,	  D.,	  2012.	  Generalization	  of	  value	  in	  
reinforcement	  learning	  by	  humans.	  The	  European	  journal	  of	  neuroscience	  35(7),	  
1092-­‐1104.	  
Wimmer,	  G.E.,	  Shohamy,	  D.,	  2012.	  Preference	  by	  association:	  how	  memory	  
mechanisms	  in	  the	  hippocampus	  bias	  decisions.	  Science	  338(6104),	  270-­‐273.	  
Wise,	  R.A.,	  Spindler,	  J.,	  deWit,	  H.,	  Gerberg,	  G.J.,	  1978.	  Neuroleptic-­‐induced	  
"anhedonia"	  in	  rats:	  pimozide	  blocks	  reward	  quality	  of	  food.	  Science	  201(4352),	  
262-­‐264.	  
Woods,	  S.W.,	  2003.	  Chlorpromazine	  equivalent	  doses	  for	  the	  newer	  atypical	  
antipsychotics.	  J	  Clin	  Psychiatry	  64(6),	  663-­‐667.	  
Wynn,	  J.K.,	  Horan,	  W.P.,	  Kring,	  A.M.,	  Simons,	  R.F.,	  Green,	  M.F.,	  2010.	  Impaired	  
anticipatory	  event-­‐related	  potentials	  in	  schizophrenia.	  International	  journal	  of	  
	  123	  
psychophysiology	  :	  official	  journal	  of	  the	  International	  Organization	  of	  
Psychophysiology	  77(2),	  141-­‐149.	  
Yelle,	  M.D.,	  Oshiro,	  Y.,	  Kraft,	  R.A.,	  Coghill,	  R.C.,	  2009.	  Temporal	  filtering	  of	  
nociceptive	  information	  by	  dynamic	  activation	  of	  endogenous	  pain	  modulatory	  
systems.	  J	  Neurosci	  29(33),	  10264-­‐10271.	  
Yelle,	  M.D.,	  Rogers,	  J.M.,	  Coghill,	  R.C.,	  2008.	  Offset	  analgesia:	  a	  temporal	  contrast	  
mechanism	  for	  nociceptive	  information.	  Pain	  134(1-­‐2),	  174-­‐186.	  
Zaki,	  J.,	  Schirmer,	  J.,	  Mitchell,	  J.P.,	  2011.	  Social	  influence	  modulates	  the	  neural	  
computation	  of	  value.	  Psychological	  science	  22(7),	  894-­‐900.	  
Zauberman,	  G.,	  Diehl,	  K.,	  Ariely,	  D.,	  2006.	  Hedonic	  versus	  informational	  evaluations:	  
task	  dependent	  preferences	  for	  sequences	  of	  outcomes.	  Journal	  of	  Behavioral	  
Decision	  Making	  19,	  191-­‐211.	  
	  
 
